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European Citizens.” 
 
  
Abstract: This deliverable focuses on substantive and procedural criminal law 
measures to tackle identity theft and its consequences. Because identity-related crime 
is such a complex and broad phenomenon, we first outline the context in order to detect 
the key challenges. Next, we look at the criminalisation of identity theft. Criminalisation 
is the shaping of particular wrongful behaviour into an offence. Hence the relevant 
features of the phenomenon are highlighted, different concepts clarified and the legal 
interests at stake in the context of identity theft identified. The paper further examines 
and evaluates different strategies to criminalise identity theft. It finds that existing 
criminal provisions do not adequately protect the role of identification information as a 
‘IT-personalised key’, nor the interests of the primary victim of identity theft. New 
technologies make it more difficult for the primary victims to clean up the mess caused 
by the abuse of their data and to restore their compromised identity.  
On basis of the ECtHR law we conclude that EU member states have a positive obligation 
not only to criminalise identity theft but also to bring the identity thief to Court and to 
restore a compromised identity. States cannot do this alone. Governments have to 
elaborate a legal framework that obliges third parties, in particular service providers, 
to cooperate with law enforcement. When dealing with identity theft, the following 
measures should be considered: reporting mechanisms and notification duties for the 
data controller; the identification of the perpetrator and the retention and preservation 
of data to assist law enforcement; and the blocking of access to and the rendering 
inaccessible of the illegal content, and/or the deletion of illegal content. For now it 
remains unclear if service providers have to take data offline upon the simple request 
of a data subject. We suggest that prior to taking data related to ID fraud offline, an 
assessment of the notified identity fraud should be made by an assessment centre with 
a high expertise in identification and ID fraud. Here the EKSISTENZ project’s tools can 
be used to verify the identity of the person claiming to be an identity fraud victim. These 
centres should be complemented by hotlines for individuals to report ID theft. Once ID 
theft is established, these centres can then ask service providers (voluntarily) to take 
down or block certain data.  
As identity theft mostly happens online, it is often a cross-border crime. International 
cooperation is thus critical to tackle ID theft. The final part of the deliverable focuses on 
This project is funded as a FP7- SEC-2013.1.1-2: “Stronger Identity for EU citizens” – 
Capability Project. The project has received funding from the European 
Community’s Framework Programme (FP7/2007- 2013) under the Grant Agreement 
n° 607049. 
procedural jurisdiction and the enforceability of forced ISP cooperation in a cross-
border context. The current framework is found unsatisfactory: measures in the fight 
against ID theft are excessively hindered by a lack of (enforcement) jurisdiction or by 
slow or inexistent mutual legal assistance.  
Belgian legislation and case law feature prominently in the research, not just because of 
the access of the researchers to the sources, but mainly because Belgian courts and the 
Belgian legislators have been ambitious in their explicit, internationally resounding, 
effort to alter the existing legal status quo when it comes to cooperation duties for 
service providers in criminal law procedures. Furthermore, national legislation and case 
law from other EU countries and the U.S. was included to the extent that it provided us 
with new insights.  
This deliverable is drafted based on literature research undertaken by KU Leuven 
Institute of Criminal Law and CiTiP, as well as input provided by the contributing 
partners: AgID, UC3M, IDP, SPRL as foreseen in the DoW. The research is kept up to date 
until 25 May 2017. 
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Introduction 
 
OBJECTIVE. – The overarching objective of the EKSISTENZ Project (hereafter ‘the Project’) is 
to protect EU citizens from major threats to their identity. The Project will therefore 
propose innovative solutions to create a real and strong link between the citizen and his or 
her primary identity document. It will focus on the citizen, to propose solutions to prevent, 
detect, respond and recover from an identity theft incident. To this end, the Project will: 
Strengthen existing electronic-based primary identity documents, and associated bearer 
authentication methods, using biometric features and/or prior knowledge about the 
legitimate holder.  
1. Derive from the primary identity document some secondary identities, in 
controlled environments.  
2. Uniquely and easily verify primary and secondary identities and the bearers of 
such identities.  
3. Use the European Union funded STORK2.0 project in order to provide bilateral 
recognition solutions of primary identity between EU Member States.  
 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the relevant criminal law framework needed to 
ensure secure citizen IDs and to provide suggestions to curtail the existing legal 
uncertainty with regard to identity fraud and identity theft. We will study criminal law 
measures to tackle the abuse of primary identities and secondary identities derived from 
this primary identity and the shortcomings of such measures. According to the EKSISTENZ 
terminology proposal ‘primary identity’ refers to a token: 
- issued by a Member State; 
- that is subject to an electronic identification scheme as defined in EU Regulation 
910/2014 and appears in the list of such schemes that the European Commission 
maintains (and publishes) according to article 9 of that regulation; 
Most often, it refers to an e-ID card. Such card can be regarded as a token or means to 
identify. 
 
‘Secondary identity’ can be regarded as a token: 
- the credentials of which have been (partly or wholly) validated based on a primary 
token of the entity to which these credentials pertain; 
- the credentials of which have been issued by the token issuer; 
- that is subject to an electronic identification scheme as defined in EU Regulation 
910/2014 
o that is published by the token issuer; 
o that pertains to tokens issued by that token issuer; 
o and that satisfies the requirements of article 7 of the Regulation (replacing 
‘(notifying) Member State’ with ‘token issuer’). 
 
The main objective of the Project is to guarantee that the means of identification truthfully 
identify the person who uses it (the ‘identity match’). The focus of this paper therefore lies 
on the abuse of (primary and secondary) identification means in the context of an 
identification process and on the role played by criminal law. The abuse of identities is not 
a new phenomenon. Long before the existence of the Internet, identity documents were 
stolen, forged and false names were used to hide one’s own identity and to commit crimes.2 
The Internet and the digital technology have however created new opportunities and have 
rendered the problem more complex.3 We will therefore pay specific attention to this new 
context. The research tries to detect shortcomings in the legislation available to tackle this 
phenomenon and to make suggestions for a clear, adequate criminal law framework to 
ensure secure citizen IDs.  
 
VICTIM PERSPECTIVE: RESTORATION4 – From the victim’s perspective, the impact of identity 
abuse can be significant (cf. infra). One approach to the phenomenon is to look at possible 
criminal law mechanisms to repair the harm caused by the crime and to limit further 
damage in order to prevent repeat victimisation. It is important to distinguish clearly 
                                                          
2 Note that these acts are not always committed for criminal purposes but also for good reasons, 
e.g. the legitimate use of false identities by undercover agents or political refugees. ‘False’ does not 
necessarily have to be ‘wrong’, e.g. the use of pseudonyms to criticize the government to hide from 
authoritarian governments like Germany’s before and during World War II (cf. infra).  
3 W. BRUGGEMAN, R. VAN EERT, A. VAN VELDHOVEN (eds.), What’s in a name? Identiteitsfraude en –
diefstal, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2012, 82. 
4 Consideration 9 of the EU Victim’s Directive stresses the importance of crime as a societal wrong 
as well as a violation of the individual rights of victims. As such, victims of crime should be 
recognised and treated in a respectful, sensitive and professional manner. Victims of crime should 
be protected from secondary and repeat victimisation, from intimidation and from retaliation, 
should receive appropriate support to facilitate their recovery and should be provided with 
sufficient access to justice. This is the essence of restorative justice. Cf. Directive 2012/29/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the 
rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and of replacing Council Framework Decision 
2001/220/JHA, OJ 2012 L 315, 57. 
between the different types of victims, because the legal remedies will be different. First 
we have the ‘primary victim’, this is the natural person whose identity is abused without 
his or her consent and whose identity risks being compromised (the ‘original identity 
bearer’).5 In the overall context of the Project it is however important to note that the 
impersonated person can also consent to this: there can be collusion with the identity 
fraudster. In that case he or she may even become an accomplice to the identity abuse. The 
Project also covers these types of abuse as the focus lies on any type of manipulation of 
identification means in the identification process; in other words, any fraud where a 
person pretends to be someone else, either with or without the consent of the original 
identity bearer. This can also be committed with a fictitious identity or even with the 
identity of a deceased person. Our research will however focus on the hypothesis that the 
original identity bearer does not consent, because criminal law faces some specific 
problems in dealing with it (cf. infra).  
Secondly, there is the ‘secondary victim’, the third party who is defrauded or otherwise 
harmed by the perpetrator who is impersonating someone else.6 The secondary victim can 
either be a private company that relies on the identification means in order to provide 
services, e.g. an airline company that sells airline tickets, or a governmental authority that 
relies on it to give citizens access to key governmental activities. 
A third specific category of potential victims are the parties who store the identification 
information (the data controllers7). They will have a responsibility towards this 
                                                          
5 Note that this may also be a legal person. Most research on identity theft focus on the identity of 
natural persons. ‘Stealing’ a company’s identity is however an equally significant phenomenon 
which relates more to intellectual property rights (trademarks etc.). Due to the scope of this paper, 
we will not study this type of identity ‘theft’ but indicate that this is also an interesting issue. 
6 Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, Study for an Impact Assessment on a Proposal for a New 
Legal Framework on Identity Theft, 2012, 171, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-
library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-
trafficking/cybercrime/docs/final_report_identity_theft_11_december_2012_en.pdf.  (hereafter 
referred to as ‘CSES Impact Assessment’). 
7 The data controller is the (natural or legal) person who (alone or jointly) decides to process 
personal data of others. The controller determines the purposes and means of the processing, f.i. a 
credit institution who decides to create a database for its defaulting customers. A data processor is 
the (natural or legal) person who processes data on behalf of the data controller, f.i. a marketing 
company who conducts a market analysis of the customer data on request of the credit institution. 
Both have responsibilities towards the data, but the overall responsibility lies with the data 
controller, who must ensure compliance with data protection law. A processor can also be a data 
controller in its own right, in relation to the personal data it processes for its own purposes. A 
processor furthermore also becomes a controller when he/she exceeds the limitations of the use as 
prescribed by the data controller, at least to the extent of the breach. EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR 
information (cf. infra). If their systems are targeted, they not only face direct damage but 
they will also risk liability claims and reputation loss. 
 
RISK ACCEPTANCE - For our research, we assume that abuse can never be fully prevented. 
Studies have detected vulnerabilities in every step of the identification process. They have 
shown that risks can be reduced but never fully excluded.8 Hence, the first step is to 
recognize this fact and to accept it (risk acceptance). Only then we can reflect on further 
alternatives to tackle the phenomenon, which for victims should entail measures to put an 
end to the harmful consequences of identity theft. We will therefore analyse which criminal 
law instruments are available for victims to ensure the restoration of their identity and 
whether they properly address their needs.  
 
VICTIM RIGHTS - The EU Victims’ Directive defines the victim as ‘a natural person who has 
suffered harm, including physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss which was 
directly caused by a criminal offence’.9 In case of identity abuse, first and foremost this 
refers to the primary victim. According to consideration 52 and article 18, measures should 
be available to protect the safety and dignity of victims (and their family members) from 
secondary and repeat victimisation, f.i. interim injunctions. There should be measures 
which protect against the risk of emotional and psychological harm. Consideration 62 
states that for victims of crime to receive the proper degree of assistance, support and 
protection, public services should work in a coordinated manner and should be involved 
at all administrative levels (EU, as well as national, regional and local). In order to avoid 
repeat referrals, victims should further be assisted when finding and addressing the 
competent authorities. This includes the development of ‘sole points of access’ that address 
victims' multiple needs when involved in criminal proceedings. They include the need to 
receive information, assistance, support, protection and compensation. All these points 
should be borne in mind when one studies the criminal law remedies available to the 
                                                          
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS and COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Handbook on European data protection law, 
Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2014, 49-54. 
8 FIDIS D12.7, ‘Identity-related crime in Europe - Big problem or big hype?’, www.fidis.net 
(hereafter referred to as ‘FIDIS D12.7’); Cf. N. VAN DER MEULEN en B.-J. KOOPS, ‘Van preventie naar 
risicoacceptatie en herstel voor slachtoffers in Nederlands beleid tegen identiteitsfraude’, NJB 2012, 
1414. 
9 Art. 1.a.i. Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 
establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and 
replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA. 
victims as a proper response to identity fraud, including the recovery of a compromised 
identity. 
Articles 21 and 22 oblige Member States to protect the privacy of victims and to assess the 
specific individual needs of the victim, depending on (among others) the type or nature of 
the crime. We will therefore investigate to what extent recovery of the ‘compromised’ 
identity can be seen as entailing a positive state obligation. Under the doctrine of positive 
human rights obligations, developed by the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’), 
states can be compelled to implement an adequate criminal law framework in order to 
punish human rights violations and to apply it in practice through effective investigation 
and prosecution.10 This contains three aspects11: 
- An obligation to criminalise: to enact appropriate and adequate criminal law 
provisions. The question in this context is not whether States should criminalise 
forms of identity abuse. As we will see further, a variety of criminal law provisions 
can be applied in cases of such abuse. The relevant question is how this behaviour 
should be criminalised; 
- An obligation to investigate: to guarantee effective criminal law protection against 
human rights violations through effective investigation and prosecution. This 
implies making the crime less profitable and appealing by increasing the risk of 
being caught and reducing the damages. This entails among other reporting 
mechanisms and identification of the perpetrator; 
- An obligation to remediate: to guarantee effective remedies against human rights 
violations. As we will see below, a mere financial compensation does not suffice in 
this context. The most important concern of primary victims is that the 
compromised identity is ‘restored’. 
 
In this analysis, we will also look at corporate responsibilities, in particular those of 
internet service providers. They play a vital role in our digital information society. To what 
                                                          
10 ECtHR 20 March 2012, C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania; ECtHR 27 September 2011, M. and C. v. Romania, 
ECtHR 2 December 2008, K.U. v. Finland; ECtHR 4 December 2003, M.C. v. Bulgaria; ECtHR 28 
October 1994, Murray v. United Kingdom; ECtHR 26 March 1985, X&Y v. the Netherlands; J.-F. 
AKANDJI-KOMBE, ‘Positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights A guide to 
the implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights’, Human rights handbooks, No. 
7, Council of Europe 2007. ; C. CONINGS, J. HUYSMANS, F. VERBRUGGEN, ‘Dagelijkse kost: Europese 
ingrediënten die het Belgische strafrecht kruiden’ in R. VERSTRAETEN en F. VERBRUGGEN, Straf- en 
strafprocesrecht, Brugge, Die Keure, 2012-13, 21-22. 
11 P. DE HERT, ‘Systeemverantwoordelijkheid voor de informatiemaatschappij’ in De Staat van 
Informatie, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2011, 39-42. 
extent does this impose specific obligations on them?12 Under the current legal framework 
internet service providers profit from a rather flexible liability regime which diverges from 
the normal regime for criminal liability (cf. infra).13 Is this is still tenable in today’s society 
or should their responsibilities be increased?14 DE HERT describes two models: 1) a 
‘compliance model’, where corporations merely have to ensure compliance with human 
rights but are not actively engaged in their protection and 2) an ‘accountability’ model, 
where the responsibilities of corporations are ‘upgraded’ and these corporations are 
forced to actively protect human rights.15 States have a choice between these two models. 
A positive State obligation in this context could however mean that European Member 
States demand a certain ‘co-responsibility’ from service providers to ensure the protection 
of the human rights of citizens. DE HERT claims that, from a human rights perspective, an 
accountability model would be the most obvious choice.16 Others tend to differ, fearful as 
they are of private, corporate intrusion on internet activities of users, of private 
intervention, censorship and exclusion.17 
 
OUTLINE. – Because identity abuse is such a broad and complex problem, we will first 
identify and demarcate the scope of the research (chapter I). In chapter II we will examine 
the criminalisation. When, despite of all preventive measures taken by government, 
companies and citizens, the identity has indeed been abused, we need adequate 
substantive criminal law instruments to take the necessary action against the perpetrator. 
‘Adequate’ however does not necessarily have to mean ‘specific’ legislation. We will look 
at different ways of criminalisation and analyse whether this contributes to the victim’s 
right to restoration. 
                                                          
12 Ibid, 43. 
13 Art. 12 to 15 e-Commerce Directive 
14 S. BIJLMAKERS, The Legalization of Corporate Social Responsibility: Towards a New Doctrine of 
International Legal Status in a Global Governance Context, Thesis for the Degree of Doctor in Laws 
KU Leuven, 2017, 495 p; B. A. ANDREASSEN and V. KHANH VINH, Duties across borders, Antwerpen, 
Intersentia, 2016, 342 p.  
15 P. DE HERT, ‘Systeemverantwoordelijkheid voor de informatiemaatschappij’ in De Staat van 
Informatie, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2011, 37-38. 
16 Ibid., 62. 
17 A. KUCZERAWY, ‘Intermediary Liability & Freedom of Expression: Recent Developments in the EU 
Notice & Action Initiative’ (ICRI Working paper 21), Computer Law and Security Review 2015, 46-
56; P. VAN EECKE, ‘Online service providers and liability: a plea for a balanced approach’, Common 
Market Law Review 2011, 1455-1502; P. VAN EECKE and B. OOMS, ‘ISP liability and the E-commerce 
directive: a growing trend toward greater responsibility for ISPs’, JIL 2007, 3. 
Criminalisation, the modelling of particular wrongful behaviour into an offence, is however 
not the only response to the phenomenon. As we will see later, new technologies make it 
more difficult for the primary victim to clean up the mess and to restore the compromised 
identity. Next to adequate substantive criminal law provisions, we also and urgently need 
to focus on procedural measures to end the crime immediately in order to limit further 
damages for the primary victim and to restore the harmful consequences.18 We will study 
this in the chapter III.  
As identity theft most of the time happens online, it is often a cross-border crime. Chapter 
IV of this deliverable therefore focuses on procedural jurisdiction and the enforceability of 
forced ISP cooperation in a cross-border context. In Chapter V we will focus on which steps 
can be taken to tackle ID fraud more efficiently.  
  
                                                          
18 N. VAN DER MEULEN en B.-J. KOOPS, ‘Van preventie naar risicoacceptatie en herstel voor slachtoffers 
in Nederlands beleid tegen identiteitsfraude’, NJB 2012, 1414. 
I The (ab)use of identity in the digital information 
society  
 
1 The key to unlock many doors 
 
IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION. - In contemporary society, identity is a concept that has 
expanded and diversified. Therefore, as we will see later on, many situations may lead to 
impersonation (the taking over of another identity or pretending to be someone else). An 
identity is construed by multiple elements that represent a person. These attributes must 
be included in its definition.19 Identity is thus the set of information that can be used to 
establish who we are as unique individuals in order to distinguish us from another with 
certainty.20  
This functional definition links identity to identification, a practical pocess to verify the 
identity of individuals in order to conduct social, governmental or commercial activities.21 
Identity in this context must be understood as ‘civil’ or ‘bureaucratic’ identity.22 
Governments rely on identity to give citizens access to specific key governmental activities 
related to immigration, taxation, national and social security and criminal records. The 
private sector uses it for a range of commercial activities, such as access to financial 
services, medical health care services, telecommunication services and so forth.23 Identity 
thus allows a person to be qualified as a ‘legal subject’ to whom the government and other 
parties can attribute specific acts in a reliable way.24  
                                                          
19 T. CASSUTO, ‘Usurpation d’identité numérique, AJ Pénal 2010, 220. 
20 N. ROBINSON, H. GRAUX, D.M. PARRILLI, L. KLAUTZER and L. VALERI, Comparative Study on Legislative 
and Non Legislative Measures to Combat Identity Theft and Identity Related Crime: Final Report, 2011, 
1, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-
human-trafficking/cybercrime/docs/rand_study_tr-982-ec_en.pdf (hereafter referred to as ‘RAND 
Study’); S. REVEL, ‘Précision sur la notion d’usurpation d’identité ou l’inexistence de l’ubiquité’, AJ 
Pénal 2010, 218. 
21 RAND Study, 5. 
22 U.R.M.Th. DE VRIES, H. TIGCHELAAR, M. VAN DER LINDEN en A.M. HOL, Identiteitsfraude: een 
afbakening. Een internationale begripsvergelijking en analyse van nationale strafbepalingen, 2007, 
32. 
23 RAND Study, 1; B.-J. KOOPS, R. LEENES, M. MEINTS, N. VAN DER MEULEN en D.-O. JAQUET-CHIFFELLE, ‘A 
typology of identity-related crime. Conceptual, technical and legal issues’, Information, 
Communication & Society 2009, 2. 
24 S. REVEL, ‘Précision sur la notion d’usurpation d’identité ou l’inexistence de l’ubiquité’, AJ Pénal 
2010, 218. 
Identification is to ensure that the identity actually belongs to the person who claims to be 
that person. It is the match between the identification information and the individual.25 
Information that can be used to identify is called the ‘identifiers’. It however does not 
guarantee that the found identity is an authentic description of that person.26 
Identification is based on the assumption that the identifier is indeed a reliable proof of the 
identity match. This proof is usually given on the basis of what a person possesses (e.g. an 
identity card), knows (e.g. a password) and/or is (e.g. fingerprints).27  
Identifiers, such as the name, date of birth, fingerprints, etc., are intangible information. In 
order to serve as evidence of an identity, they are registered in authentic acts. These acts, 
which have a specific legal status, guarantee the link between the identifier and the 
individual (birth or death certificate, passport,…).28 These proofs of the identity are the 
means of identification (which contain identifiers). They can either be tangible (such as the 
identity card) or intangible (such as the biometric data digitally stored on the identity 
card). 
 
ELEMENTS OF IDENTITY AND CONNECTED RISKS. – The individual characteristics which 
constitute an identity are29: 
- physical and biometric information, e.g. height, signature, DNA, fingerprint, iris, 
bone structure, teeth, voice, keystroke dynamics, body heat, medical history,…. 
These attributes are closely linked to an individual and are more or less unique30; 
                                                          
25 B.-J. KOOPS, R. LEENES, M. MEINTS, N. VAN DER MEULEN en D.-O. JAQUET-CHIFFELLE, „A typology of 
identity-related crime. Conceptual, technical and legal issues’, Information, Communication & Society 
2009, 3. 
26 An Eksistenz terminology proposal 
27 FIDIS D5.2b, ‘ID-related Crime: Towards a Common Ground for Interdisciplinary Research’, 
2006, 79-80, www.fidis.net (hereafter referred to as ‘FIDIS D5.2.b’). 
28 T. CASSUTO, ‘Usurpation d’identité numérique, AJ Pénal 2010, 220. 
29 B.-J. KOOPS, R. LEENES, M. MEINTS, N. VAN DER MEULEN en D.-O. JAQUET-CHIFFELLE, ‘A typology of 
identity-related crime. Conceptual, technical and legal issues’, Information, Communication & Society 
2009, 3 ; U.R.M.Th. DE VRIES, H. TIGCHELAAR, M. VAN DER LINDEN en A.M. HOL, Identiteitsfraude: een 
afbakening. Een internationale begripsvergelijking en analyse van nationale strafbepalingen, 
Disciplinegroep Rechtstheorie Departement Rechtsgeleerdheid, Universiteit Utrecht 2007, 34. 
30 Excluded are the personality characteristics, such as ‘friendly’, ‘arrogant’, ‘pleasant’,…. Which are 
not relevant in the formal identification process. U.R.M.Th. DE VRIES, H. TIGCHELAAR, M. VAN DER 
LINDEN en A.M. HOL,, Identiteitsfraude: een afbakening. Een internationale begripsvergelijking en 
analyse van nationale strafbepalingen, Disciplinegroep Rechtstheorie Departement 
Rechtsgeleerdheid, Universiteit Utrecht 2007, 34. 
- functional attributed information, e.g. name, address, unique identification 
number, social security number, password31, account and account number, date 
and place of birth, badge, licence plate, credit card number, telephone number, IP 
address, …. These elements are attributed to an individual, either in a vertical 
relationship by states or in a horizontal relationship by private parties. Some of 
them may have a special legal status because of their specific function (e.g. a 
passport, a driving licence,…).32 Apart from the name, these elements are 
instinctively further removed from the individual as they usually reduce a person 
to a number or an objective fact; 
- Biographical information, e.g. civil state, criminal record, employed/unemployed, 
adult/minor, diploma, student, etc.). These elements divide people into certain 
categories. These categories tell something about the life development of an 
individual and his position in society;33  
- Chosen (or user-created) information, e.g. nickname, pseudonym, avatar, a 
(chosen) password.34 This type of information becomes increasingly relevant in 
our information society as a so-called ‘unique’ identifier although it remains an 
artificial specification in the sense that it is created by the individual himself. 
 
A chosen or user-created identity is highly volatile and unstable. This makes it the least 
reliable as a means to identify, verify and authorize. Some chosen or user-created 
information that does provide access, for instance usernames and passwords, are really at 
the core of identity-related crime35 because they are often easy to obtain. On the other 
hand, they are also easy to restore. Other user-created information, like a Facebook profile, 
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B.-J. KOOPS, R. LEENES, M. MEINTS, N. VAN DER MEULEN en D.-O. JAQUET-CHIFFELLE, „A typology of identity-
related crime. Conceptual, technical and legal issues’, Information, Communication & Society 2009, 
4. 
35 Cf. infra for an explanation of the use of the term identity-related crime. 
are wanted for social engineering.36 The question therefore arises which legal value should 
be given to this type of identifier in the identification process. The popular and common 
use of pseudonyms moreover disrupts the identification process.37  
Biographical information also fluctuates but not in the same way. These are personal, 
societal attributes build up over time and which change during a person’s life (‘life events’). 
They usually do not provide access but are nonetheless attractive because they tell 
something about who or what a person is. They are therefore mostly used for profiling 
means (profiling of customers, criminals, for statistics etc.) or social engineering, to lure 
people into false beliefs. 
As they are stable, functional identifiers were traditionally used most to identify an 
individual and to recognize him or her as a legal subject with rights and obligations 
(vertical vis-à-vis the government and horizontal vis-à-vis third parties). For people intent 
on crime, functional attributed information is therefore most appealing. As they are 
principally used for verification, authentication and authorization38, they are valuable. 
They are also relatively easy to obtain and to abuse through stealing, forgery, hacking etc. 
Especially functional information in the electronic form appears to introduce considerable 
vulnerabilities (cf. infra). 
The use of biometrics has significantly increased the ability to compare characteristics of 
human beings in order to exclude or link with high probability.39 They are therefore used 
ever more as identifier, specifically as a back-up of functional information in order to 
prevent identity abuse, and thus as a countermeasure against identity-related crime. Yet, 
research has shown that biometrics can also be misused. Especially since biometrics are 
usually not secret.40 The ‘stealing’ or forging of biometric information becomes more and 
more attractive as biometrics are deemed very stable and safe. As we will see further, 
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37 T. CASSUTO, ‘Usurpation d’identité numérique, AJ Pénal 2010, 220. 
38 Verification in order to check the correctness of the information (i.e. verifying if the entered pin 
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40 E. KINDT, Privacy and Data Protection Issues of Biometric Applications: a Comparative Legal 
Analysis, Springer, Dordrecht, 2013, 335.  
biometrics are thus a double-edged sword in tackling identity-related crime. A major 
concern for instance is that the detection of fraud involving biometrics is difficult and once 
the biometrics are compromised, they become useless as a reliable identification tool.41 
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2 Identifying the challenge: protecting the ‘IT-
personalised key’ 
 
IDENTIFICATION IN THE DIGITAL INFORMATION SOCIETY. – The digitisation has made it possible to 
introduce technical standards in order to identify, with a high degree of trust, users of 
certain IT-systems. Digital signature, authentication protocols and encryption ensure the 
regularity of transactions.42 
At the same time, this digitisation introduces new risks for the identity information and the 
identification process, which is still mostly nationally organised and based on traditional 
methods of verification. First of all, identity information is increasingly digitised and stored 
in IT systems and that makes it available for illegal access and thus more vulnerable.43 
Secondly, the technology makes it possible for perpetrators to act quasi anonymously. This 
anonymity gives them an obvious advantage. Online verification and authorization of 
identity is less obvious than offline because the Internet lacks traditional ways of identity 
control.44 Face-to-face verification is for instance replaced by machine verification or even 
no verification at all.45 By simply creating an email-account without the need of identity 
verification, one can create a false identity.46 Online authentication procedures are 
therefore considered as intrinsically less secure than offline procedures.47 They often 
merely rely on the combination of a public or semi-public identifier and a password.48 
Because it is so easy to create fictitious identities, the only reliable identifier is often the 
IP–address. The reliability of this type of identifier is however relative as it technically very 
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46 J. CLOUGH, Principles of Cybercrime, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 6. 
47 FIDIS 5.2b, 78. That does not mean that ‘offline’ procedures are flawless or secure. We just want 
to note that other security issues arise when these procedures are automatized and that the law has 
to deal with this shift.  
48 T. CASSUTO, ‘Usurpation d’identité numérique, AJ Pénal 2010, 220. 
easy to hide it (using proxies or other anonymizing tools). Thirdly, its communication is 
routed through a number of jurisdictions, leaving only digital traces which are volatile and 
can easily be removed. Some jurisdictions do not regulate identity theft or the retention of 
data and provide ‘digital safe havens’ to offenders. Fourthly, the risk of detection is very 
low. Many abuses are not reported by the victim and even if they are, law enforcement has 
very few adequate means to address it. Simply identifying the offender is problematic 
because it requires international legal assistance and relies on the cooperation of ISPs. 
Finally, the ubiquitous nature of the Internet and its global reach, the transferability of data 
and the fact that the data are often in the hands of (multiple) third parties challenge the 
way to deal with the problem after the identity-related crime has been committed and to 
redress the situation. Law enforcement faces many difficulties to take offending 
information offline (jurisdictional problems, technical issues, effectiveness…) and 
companies are driven by their own economic interests. The victim is therefore confronted 
with plenty of problems to recover his ‘compromised’ identity. 
 
DIGITISATION AND PERSONALISATION OF IDENTIFICATION. – The importance of physical, 
biometric information as an identifier has increased. At the same time, the digitisation of 
this information and its processing has resulted in an anonymization of the identification 
process. These two evolutions have an impact on the concept of identity and on the 
importance of its protection.49 
The combination of digital identification information, like an e-ID, backed up by (digitally 
stored) biometrics not only increases the risk of identity-related crime but also the damage 
of this crime. It makes it more difficult for the victim to prove the abuse of his identity50, to 
end the crime and to recover his or her compromised identity. Victims have no control over 
this information, reason why they lack possibilities to restore inaccuracies.51  
The paradox therefore is that the more the link between an individual and his or her 
identity is being strengthened, the more the identity is endangered if another person gets 
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hold of this link.52 This paradox specifically counts for biometrics: once biometric features 
are compromised, they are not easily revoked or changed. Their utility is therefore 
inherently limited. One can have a hundred passwords, but only ten fingers.53 Moreover, 
in the digital world identification processes and protection mechanisms can easily be 
circumvented (via physical means or even ‘voluntary’ disclosure of information by the 
victim). No system is 100 % safe.54 Therefore, we have to look further than the mere 
prevention and also develop an adequate criminal law framework to end the abuse and to 
limit further damage (detect – respond – recover). 
 
THE CHALLENGE: PROTECTION OF IDENTITY AS AN ‘IT-PERSONALISED’ KEY. – In sum, regarding the 
practical matter of identification, we see several evolutions:  
 A digitisation of primary identification information: a shift from physical, paper 
identity documents to ‘e-ID’; 
 This comes with a shift from identification on the basis of what a person possesses 
and knows to what a person is, or at least a combination of the three. A classic 
example is the increasing reliance on biometrics in the identification process.55 
 A merger between such digital identification information and ‘personal’ access 
keys into an ‘IT-personalised key’, a tool to verify, authenticate and authorize.  
The scope of the research is to protect identity, understood as such an ‘IT-personalised 
key’. This is necessary because of the growing importance of this function in today’s 
information society. Previously, only physical objects, such as paper documents and cards, 
were suitable to verify and authenticate one’s identity and to get access to certain well-
defined facilities, like social security, tax on web, personal medical files, etc. Nowadays, we 
see that digital identification information is increasingly being used as a key to get access 
to a whole range of facilities, i.e. the use of e-ID to get access to a chatroom, the use of 
digitised fingerprints to access a smartphone, cash transfer apps, e-commerce, etc. Where 
a key (to open a door or a safe) used to be ‘identity-neutral’, this key is now connected to 
identity information in order to improve the identification process. These shifts may 
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simplify commercial and daily life and may reduce time-consuming identity checks. They 
however also increase the risks of the abuse of one’s identity. One’s identity becomes more 
attractive to appropriate because it can be used for multiple purposes. Its value thus 
increases. 
Due to the registration of identification information in automated systems, the identity 
becomes more exposed to appropriation and abuse.56 We also see a shift from traditional 
and laborious identity document fraud and forgery to ‘quasi-effortless’ online forms of 
fraud, like IT-forgery, hacking,… Especially single and ‘stable’ identification data (like 
passport numbers, social security numbers…) that are not sufficiently protected by secure 
systems are vulnerable.57 This leads to an increase of identity-related crimes. 
 
IDENTIFYING THE KEY ISSUES. – Tackling identity-related crime, and notably a very specific 
form of this phenomenon: identity theft (cf. infra), confronts us with some particular 
difficulties. First of all, identity-related crime can cause different types of social and 
economic harm, such as distrust in identification and authorization procedures, especially 
in an online environment. This affects the trust in e-commerce and other online services 
(such as e-banking, e-commerce and e-government) in general. To restore trust and to 
ensure the privacy of their clients, these companies have to invest in secure IT-systems, IT-
management, etc. Due to the risks created by the automated processing of identification 
information, they are thus confronted with new responsibilities and liabilities. The 
increasing distrust may also lead to stronger and tighter security measures, such as logging 
and profiling. The financial and administrative burden of these measures will eventually 
lie on the end user or client. They also have to carry other costs, such as loss of convenience, 
privacy and liberty.58 Strong security measures that at the same time ensure the 
identification as well as the privacy and liberty of citizens are thus the challenge. This is an 
important element in the context of the Project as it emphasizes the possibility and 
importance of anonymous or semi-anonymous identity checks. 
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Furthermore, identity-related crime (and identity theft in particular) causes specific harm 
to the rights and freedoms of the primary victim, the person whose identity has been 
‘stolen’ and is being compromised.59 This makes the phenomenon so unique and complex. 
First of all, the perpetrator gains access to the personal sphere of the victim. By pretending 
to be the victim, he can also obtain all kinds of personal information that is normally only 
available to the victim. Secondly, the victim can be confronted with numerous problems, 
such as being addressed by creditors demanding payments for goods or services that he or 
she has never ordered, being blacklisted and rendered unable to obtain certain services 
(loans, airline tickets, etc.), even being wrongfully accused of or arrested for crimes 
committed under the cover of his or her identity.60 This affects the victim’s dignity, 
autonomy and privacy.61 He or she can thus suffer different types of damage, financial and 
non-financial: money that has been stolen, costs to reconstitute one’s name (e.g. starting a 
criminal investigation, defending oneself in procedures started by creditors), reputational 
damage, psychological damage, time and effort spent in taking restorative action and 
damage from being mistakenly associated with crimes (e.g. false accusation or even 
imprisonment).62 Once their identity has been compromised, victims of identity theft 
spend enormous amounts of time, money and effort to clear their name.63 For them it is 
therefore important to clean up the mess as soon as possible and limit further damage from 
occurring.64  
Note that the rectification of this harmful situation is also crucial for the entity that has to 
verify the identity of somebody (the ‘identity verifier’). We cannot expect from the identity 
verifier to make a ‘Solomon judgement’ when somebody claims an identity or denies the 
alleged behaviour alleging identity abuse. The identity verifier often has no other choice 
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than to rely on the available identification means and has no or insufficient instruments to 
check the veracity of the identity match. This affects society as a whole, as it must be able 
to count on the authenticity of identification means and builds further upon that 
assumption.  
The Project will therefore propose innovative techniques to create a real strong link 
between the citizen and his or her primary identity. Such a link is necessary, not only to 
prevent the crime from being committed but also to limit further damage and to restore the 
situation after identity abuse. Specific challenges should indeed be taken into account and 
covered. One such issue which has been underestimated, is the aftermath of identity abuse 
for persons whose identity has been compromised and their lack of control over the 
information. Most countermeasures focus on making it more difficult to obtain or access 
identification information. These efforts are however faced with a dilemma: at the one 
hand the identification information should be held confidential in order to avoid abuse, on 
the other hand it is needed as a reliable access key to certain services and is therefore 
available to many actors, making secrecy impossible.65 Moreover, the key identification 
information (e.g. name, social security number, biometric data) usually remain the same 
throughout a person’s lifetime. Therefore, once compromised, it will be very difficult to 
restore them.66  
 
Finally, the ‘e-aspect’ confronts the victim with extra difficulties, such as: 
- The online context often implies remote communication. The perpetrator can 
therefore commit the crime from any part of the world, thereby transferring 
communication through servers and computers located in several countries. This 
generates specific cross border issues, such as jurisdiction conflicts, mutual legal 
assistance problems, extradition issues,… They can strongly complicate criminal 
investigations and undermine the effectiveness of territory-based policies67; 
- Online information is largely intangible and volatile. Once compromising 
information is transferred online, it is very difficult to take it offline, and thus to 
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end the crime and limit further damages. Online identity theft can therefore exceed 
offline identity theft in scale of harm68. 
- Because the online environment is dominated by private entities, such as internet 
service providers, in fighting illegal activity online public-private partnerships 
became a growing trend in the past few years.69 Tackling identity theft requires 
participation of the private sector, governments cannot handle it alone. Private 
sector interests, such as business costs and reputation, may collide with the 
victim’s interests. Therefore Regulation may sometimes be needed to force these 
entities to cooperate. Lawmakers are however striving to find ways to develop 
regulatory frameworks which reconcile the economic interests of these private 
entities with those of the victims of online crime. Due to the complexity and variety 
of the online environment, regulatory domains often overlap, creating confusion 
over which applies. Lastly, enforcing such cooperation in a global, digitised context 
has proven to be challenging (cf. infra); 
- The online context is a playground for identity ‘thieves’ because they can commit 
the crime with great speed and profit and a low probability of getting caught. 
Online perpetrators can very easily create a fictitious identity and use technologies 
to conceal their identity (sometimes by abusing someone else’s) or their real 
location. The internet also makes it easy to gather identification information from 
unsecured or poorly secured information systems or even open sources, such as 
social media accounts with limited privacy settings. It is also an interesting market 
place to sell ‘stolen’ identification information to interested third parties. The 
identification information is therefore easier to ‘commercialise’; 
In sum, the online context makes it easier and more attractive to commit identity theft, to 
profit from it and to escape from prosecution. Mere financial compensation will not suffice 
to restore abuse victims.70 An active legislative and supervisory policy may be necessary 
in this context. 
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II Criminalisation of identity theft: a matter of 
criminal policy 
1 EU initiatives with regard to criminalisation of identity 
theft 
 
EU INITIATIVES. – In short, identity-related crimes relate to the security of documents and 
IT-systems. The perpetrator profits from weaknesses in the identification process or the 
lack of care with personal data. The digital context poses extra difficulties with regard to 
the detection, prosecution and ending of the criminal behaviour. 
One way to tackle the phenomenon is to adopt specific criminal offences. In the recent 
years, the EU has paid attention to identity-related crime, and more specific identity theft. 
In 2010, DG Home Affairs launched a legislative proposal on criminalisation of identity 
theft.71 In this context, a comparative study on the legislation of EU Member States was 
prepared.72 It does not directly support the conclusion that there is need for EU action. 
Despite the lack of a single pan European instrument, the study identified no instances in 
which an act of identity theft could not be punished at national level.73 No clear regulatory 
gap could be identified as this issue largely depends on how identity theft is defined and 
how broadly one wishes to criminalise specific behaviour, especially in the absence of 
harm to the victim and outside the context of existing crimes.74 The study suggests to 
concentrate on non-legal responses, such as awareness campaigns, efficient reporting 
mechanisms etc. Furthermore, as long as there is no common understanding of ‘identity 
theft’, drafting a clear common definition will be extremely challenging. There is also a 
substantial risk of overlap with existing criminal provisions, such as fraud and forgery. It 
is therefore more important to ensure consistency in national criminal law enforcement, 
rather than to create a new offense. Based on these observations, the study concluded that 
any regulatory initiative aiming to introduce new criminal concepts into national criminal 
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law should undergo a formal regulatory impact assessment.75 An Impact Assessment was 
subsequently undertaken for DG Home in order to inform the Commission’s decision on 
whether criminal law measures in the field of identity theft are appropriate at the EU Level. 
This study supported the idea of the need for a Directive including a common definition of 
identity theft as a framework for further initiatives, including possible criminalisation. The 
best policy option would be to adopt a Directive on identity theft focussing on primary 
victims combined with non-legislative actions such as the establishment of a platform for 
victims and specialists to exchange experience and knowledge, information exchange and 
awareness raising and the adoption of a common definition of identity theft.76 The 
development of such comprehensive legislative proposal has however not yet been 
finished. 
 
In the meanwhile, a specific form of identity abuse has been included in the Directive on 
attacks against information systems (further ‘the Directive on Cyber-attacks’77) from 2013, 
as an optional aggravating circumstance of system and data interference.78 Article 9, 5° 
states that the Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that when such 
offences are committed by misusing the personal data of another person, with the aim of 
gaining the trust of a third party, thereby causing prejudice to the rightful identity owner, 
this may, in accordance with national law, be regarded as an aggravating circumstance, 
unless those circumstances are already covered by another offence, punishable under 
national law. The Directive on Cyber-attacks only seems to cover one specific type of 
identity abuse, namely committing illegal system or data interference by abusing 
somebody’s personal data thereby causing harmful consequences for the primary victim. 
The Directive leaves the discussion on Union-wide criminalisation of identity theft and 
other identity-related offences to be decided in the future. Consideration 14 states: ‘Setting 
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up effective measures against identity theft and other identity-related offences constitutes 
another important element of an integrated approach against cybercrime. Any need for 
Union action against this type of criminal behaviour could also be considered in the context 
of evaluating the need for a comprehensive horizontal Union instrument.’ 
 
FIRST STEP: COMMON UNDERSTANDING. – As pointed out by the RAND Study and the Impact 
Assessment, the first step in adopting a policy is to come to a common understanding of 
the phenomenon. The main issue in the debate on criminalising identity theft as a discrete 
offence, does not seem to be the lack of criminal law provisions but, on the contrary, the 
multitude of applicable criminal law provisions and the disparate approaches to the 
phenomenon. Most Member States seem to approach identity theft as a preparatory act of 
fraud, thereby focussing on the subsequent illegitimate use made of the identity (e.g. 
committing financial fraud like skimming). Identity theft is therefore not always 
criminalised in its own right.79 In this point of view, identity is not regarded as a target but 
as a means to facilitate other crimes. The question therefore arises whether identity is a 
specific legal interest in need of protection, legitimising a separate criminalisation. We will 
examine this on the basis of existing legal studies and will further analyse the legal 
interests in need of protection. We believe this can create a clear framework for further 
regulatory action. 
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2 Defining the illicit behaviour and the legally protected 
interests 
2.1  Identity theft and identity fraud: a demarcation 
ID THEFT VERSUS ID FRAUD? – The development of a policy to combat the abuse of identity 
starts with the demarcation of the phenomenon80, which is multifaceted and complex. In 
literature and common parlance, it is often referred to as ‘identity theft’. This term might 
be confusing because it treats identity as a property concept instead of an informational 
concept.81 ‘Theft’ normally requires that the owner is deprived of the good, reason why 
only tangible goods could fall within the scope of the criminal offence (cf. infra). ‘Theft’ 
further only seems to refer to the act of the illegal acquisition or gathering. In identity abuse 
situations the initial gathering can however be lawful but its further use can be unlawful. 
The abuse of identity is therefore much broader a problem and can cover a wide range of 
illegal activities, such as the unlawful access, possession, transfer, process, disclosure or 
use.82 
Due to the multiplicity and variety of possible illegal acts, it is very difficult to find a term 
which covers the entire phenomenon of identity abuse. We therefore prefer to use the 
container concept ‘identity-related crime’ to refer to the problem. Identity-related crime 
can be defined as ‘all punishable activities that have identity as a target or as a tool’.83 KOOPS 
et al. stress that this phenomenon should be understood ‘as a distinct, novel category of 
crime, because combating these crimes requires special knowledge and understanding of IMS 
(the information management systems) and their vulnerabilities, as victims suffer from 
these crimes in special ways, for instance, by being blacklisted, and because public awareness 
is low and should be raised.’84 To demarcate the problem, they take the perspective of an 
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82 Cf. i.e. the criminalisation of identity theft in 18 U.S.C. §1028 en §1028A; M. GERCKE, ‘Internet-
related identity theft. A discussion paper’, 13, www.coe.int/cybercrime.  
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target or principal tool. B.-J. KOOPS, R. LEENES, M. MEINTS, N. VAN DER MEULEN en D.-O. JAQUET-CHIFFELLE, 
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84 B.-J. KOOPS, R. LEENES, M. MEINTS, N. VAN DER MEULEN en D.-O. JAQUET-CHIFFELLE, „A typology of 
identity-related crime. Conceptual, technical and legal issues’, Information, Communication & Society 
2009, 9. 
observer of the identification process and look at possible mismatches between the 
identify information (the ‘identifier’) and the identity during the identification process 
which leads to unjust authentication.85  
Unlawful use of identity can be divided into three main categories86: 
- Unlawful identity obstruction: an identifier is intentionally deleted (identifier 
erasure) or the link fails to be made due to an intentional act (identification 
obstruction) e.g. the deletion of a patient record with the goal to destroy that 
person’s identity87, intentionally blocking or erasing someone’s identification data, 
destroying an identity card, the taking away of someone’s passport by a human 
trafficker,… ; 
- Unlawful identity restoration: the ‘compromised’ link is being wrongfully restored 
or re-established, e.g. somebody claims to have lost his identity card in order to 
receive a new one. The old one can be handed over to someone to abuse it, e.g. to 
human traffickers; 88 
- Unlawful identity change or identity fraud: the fraud or any other unlawful activity 
committed with identity as a target or principal tool89, e.g. the use of someone’s 
identity to harm that person’s reputation, provide a false name to let someone else 
in for a criminal offense. With regard to criminal activities, this is the most 
important category. It has four subcategories: 
o Unlawful identity delegation: when somebody provides his identity to 
another person, e.g. gives his or her professional fuel card to a friend so that 
he can fill up his car. This type of crime is conducted with consent of the 
original identity bearer; 
o Unlawful identity exchange: when two persons switch identity, e.g. 
somebody visits an inmate in prison and they swap places. This also 
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happens with mutual consent of the persons whose identities have been 
exchanged; 
o Unlawful identity creation: somebody creates a fictitious identity, e.g. using 
a fake profile to lure someone into false beliefs. In this situation, there is no 
abuse of the identity of another person; 
o Unlawful identity takeover (or identity usurpation or identity theft): 
somebody takes over the identity of another person. Here the identity of 
that other person is being compromised, e.g. somebody pretends to be his 
twin brother to let him in for a criminal offence, someone forges a credit 
card using someone else’s ‘stolen’ credit card data, someone uses another 
person’s mail account to send spam, …  
In the first two categories of identity fraud, the original identity bearer contributes to the 
abuse or at least condones it. In the third category the identity of another person is not at 
stake. The last category is really the key point of interest of our research: the fraud or any 
other unlawful activity where the identity of another person is used as a target or principal 
tool without that person’s consent. Please note that a fictitious identity can also be created 
with identification information of different existing persons. In that case we have multiple 
cases of identity theft. This type of behaviour thus falls under the fourth category.  
 
To resume, identity theft must be understood as a subcategory of the broader concept of 
identity fraud. We can represent the different types of abuse of identity in the following 
scheme: 
 
  
IDENTITY FRAUD AS A TWO-PHASED PROCESS. – The ways to target or obtain identification 
information (the modi operandi) differ. The perpetrators can get hold of it through physical 
methods, by clever social engineering and through outsider and insider attacks on IT-
systems.90 The motivation to obtain and further use that information can also be very 
diverse. Identity fraud can revolve around the use of another person’s or a fictitious 
identity to commit other crimes, such as terrorism, embezzlement, credit card fraud, 
money laundering, drug trafficking, traffic offences, human trafficking, distribution of 
illegal content, social security fraud etc. The perpetrator uses the identification 
information as a tool to hide his or her own identity and to avoid legal consequences, for 
example a wanted person uses a false licence plate. Sometimes identity fraud, especially 
identity ‘theft’, aims to harm the bearer of the identity. In this case, that person is the target, 
not the identification information as such, e.g. creating an embarrassing Facebook profile 
in someone else’s name to harm that person (‘cyberbullying’). 
The only correlation between these acts seems to be that they can relate to one or more 
phases in the commission of identity fraud.91 Identity fraud is often described as a two-
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stage process: the creation of a false identity and its use for a specific purpose.92 The initial 
phase involves the gathering of identification information and the creation of the false 
identity. This can be done by means of unauthorised access to IT-systems containing 
identification information and the copying of such information (outsider threat), through 
the abuse of authorised access to IT-systems or illegal disclosure to unauthorised third 
parties (insider threat), but also through theft or copying of physical identity documents,… 
This phase also includes interaction with the identification information, like possessing, 
transferring, processing or selling of identification information, e.g. falsification of identity 
documents, falsification of number plates, data protection breaches, … In a second phase, 
the perpetrator continues the fraud by using this false identity in some unlawful way (e.g. 
in the context of human trafficking, money laundering, terrorism,…).93 
 
ACCURATELY DEMARCATING IDENTITY FRAUD. – On the basis of a thorough comparative analysis 
of multiple definitions in several countries, DE VRIES et al. have developed a working 
definition of the concept of identity fraud. They define it as ‘obtaining, taking, possessing or 
creating false means of identification intentionally (and) (unlawfully or without permission) 
and to use them to commit unlawful behaviour or to have the intention to do so.’ False means 
of identification are those that do not truthfully identify the person who uses it. 
Identity fraud is a specific form of fraud. Two elements are constituent for identity fraud: 
the falsehood and the deceit. Identity fraud can be qualified as a form of falsehood in 
identification means for the purpose of deceit in some form.94 Deceit is thus the goal or 
result. On the basis of their analysis, they draw the following conclusions.95 
- First, it is irrelevant whether the false means of identification refer to an existing, 
deceased or totally fictitious person. False means of identification are those that do 
not truthfully identify the person who uses them. What matters is the pretence of 
another identity, in other words: the alteration of the truth. In the identification 
                                                          
92 U.R.M.Th. DE VRIES, H. TIGHELAAR, M. VAN DER LINDEN and A.M. HOL, Identiteitsfraude: een 
afbakening. Een internationale begripsvergelijking en analyse van nationale strafbepalingen, 
Disciplinegroep Rechtstheorie Departement Rechtsgeleerdheid, Universiteit Utrecht 2007, 199. 
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95 Ibid. 16 – 20. 
context, it does not always matter who a person is, as long as it is the ‘right’ 
person.96 The manipulation of another person’s identity is therefore not essential. 
When someone else’s means of identification are indeed compromised, this 
qualifies as identity theft, a specific subcategory of the broader concept of identity 
fraud. Identity theft expresses that there is a (primary) victim of a falsehood in 
respect of his or her means of identification. Identity fraud emphasizes more the 
element of deceit, or violation of public confidence (cf. infra).  
- Secondly, identity fraud is the obtaining and (ab)using of some means of 
identification. Being untruthful about one’s identity without (ab)using any means 
of identification does not amount to identity fraud. As we have seen above, means 
of identification can take the form of intangibles, such as a name, credit card data, 
biometric data, or tangibles, such as a passport or birth certificate. Naming a 
particular type of means of identification is not necessary to demarcate identity 
fraud. Means of identification can refer to documents, data or any other data 
carrier. These means are however the object of the fraud and their different forms 
can be relevant for policy development, such as the elaboration of 
countermeasures.  
- Thirdly, the meaning of ‘identity’ is very context-bound. Most of the time it refers 
to a civil, bureaucratic identity. As we have seen above, we understand identity as 
the set of elements that allow a person to be qualified as a ‘legal subject’ to whom 
the government or other parties can attribute specific acts in a reliable way. This 
indeed refers to a bureaucratic identity. 
- Fourthly, identity fraud is a two-phased criminal process. A distinction can be made 
between actions which relate to the obtaining, taking, possessing, creating or 
handing over of identification means on the one hand (the initial phase) and actions 
existing in using them for unlawful purposes (the subsequent phase). In the initial 
phase the means of identification can be targeted in various ways, e.g. through 
forging, stealing, unlawfully accessing a computer system etc. Some acts in this 
initial phase may however not be unlawful as such, e.g. shoulder surfing or 
dumpster diving. The means of identification can thus also be lawfully obtained, for 
instance from public sources.97 In that case, it is the subsequent use of that 
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information to create a false identity which makes the behaviour unlawful. DE VRIES 
et al. conclude that referring to actions contributes to demarcating identity fraud. 
Yet, the ways of obtaining, taking, possessing or creating, for instance through 
forging, stealing, hacking etc., are however not decisive. Most of the time, these 
particular type of actions are indeed criminalised through a range of offences. This 
is however not necessary, what matters is the unlawfulness of the subsequent use. 
In other words, what happens afterwards with the identification means is 
constituent for identity fraud. This also seems to emphasize the importance of a 
specific intent in the criminalisation of the initial phase of identity fraud and the 
requirement of some harmful result or risk of such harmful result (cf. infra). 
- This relates to the fifth conclusion, that the carrying out of the subsequent 
behaviour or even attempting to carry it out is the very essence of identity fraud. 
The mere possession of identification means therefore does not suffice. Identity 
fraud revolves around the manipulation of the identification process.  
- Lastly, it does not matter whether the fraud takes place vis-à-vis a private party 
(horizontal relationship) or a public authority (vertical relationship). Indeed, in 
both relationships, similar identification means can be used, especially since 
secondary identities are often derived from primary identities. 
 
In short, the essential elements of identity fraud are: 1) the use of false means of 
identification (the element of falsehood) and 2) the two-phased criminal process, in 
particular the abuse in the subsequent phase (the element of deceit). 
The fictitious identity can indeed be used for a variety of types of unlawful behaviour 
(financial fraud, money laundering, human trafficking…). In our opinion these subsequent 
‘result acts’ should, however, not serve to demarcate the phenomenon of identity fraud. 
That should be considered as a separate ‘intermediary act’. Otherwise, identity fraud as a 
phenomenon would become excessively context-dependant. We can compare this to 
forgery offences, where the forging and subsequent use of the forged object are usually 
criminalised in general, regardless of the specific context in which the use took place. 
Forgery is a so-called ‘intermediary offence’: behaviour that facilitates other crimes (‘result 
offences’) but that is also criminalised as a separate offence. We believe that this also 
indicates the importance of a specific intent requirement for the subsequent phase of the 
unlawful use of the means of identification.  
2.2 Legal interests at stake 
RATIO LEGIS AS OUR REFERENCE POINT. – Detecting the legal interests at stake is the second step 
in further demarcating the phenomenon and analysing the criminalisation. We have seen 
that the modi operandi and the concrete motives can be very diverse, reason why they are 
difficult to use to detect loopholes in existing law. Instead of focussing on possible ways of 
committing identity fraud, we will use the ratio legis of the criminalisation as our reference 
point. With ratio legis we mean the aim and purpose of the criminalisation, which at the 
same time justifies and limits the criminalisation of specific behaviour. The ratio legis can 
therefore be a guideline for policy makers, as well as an interpretative tool for the Courts.98 
In German Criminal Law, this purpose of a criminalisation is indicated as the (subsidiary) 
protection of a legal interest or Rechtsgut.99 This is more or less comparable to the harm 
principle in common law.100 
 
2.2.1 Legal interests in the initial phase 
INFORMATION PRIVACY. – As identification information is linked to individuals and often 
reveals information about their personal life, privacy immediately pops up as the logical 
legal interest to in need of protection (art. 8 ECHR and art. 7 EU Charter). The concept of 
privacy is very hard to define and demarcate. In general it is often described as ‘the right 
to be let alone’. It encompasses various aspects, such as the right to personal life, physical 
and psychological integrity, communication privacy and information privacy. Especially 
information privacy is important in this context. It refers to the right of an individual to 
exercise a substantial degree of control over personal information and its use, including 
the collection and circulation thereof.101 In Goodwin, for instance, the ECtHR stated that 
‘protection is given to the personal sphere of each individual, including the right to establish 
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details of their identity as individual human beings’.102 ‘Personal information’ refers to 
aspects of someone’s private life, hence intimate information (e.g. sex life, health), but can 
also include information and data about unique human characteristics which allows 
someone to be identified by others, such as biometric data.103 The notion of private life or 
personal sphere is determined from case to case and its scope depends on the specific facts 
and circumstances of the case. What we retain is that the ECtHR has recognised the right 
to identity as an aspect of private life in several cases, also in interaction with others and in 
a public context. From the case law, we can conclude that this right also protects the 
individual from (improper) identification.104 
 
In addition to article 8 ECHR, each identifier can qualify as the legal concept of ‘personal 
data’ insofar as they relate to an identified or identifiable individual. Data relates to an 
individual, if it refers to the identity, characteristics or behaviour of an individual, or if such 
information is used to determine or influence the way in which that person is treated or 
evaluated.105 It is not required that the data can lead to a direct identification or that the 
individual is easily identifiable (e.g. the full name of an individual). It suffices that the data 
may indirectly lead to an identification through a combination of the different elements. 
The processing of personal data is regulated by Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data (hereafter ‘the Data Protection Directive’).106 This legal framework regulates the 
relationship between the original identity bearer and the controller of the personal 
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identification information. It determines the principles under which personal data, 
including identification information, may be lawfully collected and processed.107 The non-
respect of these obligations result in infringements of substantial privacy rights, which 
include offences such as the illegal processing, disclosure, dissemination, access to and 
storage of the personal data.108  
It is worth stressing that data protection law starts from the assumption that every type of 
personal data is worth protecting, regardless of the context.109 As such it differs from the 
right to privacy (art. 8 ECHR), the protection of which is often context-dependent and 
based on an assessment of the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy.110 Data 
protection law acknowledges that certain types of personal data are more sensitive than 
others, such as racial or medical data, and therefore grants this special category of personal 
data specific protection. 
Since the implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
data protection is embedded as an autonomous fundamental right (art. 8 EU Charter), in 
addition to the fundamental right to privacy (art. 7 EU Charter and art. 8 ECHR). Article 8 
EU Charter sets the conditions and limits of data processing. An important consequence is 
that even if there are no specific privacy risks in the sense of article 7 EU Charter and article 
8 ECHR, the personal data are still protected as a fundamental right and its processing is 
only allowed under the conditions of article 8 EU Charter.111 
Insofar as the processing of this personal data is conducted in the electronic 
communications sector, they will also fall under the specific protection of electronic 
communications. The processing of personal data in the electronic communications sector 
is specifically regulated by Directive 2002/58/EC (hereafter ‘e-Privacy Directive’).112 This 
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It goes without saying that fraudulent collection and use result in violations of these 
Directives. The Directives oblige Member States to impose penalties on breaches of data 
protection legislation. Most forms of identity theft will thus constitute violation of data 
protection law. 
 
PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION VERSUS PROPERTY. – The usual use of the notions ‘fraud’ or 
‘theft’ seems to imply a need to protect property as a legal interest when somebody 
appropriates someone else’s identification information. This is however anything but 
obvious. Identification information used to be linked to a physical item. As such, it was 
primarily based on matter: one could identify oneself by means of a physical identity card, 
a paper birth certificate… Nowadays, identification information can be stored and 
represented in various forms, either physically or digitally. 
The taking away of physical objects containing identification information obviously results 
in a loss of property. The original identity bearers are deprived of their physical identity 
card, passport, credit card, etc. The protection of property will be a relevant legal interest 
at stake in the initial phase. 
Yet, the victim does not lose the identification information represented by these physical 
documents. He or she can, for example, report the theft or loss and receive a new 
identification document, containing the same identification information. The identification 
information itself is intangible and suitable for multiple use and storage (‘multiplicity’). 
These two specific characteristics diminish the suitability of traditional property offences 
such as theft. The traditional concept of property seems unfit for intangible objects which 
by nature cannot exclusively belong to one person.114 The exclusive character of 
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ownership is indeed intrinsically connected to the tangible and unique character of 
physical objects. Property offences are based on this materialistic concept of property. 
Applying them to cases of identity theft or fraud, where the original identity bearer does 
not necessarily lose his identity, requires a brave yet – in view of the sacrosanct legality 
principle in criminal law - questionable interpretation of the concept of property and the 
ways it can be affected.115  
This does not mean that the law does not confer any rights upon intangible goods, inclusive 
property rights. This is exactly the case for intellectual property rights and privacy rights. 
Law can construe its own concepts to regulate relationships. Criminal law is even more 
unique as its conceptual autonomy of criminal law implies that Courts are not necessarily 
bound by the meaning given to legal concepts in other fields of law. 
For information as a concept, the shift towards commercialisation is increasingly turning 
it into an economically valuable good.116 For instance, the law confers (intellectual) 
property rights on databases containing personal consumer information to the collectors 
of that information. In doing so, it creates an important incentive for entrepreneurs to 
collect this information and to monitor their consumers. At the same time, those 
consumers retain a privacy right, not a property right, over that information. The law tries 
to find a balance between these two rights. European data protection law therefore confers 
certain obligations to the data controllers so that the privacy of the data subject is 
guaranteed.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY, INTEGRITY AND AVAILABILITY OF IT-SYSTEMS AND DATA. – The same reasoning 
applies to digital identification information. Just as the information it represents, computer 
data are an intangible good. In order to avoid difficult legal discussions about the 
application of property offences, specific cybercrime legislation was introduced. Specific 
cybercrime legislation tries to fill in the gap left by property offences. Cyber-offences aim 
to protect the confidentiality, the integrity and the availability of computer systems and 
computer data (‘CIA’- offences): illegal access to a computer system, illegal interception, 
data interference, etc. In doing so, they also grant an indirect protection to the personal 
data stored in or transferred through the IT-systems. They thus create a ‘formal sphere of 
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secrecy’ for the computer data and the information it represents.117 Here we see a 
correspondence between CIA and information privacy. The Cybercrime Convention of the 
Council of Europe118 and the EU Directive on Cyber-attacks aim to approximate the 
criminal laws of states in this area. As identity theft often exploits weaknesses of IT-
systems in order to collect identification means, these cybercrime offences will play an 
important role in the criminalisation of identity theft. 
 
2.2.2 Legal interests at stake in the subsequent phase 
AUTHENTICITY IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION. – The legal interests mentioned above do not 
cover the actual function of the identification information in the process of identification 
(the ‘IT-personalised’ key, cf. supra). They mainly come in hand in the initial phase where 
they (directly or indirectly) protect identification information as the target. They are less 
relevant in the subsequent phase, the actual use of the identification information as a tool 
to get access to certain services (e.g. to pay, to get access to e-mails, to social security 
services…). The subsequent phase may indeed constitute the initial phase of another 
identity theft, if the perpetrator abuses the identity of another person (intermediate 
target) to obtain identification information of a third person (actual target).119 
As already mentioned, the construction of an identity has undergone several evolutions 
which has some repercussions for the practical identification process. Identification used 
to be primarily based on official (paper) identity documents issued by states. Therefore, 
countermeasures are usually focused on the prevention of (identity) document forgery by 
implementing more security measures (e.g. biometrics, chips, codes, holograms…). 
Although this remains an important strategy, the digitisation of the identification process 
also comes with new risks and threats (cf. supra). Nowadays identity fraud does not only 
contain abuse of a physical identity document, but can be committed in various ways (cf. 
supra). This ‘e-aspect’ may not be ignored. The criminal law needs to be adapted to new 
technological evolutions which allow a more secure identification process, but at the same 
                                                          
117 M. CHAWKI and M.S. ABDEL WAHAB, ‘Identity Theft in Cyberspace: Issues and Solutions’, Lex 
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119 F.i. the use of somebody’s login and password to hack into an IT-system in order to obtain 
identification information of other persons, or the abuse of the social media profile of someone to 
send a request to the actual target, who is the friend or colleague of the first person. 
time lead to an easier abuse of the identity and, what is more, make it more difficult to 
restore the identity.120  
The very essence of identity fraud is that someone deliberately pretends to be somebody 
he or she is not. The perpetrator pretends that the other identity is his or her own, thereby 
misleading the identity verifier (human or machine). In case of identity fraud, two legal 
interests need protection. First, we must protect the authenticity of the identification 
information as a proof of an identity match, in other words trust in the information as a 
reliable identification tool. Identity fraud actually comes down to an alteration of the truth 
(deceit). The legal interest at stake therefore resembles the legal interest behind forgery 
offences. Typical for document forgery is that there is a violation of the confidence that 
society necessarily grants to certain types of documents.121 These documents play an 
important role in society, reason why society must be able to count on their reliability. That 
reliability is called ‘public confidence’. It is violated through the alteration of the truth in 
the document. With regard to identity fraud, the truth can be altered by means of 
manipulation of identity documents or data, but also by merely pretending to be someone 
else, using his or her identification information (e.g. look-alike fraud). Society however 
necessarily depends on the reliability of that identification information during the 
identification process (cf. supra). Next to this abstract, general ratio legis, the forgery 
offences also have a concrete, specific ratio legis, namely protecting the private interests of 
the victim who has been deceived by the false use of the ‘stolen’ identity (the secondary 
victim, cf. supra).122 As set out above, this is the (natural or legal) person who is defrauded 
or otherwise harmed by the identity ‘thief’ because the secondary victim relies on the false 
identification means to provide services. The identity thief thus gains access to certain 
services or activities without right. The damages caused can vary from financial damage to 
moral damage, depending on the specific context. For instance when the impersonation is 
committed to commit social security fraud, the secondary victim (the social security 
agency) suffers (at least) financial harm. When the impersonation aims to hide criminal 
behaviour, e.g. avoidance of speeding tickets, the damage of the secondary victim is also 
primarily financial (the non-payment of fines). When the identification means are abused 
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in the context of human trafficking, e.g. to obtain asylum, the damage is non-pecuniary (the 
obtainment of an unlawful advantage). 
 
DAMAGE TO ORIGINAL IDENTITY BEARER: PRIVACY AND DIGNITY. – Above we identified the 
potential damage caused by the abuse of someone else’s identification information. It is 
clear that the private life of the original identity bearers and their dignity is again at stake 
when their means of identification are subsequently used against their will and can cause 
a very specific type of harm (cf. supra). As already mentioned ‘identifiers’ are part of 
someone’s identity and thus one’s personal life. When these identifiers are used against 
one’s will, this abuse may violate the personal life and may also affect one’s dignity, for 
instance when that person is blacklisted, confronted with numerous claims etc. This legal 
interest related to the primary victim in the subsequent phase is what sets identity theft 
apart from other types of forgery, where normally only the secondary victim suffers harm 
by the deceit. The impact of the identity theft on the privacy of the primary victim in the 
subsequent phase is the reason why identity theft asks for a specific approach. 
  
3  Different strategies to criminalise 
 
SCHEME. – The following scheme visualises the principal legal interests to be protected in 
the context of identity theft123: 
 
 
DIFFERENT STRATEGIES TO CRIMINALISE. – One way to analyse the criminalisation is to examine 
whether the two phases are sufficiently covered by the current substantive criminal law 
framework. It will not take long to conclude that criminal law in general deals with 
different facets of the obtaining, creation and use of false means of identification. It can be 
a constitutive element of a particular offence. In Belgium and France, for instance, false 
identification means can be qualified as a fraudulent means, which is a constitutive element 
of the general offence of fraud (‘escroquerie’).124  
It can also be criminalised through a range of existing offences which do not specifically 
address identity theft. The most relevant existing criminal law provisions in this context 
seem to be: 1) forgery offences (sometimes specifically of a travel document or 
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passport125), 2) data protection offences, 3) impersonation (the usurpation of a name, 
status, qualification, …), 4) cybercrime offences (IT forgery and IT Fraud, illegal access, 
illegal interception and data and system interference) and 5) the general fraud offence. All 
these different offences and their suitability for identity theft situations were already 
analysed in detail in other recent studies.126 They reveal that the application of the 
different existing criminal law provisions depends very much on the focus. The Council of 
Europe for instance has not yet developed a comprehensive strategy towards identity theft 
or identity fraud. We do find a Guidance Note with regard to identity theft and phishing in 
relation to fraud.127 While personally identifiable information of a real or fictitious person 
may be misused for a range of illegal acts, the Guidance Note only focuses on identity theft 
in relation to fraud. This entails the misappropriation of the identity of another person, 
without their knowledge or consent, in order to use it to obtain goods and services in that 
person's name. The Guidance Note examines how different articles of the Cybercrime 
Convention apply to identity theft in relation to fraud and involving computer systems, 
such as illegal access, illegal interception, computer related forgery, etc. It concludes that 
identity theft (including phishing and similar conduct) is generally used for the 
preparation of further criminal acts such as computer related fraud. Even if identity theft 
is not criminalised as a separate act, law enforcement agencies will be able to prosecute 
the subsequent offences. 
Another approach is to adopt a ‘specific’ identity theft offence. It is interesting to examine 
whether one single specific legal provision addressing identity theft could contribute to the 
restoration of the compromised identity of the primary victim. For this, we will take a 
closer look at France, where new identity theft legislation was introduced in 2011 (‘LOPPSI 
2’).128  
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128 La Loi n° 2011-267 du 14 mars 2011 d’orientation et de programmation pour la performance 
de la sécurité intérieure (‘LOPPSI 2’). 
FRANCE: NEW SPECIFIC OFFENCE. – Article 226-4-1 French Criminal Code (French CC), inserted 
in 2011, criminalises ‘l’ usurpation d’ identité ou usage de données permettant d’identifier 
un tiers’. This is the act of taking over or using another person’s identity to disturb the 
peace of that person or another person or to affect his honour.129  
Before introducing this ‘specific’ legislation, acts of identity ‘theft’ were (principally) 
criminalised through130:  
- The use of a false name in a public act or ‘usage d'un faux nom dans un acte public’ 
(art. 433-19 French CC) 
- The usurpation of a civil status or ‘usurpation d’état civil’ (art. 434-23 French CC). 
So, even before 2011, identity theft was already criminalised to a large extent. These 
offences however did not seem to cover the entire phenomenon. Instead of modifying 
existing criminal law, France decided to introduce this new type of identity theft. 
 
FALSE NAME IN PUBLIC ACT131. – Although the act described by article 433-19 French CC very 
much resembles the act of forgery (‘faux’), the offense is nevertheless placed in a section 
XI entitled ‘The damage to the civil status of persons’ alongside bigamy, celebration of 
religious marriage before the civil marriage, breach of freedom of the funeral and the 
absence of a declaration of birth. The article therefore only envisages the taking (‘prendre’) 
of (a part of) a name other than the one assigned by the civil status or the changing 
(‘changer’), alteration (‘altérer’) or modification (‘modifier’) of (a part of) the name 
assigned by the civil status in a public act. ‘Name’ has a broad meaning, it refers to family 
name, the surname, the prefix. The offence only criminalises the use of the false name in an 
authentic or public act or administrative document destined for the public authorities. 
However, the use of a false name in a non-administrative document can qualify as forgery 
in private writings (art. 441-1 French CC).  
The offence does not require a specific intent. The knowledge that the used name is not 
legally one’s own and the will to invoke it are sufficient. Therefore, even the use of a 
pseudonym in public acts is envisaged.  
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130 C. LACROIX, Usurpation d’identité, 2012, www.dalloz.fr. Other relevant criminal law provisions 
were among others: article 781 French Criminal Procedure Code (the usurpation of a name to obtain 
criminal records or ‘usurpation de nom et casier judiciaire’) and art. 225-7 French Traffic Code (the 
taking of another person’s name which could lead to a condemnation).  
131 C. LACROIX, Usurpation d’identité, 2012, n° 11-25, www.dalloz.fr. 
 USURPATION OF CIVIL STATUS – Article 434-23 French Criminal Code (French CC) criminalises 
‘Le fait de prendre le nom d'un tiers, dans des circonstances qui ont déterminé ou auraient pu 
déterminer contre celui-ci des poursuites pénales’. The perpetrator takes over the name of 
another person to commit crimes. This can lead to criminal prosecution of the victim for 
the crimes committed by the identity ‘thief’. Only the usurpation of the name of an existing 
and living person is envisaged. The question was raised whether an IP-address or e-mail 
address could also fall under the scope of the offence. This would require a very broad 
interpretation of the notion ‘name’, which conflicts with the legality principle.132 It seems 
that only when an e-mail address contains the name of another person, this can constitute 
the offence of article 434-23 French CC.133 The usurpation is limited to cases where the 
victim risks criminal prosecutions for the ‘result crime’, the crime that gave rise to the 
usurpation. This means that the constitutive elements of the ‘result crime’ must also be 
reunited. 134 
 
USURPATION OF IDENTITY. – The problem with article 434-23 French CC is that it is sometimes 
very hard to prove that the constitutive elements of the result crime are met and that the 
victim actually risked criminal prosecution.135 Next to that, as we have seen above, there 
are also other motives of identity ‘theft’. The identity of another person is for example 
sometimes used to defame the primary victim.136 Exactly for that reason, France 
introduced in 2011 a new article 226-4-1 French CC called ‘usurpation d’ identité’. This is 
the act of taking over or using another person’s identity information to disturb the peace 
of that person or another person or to affect his honour.137 The intent to disturb the peace 
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or to affect the honour of the impersonated victim constitutes the moral element (mens 
rea) of the offence (the specific intent). 
This new offence was placed in the section of crimes committed against the right to privacy. 
It is interesting to see the shift from identity theft as an offence that affects the criminal 
justice system (an ‘obstruction of justice’ – offence), such as article 434-23 French CC138, 
to a new form of an infringement of the right to privacy.139 This explains the strong 
connection with other crimes protecting this legal interest through the special intent. 
‘Porter atteinte à la à son honneur ou considération’ ressembles closely the wording of 
defamation; whereas ‘en vue de troubler la tranquillité de la victime’ brings it into the 
sphere of article 222-16 French CC (harassment via telephone).140 The offence envisages 
the identity or identification information of another person (cf. article 434-23 French CC). 
This includes the name, surname, online pseudonym, password, IP address141, etc. 
Originally, the offence was limited to online identity usurpation. In the end, this restriction 
was dropped. 
 
OVERVIEW. –  
Offence Criminal 
act  
Object Form  Intent  Specificities  Legal interest 
433-19 - taking  
- changing 
- altering 
- modifying  
A name not 
one’s own 
Paper or 
digital 
form 
seems 
irrelevant 
Intentional Only public 
documents 
Civil status / public 
order 
434-23 Unspecified 
(orally, in 
writings…) 
Another 
one’s name  
Offline 
and 
online 
intentional Only when 
this can lead 
to criminal 
prosecutions 
Obstruction of justice 
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226-4-
1 
Unspecified 
(usurpation 
or making 
use) 
Another 
one’s 
identity or 
identification 
information 
Offline 
and 
online 
Specific  Only when 
motive was 
to harm 
other person 
Privacy  
 
OTHER RELEVANT CRIMINAL LAW PROVISIONS. – Besides being an autonomous offence, identity 
theft was also often brought in connection to the offences of fraud (escroquerie) or 
embezzlement (abus de confiance). It was regarded, for example, as the constitutive 
element of the use of false name, a false quality or fraudulent manoeuvres required for 
‘escroquerie’.  
France also added a paragraph to its hacking offence (art. 323-1 French CC) in 2012, 
introducing the illegal access to an IT system which contains personal information as an 
aggravating circumstance, thereby transposing Directive 2013/40/EU into its domestic 
legal system.142 
Finally, as France created two new police databases containing personal information, one 
with digital fingerprints (FNAED) and one with DNA (FNAEG), a specific offence was 
created in this context. Article 706-56, II, paragraph 4 French Criminal Procedure Code 
(French CPC) criminalises manipulations to forge the results of a genetic analyses.143 The 
manipulation must take place by replacing one’s own biological material by another one’s. 
This specific offence relates to the general ‘obstruction of justice’- offence by altering or 
forging evidence (art. 434-4 French CP). 
 
EVALUATION – The way in which identity theft is autonomously criminalised can differ 
significantly depending on the focus and the existing legal framework. France, for instance, 
introduced an autonomous identity theft offence, the usurpation of another one’s identity 
in order to disturb the peace of that person or another person or to affect his dignity. This 
provision only criminalises one particular aspect of identity theft, namely the ‘stealing’ of 
one’s identity with the purpose to harm that specific person (‘personal attack’). So although 
France has adopted ‘specific’ identity theft legislation, its approach remains fragmented. 
The ‘specific’ identity theft offence of article 226-4-1 France CC was introduced to fill the 
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gaps left by pre-existing offences, thereby criminalising the usurpation of another one’s 
identity to violate his right to privacy. The other criminal law provisions still cover the 
other aspects of identity theft, for instance the usurpation of somebody else’s identity to 
commit other crimes. 
Because of this ad-hoc approach, some relevant legal questions were unfortunately not 
touched upon, such as the broadening of the scope of the already existing offences (for 
instance from usurpation of name to usurpation of identity or identification information) 
and more generally, a coherent and equal protection of identity online and offline, the right 
to anonymity and the right to use pseudonyms, the required moral element in this context, 
etc. 
  
4 Evaluation 
 
LEGITIMACY. – The legal interests in need of protection in the initial phase very much depend 
upon the specific context and on the modi operandi, e.g.: 
- When the identification information is stored digitally, it is important to protect 
the integrity of the system and the data against insider and outsider attacks (CIA); 
- When the physical e-ID is stolen, the legal interest of property is also at stake.  
This variety of legal interests in the initial phase explains why we need to rely on very 
different criminal law provisions to counter the phenomenon, why the approach to 
criminalise is so differentiated and why finding legal loopholes is not obvious. At the same 
time, it explains why the phenomenon is already to a large extent covered by existing 
criminal law provisions, such as cybercrime, data protection law, forgery and ‘classic’ 
property offences.  
The real challenge seems to be the protection of the legal interests in the subsequent phase: 
the authenticity of identification information in an offline and online context and the 
privacy and dignity of the primary victim in the identification process.  
As we have seen above, identity has become a key to unlock many doors. A trustworthy 
identification process – assessing the link between a person, the identity information and 
a certain claim (i.e. a money transfer) – based on reliable identification information has 
become ever so important but at the same time ever so difficult in our information society 
where human-to-human-transactions are increasingly replaced by human-to-machine-
transactions (cf. supra).144 Because of its important societal role, the authenticity of the 
identification information is worth considering protecting through specific criminal 
law.145 A second reason is that perpetrators profit from this new role and new 
vulnerabilities to alter the truth in a way (by pretending to be someone else) which can 
cause dramatic consequences for the primary victim. Victims can suffer from these crimes 
in special ways, for instance, by being blacklisted.146 Protecting one’s identification information 
therefore is not only relevant because of its societal importance but also because of the specific harm identity 
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theft can cause to the primary victim. Because of these specific legal interests in the subsequent 
phase, it seems legitimate to criminalise identity theft as an autonomous offence, free from 
the used modi operandi in the initial phase, free from the motive of the perpetrator and 
more focused on the elements of falsehood and deceit and on the harm the identity theft 
may cause to the primary victim (in other words: the harmful consequences of the offence 
with regard to the primary victim).  
 
EFFICIENT CRIMINALISATION. – Most studies conclude that existing criminal law provisions 
suffice to cope with the phenomenon. Sometimes a legal vacuum is detected, as in France, 
where parliament decided to fill the specific lacuna by introducing a new offence, rather 
than altering the existing ones. One should indeed bear in mind that criminal law is the 
ultimate resort and over-criminalisation should be avoided. We should not criminalise 
behaviour that is already sufficiently criminalised through other offences (subsidiarity 
principle). On the other hand, the case law of the ECtHR suggest that efficiency will also be 
part of the considerations on criminalisation.147 For example, victims have to fall back on 
various criminal law provisions and are not recognised as victims of the identity theft as 
such. Consequently, primary victims are deprived of an adequate criminal law instrument 
to obtain redress and can only rely on secondary crimes committed by means of the ‘stolen’ 
identification information. The legal protection of primary victims will thus very much 
depend on the specific circumstances of the case. A disparate legal framework also 
complicates the international cooperation so indispensable in these cases. 
Furthermore, those who claim that the result offences such as fraud, money laundering, 
human trafficking etc. are sufficient to tackle identity theft, deny the important fact that 
identity theft is a type of offence that should be tackled in an early stage. Like document or 
data forgery, it is a type of behaviour that facilitates other offences, but might merit 
criminalisation as a separate (preparatory) act. One should also realise that identity theft 
can cause a very specific type of harm, which should not be seen as a mere ‘indirect 
effect’148 but on the contrary, as one of the key issues, namely the difficulty to restore the 
compromised identity of the primary victim. It affects the primary victim’s dignity and 
personal life, a legal interest which is not (sufficiently) covered by the preparatory offences 
(theft, hacking, etc.) nor the result offences (fraud, human trafficking …). 
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Finally, some studies stress the importance of statistical information in order to detect 
trends and developments. 149 Identity theft however, will often be the modi operandi or the 
motive rather than the offence and will as such not be registered as such. The official police 
database only allows registrations of existing (preparatory or result) offences, without 
knowing if the infringement was in fact committed to obtain or with the abuse of 
identification information. As a consequence, no statistical data are available. 
The French approach of autonomously criminalising identity theft is a step in the right 
direction, as it takes into account the interests of the primary victim: the crime must be 
committed with the purpose to harm the primary victim. However, we believe a better 
approach would be to criminalise identity theft in a more comprehensive way. We have 
seen that the disturbance of the peace or the violation of one’s dignity is not always the 
purpose of identity theft but the (potential) consequence. The motives of identity theft can 
vary significantly so that it seems more appropriate to implement these harmful 
consequences as the constitutive (potential) result of the crime, rather than the specific 
intent.  
 
TOLERATED ACTS OF IDENTITY THEFT. – This however does not mean that the offence of identity 
theft should not require a specific intent, quite the contrary. We believe that in order to 
avoid over-criminalisation, a criminal provision with regard to identity theft should 
require the intention to obtain an illicit advantage for oneself or another or to harm 
somebody. One must bear in mind that the use of a false identity can sometimes be justified. 
Using another identity, for instance the use of a pseudonym, can be a means to safeguard 
freedom of speech, as well as privacy and private communication. Anonymity also protects 
people from unwanted or unwarranted control by public or private entities, from 
screening of social networking sites by marketing companies, from fraudsters and would-
be intruders and from censorship and control by authoritarian regimes. Therefore, ‘honest 
people’ might also feel that the best way to protect their real identity is sometimes the use 
of a pseudonym. Criminal law should not encompass all such behaviour and therefore a 
specific intent should be required.150 Another way to exclude such behaviour, is to depend 
on the concept of ‘necessity’ developed by doctrine and accepted by case law in order to 
justify certain criminal acts. Sometimes the offender is torn between the violation of the 
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law and the need to protect a legal interest which is deemed more important or at least 
equally important than the legal interest protected by the offence.151 The violation of the 
latter could be justified when this violation was the ultimate remedy to protect the other, 
higher or equally important legal interest, for instance the use of a fictitious identity by 
undercover agents or refugees. 
 
BUT…NO OVERRELIANCE ON SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW. – Of course an autonomous 
criminalisation of identity theft will not make society more ‘fraud-proof’. Criminal law is 
not and cannot be the best way to prevent identity theft. It can only play a role in the 
aftermath of it, as the legal basis to start criminal investigations, to acknowledge the 
suffering of the primary victims and to give them a stepping stone in the legal process of 
recovery of their compromised identity. 
In considering strategies to tackle identity theft, we must also bear in mind that one does 
not necessarily need to get hold of someone’s primary identity to commit identity theft. 
Somebody can easily pretend to be someone else using photographs or other personal 
information, especially in the online context. Identity theft is thus no longer limited to 
specific situations, documents or procedures but has become a much broader type of 
crime. The problem therefore is not so much the quality of the document itself but the 
quality of the identity check, the process of identification, verification and authorization.152 
This identity check relies too much on the integrity of the primary identity document. 
Especially in a digitised environment, the automation and standardisation brings extra 
risks when we blindly trust on technology.153 The real answer in combatting identity theft, 
and identity fraud in general, is to make the identity check less predictable and uniform. 
By reducing the utility of the primary identity for non-authorised persons, its might 
become less appetising to predators. Tackling identity theft, and more in general identity 
fraud, demands a more differentiated approach, such as a regime under which the different 
identification information are independently controlled from each other and where this 
information can be compared.154 A sort of ‘compartmentalisation’ of the identification 
information in order to make the identity check more complex and varied, and thus less 
predictable. 
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III Criminal law responses in the aftermath of 
identity ‘theft’: how to restore the compromised 
identity? 
1 The road to restoration: a Via Dolorosa 
 
FOCUS. – This chapter is limited to the issue of identity theft because this specific form of 
identity fraud comes with several unresolved problems as to the aftermath of the crime. 
As said, we start from the assumption that identity theft can never be completely 
prevented. We try to detect defaults in dealing with the aftermath of identity theft and to 
make suggestions for improvement to prevent further damage and bring restoration for 
the victim.155 
 
ROMET V. THE NETHERLANDS156. – Once an identity is compromised, the primary victim faces 
enormous difficulties to ‘clean up the mess’. The case of Romet v. the Netherlands before 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is a perfect example of the Via Dolorosa 
victims of identity theft have to cross when they want to restore the damages and recover 
their ‘stolen’ identity. 
 
Romet alleged a violation of article 8 of the European Convention in Human Rights (ECHR). 
In November 1995, Romet had reported to the police that his driving licence had been 
stolen two months earlier. For financial reasons, he only applied for a new driving licence 
at the beginning of 1997. It was issued to him shortly thereafter, on 14 March 1997. In the 
period between his reporting of the theft and the issuance of the new licence, no less than 
1.737 motor vehicles had been registered on his name.157 They had been registered upon 
presentation of the stolen driving licence. 
As a result, Romet received large numbers of tax assessments, faced many prosecutions on 
the basis of the Motor Liability Insurance Act and was fined by the public prosecutor for 
traffic offences committed with the cars. When he refused to pay, he was detained for 
failure to comply with these fines and he ended up paying for the offences he had not 
committed. Furthermore, he was held liable for damage caused by uninsured vehicles 
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registered in his name and even his welfare benefits were stopped as his financial means 
were considered to be sufficient in view of the number of vehicles he apparently could 
effort. 
In 1996, Romet made several unsuccessful attempts to rectify the situation. He asked the 
Agency to annul all the vehicle registrations in his name and bar the one relating to his own 
car. He also wrote several complaints to the public prosecutor. In February 2004, he lodged 
an appeal against the refusal of the Public Prosecution Service to prosecute those 
responsible for the vehicle registrations in his name. The Court of Appeal stated that 
although the police could have acted more effectively in this case, by then it was too late to 
conduct any viable investigation. The Court however noted that a complete remission in a 
single administrative act of all the administrative sanctions could come in hand. No such 
remission took place. 
 
In January 2004 Romet once more requested the Agency to annul all the malicious 
registrations with retroactive effect. Three months later, the Agency partially granted the 
request and annulled 240 registrations as of that date. The Agency refused to annul the 
registration retroactively, stating that this would be detrimental to the reliability of the 
motor vehicle registration system. Romet objected to that, arguing that the system was 
already flawed by the malicious registrations and that the refusal would have enormous 
financial consequences for him. Moreover, in 1996, the Agency had offered to annul the 
stolen driving licence on condition that Romet would apply for a new one, condition he was 
unable to meet at that time for financial reasons. The Agency dismissed Romet’s objection, 
claiming that annulment with retroactive effect would lead to legal uncertainty and to 
interference of the Agency with competencies of other authorities, such as the Public 
Prosecution Service and the Tax and Customs Administration. Such decision could affect 
the legality of decisions of the other services based on the content of the motor vehicle 
registration system. Romet appealed against that decision to the Court. He reasoned that 
the requirement to have to apply for a new driving licence in order to stop new 
registrations in the name of the stolen driving licence was unjust and discriminatory.158 
The Court disregarded his arguments and held against Romet that he had waited more than 
seven years before starting proceedings. Again, Romet appealed to the Council of State. He 
indicated that his rights under article 8 ECHR were being violated due to the unlawful 
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registrations and that the motor vehicle registration system was flawed in that it allowed 
such large-scale fraud to occur so easily (breach of data protection law). He also claimed 
the deprivation of his liberty based on the malicious registrations violated article 5 ECHR 
and article 9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The council of 
State brushed these arguments aside. It reasoned that it could not be found that the refusal 
to grant the annulment with retroactive effect was not reasonable since ‘the purity of the 
vehicle register and legal certainty of the registration of vehicles justify such a policy.’ 
As to the asserted breach of data protection law, the Council stated that ‘it cannot be 
deduced from the fact that the guideline includes a right of correction that the processor of 
those personal data is obliged to do so sua sponte and unasked and might not make the 
desired correction dependent on a request to that effect.’ With regard to article 5 ECHR, the 
Council also disagreed, stating that these provisions contain an exception to these rights in 
order to secure the fulfilment of an obligation prescribed by law. Moreover, the Council 
noted that Romet had been deprived of his liberty because he had not taken the necessary 
measures to correct the wrongful registrations. 
 
Romet took his case to the ECtHR, alleging among others a violation of the articles 6.2, 8 
and 41 ECHR. 
The main arguments of the Dutch government were that: 
- the interference had been in accordance with the law at the relevant time and it 
was Romet who had delayed matters; 
- it was the responsibility of the holder of an official document to guard against 
abuse. Romet could reasonably have been expected to ask for a replacement of the 
driving license to be issued before but he remained passive for several months 
while the cars were being registered in his name; 
 
Romet argued that the interference did violate article 8 ECRM because the procedure in 
the Dutch Road Traffic Act to apply for a new licence was not the only way to prevent such 
fraud. In addition, the malicious registrations were incompatible with article 7 of the 
European Data Protection Directive because they had been made without his unambiguous 
consent. Therefore it had not been his fault: the government had been negligent.  
 
The ECtHR did not delve into the question whether Romet had been negligent or not. It 
stated in a few sentences that from the very moment Romet reported his driving licence as 
being stolen, the domestic authorities were no longer entitled to be unaware that whoever 
might have Romet’s driving license in his or her possession was someone other than 
Romet. Therefore, ‘swift administrative action to deprive a driving licence its usefulness as 
an identity document was possible and practicable.’159 The government should have 
responded immediately after Romet reported the theft, based on its positive obligation 
under article 8 of the Convention.160  
 
The alleged violation of article 6.2 ECHR was related to the detention and various fines 
which, according to Romet, were solely based on presumptions flowing from the 
registrations of vehicles in his name. The ECtHR stated that the defence argument that the 
traffic offences had been committed in his name by other persons was available to Romet 
before the trial Court so that he was not left without means of defence.161  
Romet finally claimed compensation of the damages. The ECtHR decided that Romet had 
suffered non-pecuniary damage and awarded him 9.000 EUR.162 
 
INVESTIGATION AND EFFECTIVE REMEDIES AS A POSITIVE STATE DUTY. – The main problem in the 
Romet case was not a lacuna in the criminalisation of identity theft, but the lack of 
appropriate measures to end the crime. The extent and the impact of the identity theft was 
completely underestimated. Romet was therefore continuously confronted with the 
harmful consequences of the theft of his identity. It raises the question to what extent 
states are under an obligation to put an end to the identity theft.  
 
On the basis of the positive state duty doctrine developed by the ECtHR, states have a 
positive duty to effectively protect their citizens from violations of their human rights, even 
in a horizontal relationship.163 The ECtHR also applies this doctrine in criminal law, 
especially in the context of article 8 ECHR – violations. This means that Member States 
should not only make the impugned act punishable, but also provide for a consistent 
comprehensive procedure to bring the offender to the Court and to restore the illegal 
situation. These last two positive state obligations are strongly intertwined and are the 
tailpiece of an adequate criminal law framework to tackle identity theft. In our information 
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society, states however cannot do this alone. The ‘electronic highway’, where numerous 
forms of communication and services are interrelated and interconnected through the 
sharing of common transmission media and carriers, has altered the procedural powers 
and investigative techniques.164 Once identification information is put online, it is de facto 
(technically) beyond the control of the intended user (the original identity bearer). It is in 
the hands of third parties, in particular service providers. They hold the data and thus de 
facto control the technical environment. That is why many traditional investigative 
measures do not longer work. Governments have to elaborate a legal framework that 
obliges third parties, in particular service providers, to cooperate with law 
enforcement.165 DE HERT calls it ‘system accountability’: the responsibility of the 
government for the proper societal use of ICT.166 This is necessary in our postmodern and 
digital era where the traditional governmental powers to regulate and enforce are 
threatened by the complex and global technological processes. The fact that many 
European states lost their monopoly on telecommunication channels adds to the need for 
private cooperation duties. Especially when human rights are at stake, cooperation cannot 
remain voluntary but demands enforceable legal rules (duties to cooperate). Moreover 
privacy legislation can restrict the possibilities of ‘voluntary’ cooperation.167 ‘Forced’ 
means that the law prescribes how the norm addressee is supposed to act, there is no 
choice. This duty to cooperate with law enforcement can be enforced through either an 
administrative or a criminal legal framework. The choice between these two is often a 
matter of national policy. However, sometimes the ECtHR will demand that states should 
use criminal law (cf. infra). 
 
We can distinguish three types of duties to cooperate: active, reactive and proactive 
duties.168 ‘Active’ means spontaneously, at one’s own initiative. In that case, there is no 
prior injunction, the duty originates directly from the legal provision. ‘Reactive’ means that 
the duty will only be activated after an injunction (e.g. a Court order). The initiative 
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therefore does not lie upon the norm addressee. Without such injunction, there is no duty 
to cooperate. Sometimes, the norm addressee will have to take certain measures to support 
an active or reactive obligation to cooperate. These are the so-called ‘proactive’ duties. 
They make sure that an active or reactive duty can be executed when necessary.  
In case of identity theft, the following measures should be considered: 
- Reporting mechanisms and notification duties for the data controller; 
- The identification of the perpetrator and the retention and preservation of data to 
assist law enforcement; 
- The blocking of access to and the rendering inaccessible of the illegal content, 
and/or the deletion of illegal content; 
- The restoration of the harmful consequences (re-acquiring and resetting the 
compromised identity). 
 
BALANCING. – Most of these procedural measures also touch upon negative obligations of 
states, derived from the right to privacy and freedom of expression. In terms of articles 8 
and 10 ECHR, each infringement by a public authority must be in accordance with the law 
and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Not only victims of identity theft but also internet providers and users should be protected 
against disproportionate state interference.  
This raises the difficult question of balancing conflicting fundamental human rights. On the 
one hand, the state must protect the rights of the victim of the identity theft, such as the 
right to privacy and data protection. As we have seen above, identity theft often threatens 
the physical and mental welfare of the victim.169 On the other hand, such protection will 
clash with other fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy of other internet users, 
their right to freedom of information and the freedom of internet service providers to 
conduct business and their freedom of expression (cf. infra). In K.U. v. Finland, the ECtHR 
held that: 
‘Although freedom of expression and confidentiality of communications are primary 
considerations and users of telecommunications and Internet services must have a 
guarantee that their own privacy and freedom of expression will be respected, such 
guarantee cannot be absolute and must yield on occasion to other legitimate 
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imperatives, such as the prevention of disorder or crime or the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. Without prejudice to the question whether the conduct of the 
person who placed the offending advertisement on the Internet can attract the 
protection of Articles 8 and 10, having regard to its reprehensible nature, it is 
nonetheless the task of the legislator to provide the framework for reconciling the 
various claims which compete for protection in this context.’170 
 
Special notice should also be given to jurisdictional issues concerning these criminal law 
measures. In the following chapters, we will pay specific attention to their enforcement in 
an online context as this creates new challenges. Perpetrators can easily hide their identity 
online by using pseudonyms or false identities and profit from the ubiquitous nature of the 
internet to disseminate harmful or illegal content on large scale. Online content respects 
neither national rules nor boundaries. This complicates efforts to find an appropriate 
balance between the different human rights at stake and the fight against the distribution 
of illegal content. In its Action Plan for a safer use of the Internet in 1998, the European 
Commission for instance stated that ‘harmful content needs to be treated differently from 
illegal content’.171 Yet what is harmful or offensive in one country may be deemed illegal 
in another and vice versa.172  
As we will see further, it will not always be easy to strike the right balance between these 
rights. This is partly due to the complex international legal framework. 
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2 Complex international legal framework 
 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE. – Already in 1995 the Council of Europe adopted a set of principles in 
order to respond adequately to the new challenges raised by new technologies. The 
Committee of Ministers adopted Recommendation (95)13 of 11 September 1995 
Concerning Problems of Criminal Procedural Law Connected with Information 
Technology173 to ensure that investigating authorities possess appropriate and effective 
powers to investigate computer-related crimes. In 1996, a Committee of Experts was set 
up to further reflect on necessary steps in the fight against cybercrime. They recommended 
to adopt a binding international instrument, which resulted in the signature of the 
Convention on Cybercrime on 23 November 2001.174 This Convention is the first and only 
international treaty on cybercrime. Next to substantive criminal law provisions, it contains 
procedural provisions, such as the expedited preservation (art. 16 and 17), production 
order (art. 18), search and seizure of stored computer data (art. 19), real-time collection of 
traffic data (art. 20) and interception of content data (art. 21).  
In 2008, the ‘Guidelines for the cooperation between law enforcement and Internet Service 
Providers’ were adopted by a working group set up by the Council of Europe.175 These 
Guidelines aim to streamline the interaction between law enforcement authorities and 
ISPs with regard to cybercrime. They explicitly encourage internet service providers to 
cooperate with law enforcement agencies in order to minimise the abuse of their services 
for criminal activity. 
 
EUROPEAN UNION. – The European Union has adopted several instruments which may play 
an important role in ending and restoring identity theft: 
- Data protection Directive176  
                                                          
173 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (95)13 of 11 September 1995 
Concerning Problems of Criminal Procedural Law Connected with Information Technology 
(Hereafter: Recommendation (95)13). 
174 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, Budapest, 23 November 2001, ETS no. 185. 
175 http://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/lea-/-isp-cooperation  
176 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, OJ 1995 L 281, 31. This Directive will be repealed and replaced by the General Data 
Protection Regulation with effect from 25 May 2018 (articles 94 and 99 GDPR). 
- Framework Directive177 
- e-Privacy Directive178 
- e-Commerce Directive179 
- Data retention Directive180  
- Cyber-attack Directive181 
- General Data Protection Regulation (hereafter GDPR)182 
Each of these Directives has its own scope and its own framework. As we will see further, 
sometimes there will be an overlap which further complicates matters even more.  
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3 Concrete procedural mechanisms 
3.1 Reporting mechanisms and data breach notification laws 
3.1.1 In general 
FIRST STEP IN SWIFT RESPONSE. – Identity theft cases can at the same time qualify as a criminal 
offence, as well as violations of the right to privacy and data protection of the primary 
victim. Identity theft can thus be reported as a crime and as a violation of data protection 
law (cf. supra). A recent study on identity theft concluded: ‘The establishment of a single EU-
level reporting site might be a worthwhile avenue for exploration, as would the use at the 
national level of harmonised reporting forms/questions, which would further facilitate cross-
border investigations’.183  
The reporting of a data breach by the data controller is the first step in the fight against 
identity theft. Reporting mechanisms would also support the more systematic collection of 
statistical data.184  
Many breaches, however, remain undetected and if detected, are not reported to 
authorities or potential (primary) victims.185 In the summer of 2011, for instance, 
DigiNotar, a Dutch digital certificate authority experienced a security breach which led to 
its bankruptcy and which allowed the attackers to generate fake PKI certificates.186 These 
fake certificates were used to wiretap online communications in Iran. DigiNotar did not 
immediately report the incident to its customers or government authorities, which put the 
security and privacy of millions of citizens at risk.187 This case shows that companies who 
deliver important digital society services, should quickly inform the relevant parties (users 
involved, corporate customers involved, government authorities) about significant 
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security incidents. Immediate reporting of the incident and a swift response would have 
limited the impact considerably.188  
The issue with regard to these reporting mechanisms is therefore that primary victims 
often do not know that their personal data has been compromised because their data are 
in the hands of other parties. Fearful of reputational damages, these companies will not be 
so eager to voluntarily inform the primary victims of identity theft that their data has been 
compromised and that they are a potential victim of identity theft. That is why security and 
data breach notification duties are becoming increasingly popular with European 
legislators.189 In that case, the societal harm caused by the security and/or data breach 
outweighs the companies’ interest to keep the incident secret and these companies are 
legally obliged to inform the authorities and/or (potential) victims about the data security 
incident. The goal is to create transparency about these incidents and to limit their impact.  
Another reason for the increasing EU attention to mandatory incident reporting is that 
national incidents can have a cross-border impact. So, in order to improve security across 
the EU, common rules are needed. Furthermore, service providers often operate across EU 
countries and it would cumbersome for them to adapt their systems to different national 
legislation.190  
The EU has already developed legislation with the objective to have a consistent and 
harmonised legal framework. We will first examine the different data breach notifications 
and will then evaluate whether this framework is indeed consistent.  
 
3.1.2 Legal framework 
E-PRIVACY DIRECTIVE. –The e-Privacy Directive, as amended in 2009,191 is the first legal 
instrument containing a data breach notification duty for data holders. As soon as the 
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provider of publicly available electronic communications services becomes aware that a 
data breach has occurred, it should notify the breach to the competent national 
authority.192 Next to that, the individuals whose data and privacy could be adversely affected 
by the breach should be notified without delay in order to allow them to take the necessary 
precautions.193 The notification should also include information about measures taken by 
the provider to address the breach, as well as recommendations for the subscriber or 
individual concerned. 194 
 
SCOPE. - This duty is however limited in scope. First of all it is limited to the 
telecommunications sector, and more particular to publicly available electronic 
communication services. This rules out a large amount of companies who also hold 
personal data and where the risks of identity theft are equally high. For instance, in June 
2012 millions of hashed passwords of LinkedIn were disclosed on public hacker forums, 
urging millions of users to change their passwords because their personal data could be at 
risk.195 This type of data breach at the time was not covered by incident reporting 
legislation. However this situation would now fall under the recently adopted General Data 
Protection regulation196 that introduced a more general notification duty (cf. infra). 
Secondly, under the e-Privacy Directive the providers are not obliged to report to the 
individual if the provider has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the competent authority 
that it has implemented appropriate technological protection measures, and that those 
measures were applied to the data concerned by the security breach. Such technological 
protection measures shall render the data unintelligible to any person who is not 
authorised to access it (article 4.3). 
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DETAILS NOTIFICATION. - Next to the limited scope, it also remained unclear when 
telecommunications service providers were required to notify breaches, nor was there a 
harmonised list of information to be provided. The EU Member States were free to 
interpret the rules themselves. This led to legal uncertainty and could even result in 
competitive distortion. Regulation No 611/2013 of 24 June 2013 therefore harmonised 
this matter.197 It sets out the conditions under which data supervisors and (potential) 
victims must be informed and within which time-periods after the incident, and provides 
a basic template for such notifications (in the form of an Annex specifying the information 
to be communicated). The notification to the competent national authority must take place 
no later than 24 hours after the detection of the personal data breach, where feasible. 
Detection of a personal data breach shall be deemed to have taken place when the provider 
has acquired sufficient awareness that a security incident has occurred that led to personal 
data being compromised, in order to make a meaningful notification as required under the 
Regulation. 198 
The Regulation also clarifies in which situations a personal data breach is likely to 
adversely affect the personal data or privacy of a subscriber or individual. This shall be 
assessed by taking account of, in particular, the following circumstances199:  
 the nature and content of the personal data concerned, in particular where the data 
concerns financial information, special categories of data referred to in Article 8(1) 
of Directive 95/46/EC, as well as location data, internet log files, web browsing 
histories, e-mail data, and itemised call lists;  
 the likely consequences of the personal data breach for the subscriber or individual 
concerned, in particular where the breach could result in identity theft or fraud, 
physical harm, psychological distress, humiliation or damage to reputation; and  
 the circumstances of the personal data breach, in particular where the data has 
been stolen or when the provider knows that the data are in the possession of an 
unauthorised third party.  
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The Regulation also specifies when data are considered unintelligible. This is when the 
data are encrypted or hashed and the key used to decrypt or hash the data has not been 
compromised in any security breach, nor generated so that it cannot be ascertained by 
available technological means by any person who is not authorised to access the key.200  
The Regulation entered into force on 25 August 2013. Unlike directives, Regulations are 
directly applicable across the EU, meaning that all providers of publicly available electronic 
communications services must immediately observe the new rules in the Regulation in 
cases of data breaches.201 
 
THE E-PRIVACY REGULATION. – On January tenth 2017 the Commission proposed a Regulation 
concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic 
communications (hereafter e-Privacy Regulation).202 This Regulation will repeal the e-
Privacy Directive. The Regulation has several aims, including ensuring consistency and 
coherency with the new General Data Protection Regulation (see infra).203 In this regard 
the notification duty under the e-Privacy Directive is not adopted in the new Regulation. 
Instead only the notification duty under the GDPR will be applicable to publicly available 
electronic communication services (see infra III. 3.1.3).  
FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE. - In 2009, another notification duty was implemented in article 13a 
of Directive 2002/21 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services (Framework Directive).204 This article states that providers of 
public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services 
shall notify the competent national regulatory authority of a breach of security or loss of 
integrity that has had a significant impact on the operation of networks or services. 
When necessary, for instance in case of cross-border incidents, the national regulatory 
authority shall inform the national regulatory authorities in other Member States and the 
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European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA). It may also inform the public 
or require the providers to do so, where it determines that disclosure of the breach is in 
the public interest. 
 
EIDAS REGULATION. 205 - Article 19.2 of the eIDAS Regulation of 2014 also contains a 
notification duty for trust service providers. It is similar to article 13a Framework 
Directive. ‘Trust service’ means any electronic service consisting in the creation, 
verification, validation, handling and preservation of electronic signatures, electronic 
seals, electronic time stamps, electronic documents, electronic delivery services, website 
authentication, and electronic certificates, including certificates for electronic signature 
and for electronic seals.  
Trust service providers must, without undue delay but in any event within 24 hours after 
having become aware of it, notify the competent supervisory body and other relevant 
bodies206 of any breach of security or loss of integrity that has a significant impact on the 
trust service provided or on the personal data maintained therein. 
Where the breach of security or loss of integrity is likely to adversely affect a natural or 
legal person to whom the trusted service has been provided, the trust service provider shall 
also notify the natural or legal person of the breach of security or loss of integrity without 
undue delay. 
Where appropriate, in particular if a breach of security or loss of integrity concerns two or 
more Member States, the notified supervisory body shall inform the supervisory bodies in 
other Member States concerned and ENISA. 
The notified supervisory body shall inform the public or require the trust service provider 
to do so, where it determines that disclosure of the breach of security or loss of integrity is 
in the public interest. 
 
E-COMMERCE DIRECTIVE. – Another duty to notify breaches is ‘hidden’ in article 15 of the e-
Commerce directive: ‘Member States may establish obligations for information society 
service providers promptly to inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal 
activities undertaken or information provided by recipients of their service (…)’. Identity theft 
or fraud qualifies in most Member States as an illegal activity (cf. supra). This obligation 
                                                          
205 Regulation No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on 
electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and 
repealing Directive 1999/93/EC OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 73–114 
206 such as the competent national body for information security or the data protection authority 
was introduced to compensate the system of limited liability of these ISPs (cf. infra). In 
exchange for that exemption, these ISPs are obliged to inform the competent authorities to 
allow them to take the necessary measures, such as the rendering inaccessible of the 
offending information (cf. infra).  
Belgium, for instance, has implemented such an obligation to inform in the law transposing 
the e-Commerce Directive into its national legal framework.207 This duty to inform is 
enforced through the imposition of a criminal fine of 26 to 25.000 euro in case of non-
compliance. 
Of course, these providers will sometimes also process personal data themselves. In that 
case there can be an overlap between the e-Commerce Directive and the Directives 
regulating the processing of personal data and the question arises how these overlapping 
Directives relate to each other.  
The e-Commerce Directive emphasises that the protection of personal data is solely 
governed by the Data Protection Directive and e-Privacy Directive. The relationship 
between the different Directives is handled by article 1(5)b of the e-Commerce Directive. 
That article suggests that the liability exemptions provided in the e-Commerce Directive 
should not be applied in cases concerning the liability of ‘data controllers’, as this is a 
matter regulated by the Data protection Directive and the e-Privacy Directive.208 It should 
therefore be examined whether an ISP acts as a ‘neutral’ internet intermediary, falling 
under the scope of the e-Commerce Directive, or as a ‘data controller’, falling under the 
scope of the Data Protection Directive. Recital (47) of the Data Protection Directive states 
that providers of electronic telecommunications or electronic mail services may be 
considered controllers ‘in respect of the processing of the additional personal data necessary 
for the operation of the service’ but will generally not be considered controllers ‘in respect 
of the personal data contained in the message’.  
 
GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION209. – The General Data Protection Regulation of 27 
April 2016 introduces an obligation for controllers and processors to notify personal data 
breaches. The Regulation will replace the Data Protection Directive and shall apply from 
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25 May 2018 onwards. A controller under this Regulation is the natural or legal person, 
public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the 
purposes and means of the processing of personal data.210 A processor is a natural or legal 
person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf of 
the controller. Personal data breach is defined as a breach of security leading to the 
accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access 
to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed.211 The question can be raised 
what is meant by ‘a breach of security’.212 Do organisational security measures result 
under it or only technical security measures covering IT security? If we go for a broad 
interpretation the unauthorised disclosure by employees who were authorised to access 
the data concerned, but misused their access rights would fall under ‘breach of security’.213  
 
NOTIFICATION TO THE SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY. Article 33 of the Regulation contains the 
obligation of the controller to notify a personal data breach to the supervisory authority 
competent, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of it. There is no notification 
duty if the personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of 
natural persons. Recital 75 of the Regulation clarifies that the risk to the rights and 
freedoms of natural persons, of varying likelihood and severity, may result from personal 
data processing which could lead to physical, material or non-material damage, and 
includes among other things identity theft or fraud. Where the notification to the 
supervisory authority is not made within 72 hours, it shall be accompanied by reasons for 
the delay. The notification shall at least: (a) describe the nature of the personal data breach 
including where possible, the categories and approximate number of data subjects 
concerned and the categories and approximate number of personal data records 
concerned; (b) communicate the name and contact details of the data protection officer or 
other contact point where more information can be obtained; (c) describe the likely 
consequences of the personal data breach; (d) describe the measures taken or proposed to 
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be taken by the controller to address the personal data breach, including, where 
appropriate, measures to mitigate its possible adverse effects.214 The processor shall 
notify the controller without undue delay after becoming aware of a personal data 
breach.215 
 
COMMUNICATION TO THE DATA SUBJECT.- Article 34 of the Regulation obliges the controller to 
communicate the personal data breach to the data subject when the personal data breach 
is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. The 
communication to the data subject shall describe in clear and plain language the nature of 
the personal data breach and contain at least the name and contact details of the data 
protection officer or other contact point where more information can be obtained, the 
likely consequences of the personal data breach, the measures taken or proposed to be 
taken by the controller to address the personal data breach, including, where appropriate, 
measures to mitigate its possible adverse effects.216 According to article 34 (3) there will 
be no communication duty if any of the following conditions are met: ‘(a) the controller has 
implemented appropriate technical and organisational protection measures, and those 
measures were applied to the personal data affected by the personal data breach, in 
particular those that render the personal data unintelligible to any person who is not 
authorised to access it, such as encryption; (b) the controller has taken subsequent 
measures which ensure that the high risk to the rights and freedoms of data subjects is no 
longer likely to materialise; (c) it would involve disproportionate effort. In such a case, 
there shall instead be a public communication or similar measure whereby the data 
subjects are informed in an equally effective manner.’ The supervisory authority may 
inform the data subject if the controller has not already done so.217  
 
If controllers or processors neglect their notification duties under the regulation, 
administrative fines up to 10 000 000 EUR, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 2 % of 
the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher, 
can be imposed.218 
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 3.1.3  Evaluation: a complex patchwork of notification duties 
OVERVIEW. – Under the Data Protection Directive there was no general obligation on 
controllers to notify data breaches either to data protection authorities or to the affected 
data subjects.219 However, as we have seen, some sector-specific notification duties were 
put in place. Until the enforcement of the General Data Protection Regulation, in the context 
of personal data breaches,220 only providers of publicly available electronic 
communications services and trust services are required to notify incidents at a national 
and EU level. With the introduction of the GDPR there will exist a duty for all controllers to 
notify personal data breaches that put the rights and freedoms of natural persons at risk. 
The notification duties as described in the different EU instruments are summarised in the 
Annex to this report.  
 
EFFECTIVENESS OF NOTIFICATION DUTIES.- The question remains if these notification duties are 
effective. A significant degree of uncertainty remains on certain key issues, such as who 
must be informed, which information must be provided and its level of detail, which 
safeguards should surround the disclosure, how to co-ordinate EU wide responses and 
exactly which companies will be subject to the incident reporting. Practical guidance is 
thus very much needed to enhance legal certainty.  
In an evaluation and review of the e-Privacy Directive, a study prepared for the European 
Commission by Deloitte, the effectiveness of article 4 e-Privacy Directive is scrutinized. One 
of the key findings is that there are ‘practical difficulties when it comes to the application 
of personal data breach notifications: confusion for businesses about which authority to 
contact, confusion based on the duplication with the GDPR, few breaches are notified 
hinting towards a low level of compliance, enforcement powers of authorities not always 
appropriate’221 
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A PATCHWORK OF NOTIFICATION DUTIES. - The co-existing of different notification regimes 
creates (too) many reporting obligations. This leads to additional and unjustified burdens 
for businesses and confusion over the competency related to breaches. In some cases the 
same incidents are reported to different authorities causing duplications.222  
The GDPR lies a notification duty on all ‘data controllers’, and thus overlaps with all the 
other notification duties under EU law. However it still remains relevant to know when 
these other duties apply, since they all differ223 and the GDPR normally will function as lex 
generalis. Meaning that it can be overruled by more specific notification duties in other EU 
instruments qualifying as lex specialis.224 For example under the eIDAS Regulation trust 
service providers must notify within 24 hours. This lex specialis will override the 72 hours 
term in the GDPR. 225 
 
The EU Commission took this concern into account and did not include a separate data 
notification duty in its proposal for the e-Privacy Regulation, replacing the e-Privacy 
Directive. From May 2018 onwards providers of publicly available electronic 
communications services thus will no longer have a separate notifications duty under the 
e-Privacy Regulation next to their duty under the GDPR. If we compare the GDPR with the 
e-Privacy Directive we can conclude that the obligations under the GDPR are more limited. 
Under the e-Privacy Directive telecom providers must notify all personal data breaches 
within 24 hours to the DPA. The GDPR, on the other hand, foresees in a timeframe of 72 
hours and only requires notification where the personal data breach is likely to result in a 
risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. According to ENISA, the notification 
duty for telecom service providers will therefore be made more efficient and less costly.226  
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THE GDPR TOO LENIENT? On the other hand, according to DE HERT and PAPAKONSTANTINOU, 
the data breach notification duty under the GDPR might be too flexible.227 As discussed 
above, the GDPR follows a three level approach. If the personal data breach is ‘unlikely to 
result in a risk for the rights and freedoms of individuals’ controllers have no notification 
duty at all. If there is a risk, they need to notify the competent Data Protection Authority 
(DPA). If this risk is ‘high’ they also need to notify the data subject.228 However even at this 
stage controllers can avoid notifying the individual by taking ex post measures (see article 
34 (3) GDPR). Therefore ‘in practice very few notifications are expected to indeed reach 
the public in a meaningful format’.229 It is noteworthy that the initial proposal by the 
Commission foresaw in a broader notification duty. As in the e-Privacy Directive, all 
personal data breaches had to be notified to the DPA and the data subject had to be notified 
when the breach was likely to adversely affect the protection of the personal data or 
privacy of the data subject.230 However, controllers are very reluctant swiftly to 
communicate data breaches to individuals, because this would incur substantial costs and 
reputational damage.231 This explains why notification duties in the discussed EU 
instruments are layered. In first instance controllers are only obliged to inform the 
supervisory authorities and only in second instance the individuals concerned.232  
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FEW BREACHES NOTIFIED. – From a study prepared for the EU Commission by Deloitte it 
appears that the numbers of breach notifications in many Member States are very low or 
even inexistent. Some authorities explained that the lack of criteria made it difficult to 
determine which breaches need to be notified. Correspondingly, some authorities 
responding to Deloitte’s online survey indicated that businesses in some cases fail to report 
personal data breaches.233 
 
PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT. - Finally, effective enforcement and a 
sanctions mechanism are important to ensure the objectives are achieved. Here the 
question surges whether notification duties should be enforced through administrative 
sanctions or criminal sanctions. In 2009, the Article 29 Working Party recommended to 
give the national data protection authorities more power, including the power to impose 
financial sanctions on controllers and processors.234 However, it was pointed out during a 
workshop which the Commission held with competent Member State authorities, that not 
all competent authorities have the power to enact penalties in case of violations of article 
4.235 
In Belgium there is a legislative proposal pending, which extends the telecom data breach 
notification duty to all sectors (to the extent that they process personal data). The idea is 
to enforce it through administrative sanctions as 1) current breaches are quasi never 
prosecuted in reality, 2) administrative authorities can respond more quickly (and thus 
more effectively) and 3) the criminal sanctions are low in relation to the market value of 
personal data, thereby creating little deterrent effect.236 The GDPR also opted for 
administrative sanctions. High fines apply when a data controller neglects his notification 
duties (supra, article 83 (4) a GDPR). As we will see further on, there are specific 
jurisdictional issues which hinder enforceability. 
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EXCESSIVE BURDEN? - Enhancing legal certainty and enforcement is however not the only 
concern. Notification duties go hand in hand with different costs.237 Concerns further raise 
whether such mandatory incident reporting will hinder business growth and competition. 
Such reporting requirements could indeed impose significant administrative burdens and 
cause reputational risks for businesses, particularly for SMEs, which may not have the 
resources required to meet these standards. Article 13a Framework Directive and article 
19.2 eIDAS Regulation both state that the public must be informed when the security 
incident has an impact on public interest. It remains unclear when this is the case and which 
information should be disclosed. This is however of great importance to the undertakings 
who can suffer economic losses and reputational damages when this information would 
unnecessarily be publicly revealed. One might even argue that the information that does 
not fall under the scope of the notification duty qualifies as confidential business 
information and is as such worth protecting against illegal disclosure. So there is a very fine 
line in this case between information that must be disclosed and information that may not 
be disclosed. This issue should be clarified. These reporting requirements may also not 
hinder a quick and effective response to the incident. Emergency response should remain 
the prior concern.238 Hence, a careful balance between stimulating better exchange of 
information and adding unnecessary burdens to businesses should be struck. There are 
also some other concerns. Disclosing of information in order to protect the privacy rights 
of the victim may also pose new threats to privacy rights when that disclosure is not 
regulated in an adequate way, f.i. more information than necessary is disclosed, the 
disclosure is not surrounded with the necessary security requirements etc. This issue 
should also be addressed. 
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3.2 Identifying the identity ‘thief’ 
3.2.1 In general 
ANONYMITY IN CYBERSPACE. – The enactment of a criminal offence has limited deterrent effect 
if there are no means to identify the actual offenders and to bring them to justice.239 The 
internet offers users more possibilities to protect their real identity than many other 
channels of communication do. Such a protection is not always a bad thing. As already 
explained, in cyberspace anonymity is a means to safeguard freedom of speech, as well as 
privacy and private communication (supra III. 4). But neither of these two fundamental 
rights is an absolute one. In some situations and under some conditions, states may 
intervene (Article 8.2 and 10.2 ECHR). This is definitely justified to detect crime, to collect 
evidence or to identify and prosecute the perpetrators. States may therefore, within the 
limits set by their national legislations and by the texts protecting fundamental rights and 
freedoms, uncover the identity of criminal suspects on the internet.  
These days, much of the information which is of interest to the criminal investigation is not 
held by the government, but by private entities with relevant technical knowhow and 
access to the information. Most service providers however do not execute effective or 
reliable identity controls. Yet, they do dispose of a large amount of data that might help to 
retrieve someone’s real identity. A lot of this ‘identification data’ will be useful in a criminal 
investigation in order to identify the perpetrator. The challenge is how to enable the 
service providers to hand over this information to law enforcement.  
 
3.2.2 Legal basis for identification orders 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE. – Different initiatives by the Council of Europe introduce 
recommendations to identify perpetrators. Recommendation (95)13 already 
recommended states to impose specific obligations on service providers which offer 
telecommunication services either through public or private networks to identify their 
users when ordered by the competent investigating authority.240 Article 18 Cybercrime 
Convention further obliges the Member States to adopt legislative and other measures to 
order a service provider offering its services in the territory of the Party to submit 
subscriber information relating to such services in that service provider’s possession or 
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control. Subscriber information means, among others, the subscriber’s identity, his 
address, telephone number etc.241 On the basis of this article, Member States can thus 
impose a duty to disclose the identity of the user of an ICT-application to law enforcement, 
when ordered to do so by a competent authority. Such orders should help investigators to 
link telephone numbers, email-addresses and IP addresses to specific users.  
These type of orders were, among others, deemed necessary as service providers are at the 
same time obliged to ensure the confidentiality of the identification data, among others by 
data protection law and other secrecy obligations. Most of these obligations are enforced 
by the threat of criminal sanctions. Therefore, in order to prevent contractual and criminal 
liability, they can only disclose the information when they are legally obliged to do so.242 
 
DATA RETENTION DIRECTIVE. – No European instrument directly deals with the obligation to 
hand over identification data. The recently annulled Data Retention Directive was based 
on the principle that data should be available for the purpose of investigation, detection 
and the prosecution of serious crimes in relation to the use of ICT. It thereto imposed an 
obligation to retain certain categories of identification, location and traffic data for a period 
between six months and two years in order to ensure their availability, upon request, for 
law enforcement agencies. How these law enforcement agencies access the data, is a matter 
of national procedure. On the 8th of April 2014, in the Digital Rights Ireland case, the CJEU 
declared the Directive invalid.243 The Court ruled that the principle of data retention 
serves, under clear and precise conditions, a legitimate and general interest, namely the 
fight against serious crime and the protection of public security. The Directive however 
disproportionally infringed the rights of privacy and data protection and should have 
provided more safeguards to protect these fundamental rights. As a result of the invalidity, 
data could only be retained under EU law on the basis of article 15 (1) e-Privacy Directive.  
 
DATA RETENTION AND THE E-PRIVACY DIRECTIVE. - Article 15 (1) of the e-Privacy Directive 
allows Member States to create national rules which restrict the rights and obligations 
provided for under the general rules where it is ‘necessary, appropriate and proportionate’ 
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to do so for the purposes of safeguarding national security, defence, public security, and 
the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences. Article 15 (1) 
further states: ‘To this end, Member States may, inter alia, adopt legislative measures 
providing for the retention of data for a limited period justified on the grounds laid down in 
this paragraph.’ In the Tele2 Sverige case244 the question was raised whether a general 
obligation to retain traffic and location data is allowed in light of the Digital Rights Ireland case, Article 15(1) 
of e-Privacy Directive and Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the EU Charter.245 And if so, whether such general 
data retention obligation must be accompanied by all the safeguards laid down by the Court in paragraphs 60 
to 68 of Digital Rights Ireland in connection with access to the data, the period of retention and the protection 
and security of the data. 
 
On the 21st of December 2016 the Court ruled that ‘article 15 (1) e-Privacy Directive read in 
the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, for the 
purpose of fighting crime, provides for general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and 
location data of all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic 
communication.’246 Furthermore, the Court stated that national legislation governing the 
protection and security of traffic and location of data should only allow the competent 
national authorities access to the retained data, in the context of fighting crime, if the 
following requirements are met: the objective must be the fighting of serious crime, there 
must be a prior review by a Court or independent administrative authority and the data 
must be retained within the EU.247  
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PERPLEXITY. - The judgement is a real stumbling block for the investigation of crimes. 
Especially the requirement of ‘serious crime’248 is problematic in the fight against ID theft. 
Not every type of ID theft will qualify as a serious crime. The Court states that ‘the 
effectiveness of the fight against serious crime, in particular organised crime and terrorism, 
may depend to a great extent on the use of modern investigation techniques, such an objective 
of general interest’.249 In the case of cybercrime not only serious crimes depend on modern 
investigation techniques. A single person can commit a variety of e-crimes without any 
accomplice or terroristic motive with only the help of a computer. Furthermore, even if the 
requirement of a serious crime is met, only data retention for the future is possible. In many 
cases this will be too little, too late. A runaway teenager case (not serious) can become a 
murder case (serious) if the body is found months later. Localisation or communication 
data from the period of disappearance would be very important for the murder 
investigation, but will no longer be available. 
 
DATA RETENTION AND THE ECTHR. - In the case of Figueiredo Teixeira v. Andorra250 before the 
ECtHR, Mr Teixeira complained that the storage of data relating to his telephone 
communications amounted to an unjustified interference with his right to respect for his 
private life under article 8 of the ECHR.251 Mr Teixeira, who was suspected of the serious 
offence of drug trafficking, was arrested on 5 December 2011.252 The judge responsible for 
the criminal investigation asked Andorra Telecom to hand over a list of incoming and 
outgoing calls from two telephone numbers pertaining to Mr Figueiredo Teixeira over the 
period from 15 August to 4 December 2011, and to inform him of the identities of 
subscribers holding the numbers set out in the list.253 
The ECtHR decided unanimously that article 8 ECHR had not been violated. It stated that 
the interference was prescribed by law and emphasised that the Andorran procedure 
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provides a wide range of safeguards against arbitrary actions. These included the 
involvement of a judge to grant prior authorisation for the measure, exclusively applicable 
to very serious offences; a statutory time-limit on the measure; and finally, the fact that the 
applicant could at any time contest the lawfulness of evidence gathered during 
proceedings.254 The impugned interference had a legitimate aim, that is the prevention of 
crime as foreseen in article 8. Furthermore the measure was deemed proportional by the 
Court. 255 From this judgement it seems to appear that the compulsory storage of personal 
data by a telecom company as such is not a problem under the Convention. The 
communication of this data however, has to meet certain conditions and safeguards to be 
in accordance with the right to privacy. This is the main difference between this case and 
the Tele2 Sverige case of the CJEU. 256 The assessment of a breach of the right to privacy257 
is similar but according to the CJEU takes place in an earlier stage, namely at the time of 
the retention of the data, whereas the ECtHR only verifies if the subsequent use, the 
communication of data to the authorities, meets the necessary safeguards.  
 
NATIONAL DATA RETENTION LAWS RENDERED INVALID? - In 2015 the Belgian Constitutional 
Court, relying on the judgement of the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland, annulled the Belgian 
data retention law258 that partially implemented the Data Retention Directive in Belgian 
law.259 Recently (May 2016) Belgium adopted a new Data Retention law.260 Just as with 
the annulled legislation, a general retention duty for telecom and internet providers is 
introduced. However, in the reformed law extra privacy guarantees are built in. For 
example, data should only be retained for 12 months and there is no longer a possibility to 
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prolong the retention period.261 The security of the stored data is also enhanced by, among 
other things, a duty to make the stored data illegible for unauthorised persons.262 Against 
the background of the Tele2 judgement this legislation is more than likely to face a new 
annulment by the Belgian Constitutional Court since it still imposes general data retention 
and only restricts the access to it is .263 Not only Belgium, but all EU-countries with a 
general data retention duty will need to adapt their national legislation to bring it in line 
with the CJEU judgement. This will certainly be the case for Sweden and the UK, whose 
legislations led to the preliminary questions in the Tele2 case.  
 
3.2.3 Case law with regard to identification orders 
ECHR LIMITS TO ANONYMITY. – In the case of the European Court of Human Rights K.U. v. 
Finland,264 a Finnish service provider refused to divulge the identity of the holder of an IP 
address to the victim of an identity theft,265 regarding itself bound by the confidentiality 
of telecommunications. At that time, there was no Finnish legal provision authorising the 
service provider to disclose telecommunications identification information. The disclosure 
of this information would have breached professional secrecy, in this case qualified as 
‘malicious misrepresentation’.  
 
The Finnish government argued that it was a private individual who interfered with K.U.’s 
private life and that according to Finnish legislation, a service provider has an obligation 
to verify the identity of the sender before publishing a defamatory announcement on its 
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website.266 Failure to identify is a criminal offence which has sufficient deterrent effect and 
the government had thus taken the necessary measures to ensure the protection of private 
life.267 
On the basis of a violation of article 8 ECRM, the ECtHR required Finland to ensure access 
to communication data in order to identify the perpetrator who had violated another 
individual’s right to private life and to enable effective criminal prosecution. As 
telecommunication data are qualified as personal data and also fall under the protection of 
article 8 ECHR268, the ECtHR thus had to balance these two types of privacy. The ECtHR is 
very clear: it is necessary to disclose communication data to law enforcement in order to 
ensure an effective and efficient protection of private life. As such the Court contributes to 
the difficult balancing exercise between on the one hand the confidentiality of 
communication data, guaranteeing as well the ‘formal sphere’ of the right to privacy (art. 8 
ECRM) as the right to freedom of information (art. 10 ECRM), and on the other hand the 
‘substantive’ right to privacy.  
 
ASSURE AUTHORISED ACCESS, EXCLUDE UNAUTHORISED ACCESS – The ECtHR thus obliges Member 
States to assure effective protection of private life in a digital context and thereto requires 
effective means of identifying perpetrators in that context. A duty to verify, sanctioned with 
a criminal penalty in case of non-compliance, apparently was not sufficient. Law 
enforcement must be enabled to access data in order to identify the perpetrator of a serious 
violation of private life. 
In the same year, the ECtHR decided in I. v. Finland, that the respect for private life under 
article 8 ECHR, holds a positive obligation for the state to provide for effective information 
security measures to exclude the possibility of unauthorised access to data.269 In this case, 
the Court had to assess the security measures of a public hospital with regard to the IT-
system storing medical data.270 The Court found that the lack of keeping records of 
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personnel who had access to the records, constituted a lack of effective security measure 
in order to protect the private life.271 
Both judgements make clear that an effective protection of private life must be included in 
the IT infrastructure, such as the keeping of records and the enabling of access to 
identification data to law enforcement.272 Deterrence thus not results (only) from the 
criminalisation of certain behaviour, but also depends on the risk of being caught, in this 
case the risk of being identified.  
On the basis of this case law, one might argue that this also demands technical measures 
which provide for the reliable identification and authentication of users of electronic 
communication services. Such technical measure enables that only authorised persons 
access the identification data and that unauthorised access is made more difficult.273 Here 
the Project’s technology might provide as a handy tool in the fight against ID Fraud and 
other misuse of personal data.  
 
One could also argue that effective protection of private life indirectly implies the recording 
and retention of this identification data for law enforcement purposes, which brings us 
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The Dutch government made an assessment of the pros and cons of encryption and came to the 
conclusion that, for now, it is not desirable to take restrictive measures concerning the 
development, availability and use of encryption in The Netherlands. (NEDERLANDS MINISTERIE VAN 
VEILIGHEID EN JUSTITIE, ‘Kabinetsstandpunt Encryptie’, 4 January 2016, 
file:///C:/Users/u0110896/Downloads/tk-kabinetsstandpunt-encryptie.pdf.)  
The British government on the other hand wants to ban end-to-end decryption, requiring 
mandatory back doors in the encryption technology. This appears from leaked documents in hands 
of the Open Rights Group. 
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back to the controversial domain of data retention.274 The practical effectiveness of 
identification namely depends to a large extent on the legal obligation to store and retain 
this data. On the basis of K.U. v. Finland, we could argue that in order to protect essential 
aspects and values of private life, States have a positive obligation under the ECHR 
guarantee some storage and retention of identification data and to provide access to it in 
criminal investigations.275 Again, the right balance should be struck between various 
competing rights and claims and this assessment might be different in case it concerns 
children or other vulnerable persons. The outcome of this assessment might be different 
in other cases, as is demonstrated by the CJEU judgement Promusicae.276  
 
3.2.4 Conclusion 
NEED FOR IDENTIFICATION ORDERS. – On the basis of K.U. v. Finland, we can conclude that 
States should implement a legal procedure where a judicial authority may order, under 
certain conditions, the release of information required to identify an internet user 
provided that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he or she has committed a 
criminal offence. It should be noted that the ECtHR paid specific attention to the fact that 
in this case a minor was the subject of an advertisement of a sexual nature. This created a 
stronger positive obligation to protect fundamental rights, even in a horizontal 
relationship.277 The ECtHR is indeed particularly strict when it comes to the protection of 
the physical and emotional welfare of children because of their vulnerability.278  
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Nonetheless, the ECtHR provides some essential elements concerning the positive 
obligations in the context of article 8 ECHR violations and unfair processing of personal 
information. The right to private life and the right to informational self-determination, 
which is the core of the data protection law, complement each other in defining the 
elements of protection in the context of electronic communications and IT systems. The 
storing and retention must not only be seen as a threat to fundamental human rights such 
as the right to private life; sometimes it is required to protect those very same rights.279 
The judgement of K.U. v. Finland is very important as it makes it clear that weak or even 
non-existent user identification and authentication may easily create problems with 
regard to an effective protection of fundamental human rights, in particular private life. 
Personal data legislation, such as data protection laws, should not stand in the way of an 
effective protection but might on the contrary be used to address this weakness. These 
laws should arrange proper identification and authentication in electronic transactions 
when elements of personal integrity and identity are at stake. With ‘proper’ we mean that 
they should make identification and authentication possible while at the same time 
surround these processes with the necessary guarantees with regard to competing 
fundamental human rights and freedoms at stake, such as the right to privacy of other users 
and their right to freedom of expression. These rights are not absolute and are sometimes 
overridden by other interests. The ECtHR calls for a balanced approach and emphasises 
the role of the legislator therein.280 It accepts that Member States have a certain margin of 
appreciation and that positive obligations should not create a disproportionate burden to 
other concerned private persons, such as internet service providers. It also accepts that 
implementing legislation and criminal policy in the changing social and technological 
modern society is difficult and that different circumstances apply in different Member 
States. The standards are however defined from the perspective of the protection of 
fundamental human rights and freedoms. The ECtHR for instance considered that although 
Finland had legal provisions regulating the issue, it failed to meet its positive obligation to 
provide practical and effective protection because its legislation did not enable the 
authorities to identify and prosecute the person who had committed the criminal offence 
that violated the applicant’s private life. Therefore the ECtHR actually imposes a positive 
duty upon States to follow societal and technological developments in order to ensure that 
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the legislation in force can provide effective protection. This means that they must actively 
and systematically manage the risks to fundamental human rights.281 The Court extended 
its principle of practical effectiveness to the effectiveness of criminal investigations and 
stated that these require access to identification data in order to identify the perpetrator. 
In that perspective, the protection of private life and identity can be achieved by attempting 
to provide for proof of identity and authentication in IT-systems and at the same time 
implementing the necessary safeguards to protect this personal data during that 
identification process, for instance by obligating internet service providers who store the 
data to provide for the proper security of their IT and archive systems.282 In I. v. Finland, 
for example, the ECtHR decided that article 8 ECHR had been breached because the IT 
system did not record who had been obtaining access to and consulting confidential files 
and access was not restricted only to staff members who were responsible for the 
treatment of these files. This implies that the ECtHR requires (technical) secure IT systems, 
which can only be accessed by authorised persons and which should be subject to effective 
audits.283 This also means that IT systems which make it impossible or very difficult to 
detect the identity of the user, such as TOR, should be critically assessed. 284 Such 
applications can indeed enhance the freedom of expression and protect the right to 
anonymity, yet these rights are not absolute and can (at least in most Western countries) 
be sufficiently protected by restricting the access by the competent governmental 
authorities to that data. In that way, the right balance can be struck.  
 
IDENTIFICATION HINDERED BY CJEU CASE LAW. - According to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, a general data retention obligation contravenes the right for private and 
family life and the right to the protection of personal data (supra Tele2 case). The rationale 
behind this case law cannot be reconciled with the positive obligation of Member States in 
the light of the ECtHR case law. Member States’ duty under the ECHR to make identification 
possible might in many situations, be rendered practically impossible by the CJEU’s ban on 
general data retention. One can hope that the CJEU would adjust its – very principled, yet 
not very practical – position to the more nuanced position taken by the ECtHR, thus 
defusing a potential conflict on fundamental (human) rights standards in a fundamental 
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policy area. Once an identity is stolen it is important that we can identify the identity thief, 
in order to stop the crime and to make a claim for damages by the victim possible.  
 
3.3 Blocking, rendering inaccessible and erasing of personal data 
3.3.1 In general 
POLICY CONCERNING BLOCKING MEASURES. – The potential harm and negative consequences of 
identity theft often result from the widespread and continuous availability of the 
compromising information online. In order to end the crime or to prevent further damage, 
the compromising data can be rendered inaccessible, either by the blocking of access to or 
by deleting compromising online content. Both measures could provide an effective 
remedy to end the identity theft and to limit further damages. Because of the difficulties to 
identify the perpetrator and to locate the compromising data (cf. infra), law enforcement 
often has to turn to internet intermediaries to block access to or to take offending 
information offline. Especially blocking of access to illegal content through internet access 
providers seems to be the new trend as state authorities’ requests to remove or take down 
the illegal content are rejected or simply ignored by hosting or content providers outside 
their jurisdiction (yet cf. infra Google Spain).  
 
EU-RELUCTANCE. - The blocking or deletion of online data appears to be a major issue. 
Regardless of possible technical difficulties (e.g. easy to circumvent), this measure also 
poses legal problems as it remains uncertain under which conditions such a measure is 
compatible with EU law. Blocking measures clearly affect fundamental human rights such 
as the right to privacy, the right to freedom of expression, the right to property, the EU right 
to provide services in any Member State285 and the right to conduct a business.286 
Therefore, they can only be imposed by law, subject to the principle of proportionality, 
with respect to the legitimate aims pursued and to their necessity in a democratic society 
the triple ‘proportionality check’ of article 8.2. and 10.2 ECRM, cf. infra). The main issue 
seems to be the potential collateral blocking of legal content. Next to these restrictions, the 
e-Commerce Directive stipulates that a general monitoring obligation cannot be imposed 
on ISPs, which may also impose limits to the legal possibilities of internet blocking.287 This 
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however has not stopped the issuance of blocking orders in practice, which has led to 
various cases at the ECtHR and the CJEU (cf. infra). 
Because of efficiency and legal concerns, the EU remains reserved in its policy towards the 
blocking and deletion of online illegal content and does not encourage it.  
 
EXCEPTIONS. - An exception is the EU’s policy with regard to combating the sexual abuse, 
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography.288 The EU also shows itself more 
flexible towards blocking of online data, and which is of great importance with regard to 
identity theft, is in the context of the processing of inaccurate, incomplete or no longer up-
to-date personal data. In the context of data protection law, the rectification, blocking or 
erasure of data is even recognized as a right of the data subject (cf. infra). Yet in general, 
the blocking of access is not a requirement under EU law. The 2005 Framework decision 
on Attacks against Information Systems289 for example did not address this issue, nor does 
the Directive 2013/40/EU which has replaced the Framework Decision.290 In several 
policy documents concerning cybercrime, the European Commission expresses its 
concerns towards internet blocking because of the direct economic impact of the measure 
for ISPs and internet users and its ineffectiveness as in most cases blocked websites simply 
reappear under another name outside the EU’s jurisdiction.291 This is exactly what 
happened in the fight against the illegal website the Pirate Bay, which we will discuss 
further on, and which gives some food for thought with regard to internet blocking. First 
we will examine the current legal possibilities of internet blocking. 
 
3.3.2 Legal basis for blocking data 
ERASURE OR BLOCKING OF PERSONAL DATA BY THE ‘DATA CONTROLLER’. – When the identification 
information is linked to the wrong person as a consequence of identity theft, it is of great 
importance to rectify this situation as soon as possible. Keeping this in mind, we will take 
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a look at the EU instruments and the case law of both the CJEU and the ECtHR on the 
blocking and erasure of data.  
 
EU DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION. - Because the matter of identity theft is related to personal 
data and the right to data protection of the victim, the principles set out by the Data 
Protection Directive and responsibilities of data controllers with regard to the processing 
of personal data will apply. The conditions for the processing of personal data are defined 
in articles 6 and 7 of the Data Protection Directive.292 The data controller293 has the task 
of ensuring that personal data are processed ‘fairly and lawfully’294, that they are ‘collected 
for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is 
incompatible with those purposes’295, that they are ‘adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/ or further processed’,296 that they 
are ‘accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date’,297 and finally, that they are ‘kept in a 
form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the 
purposes for which the data are processed’.298 The CJEU concluded in Google Spain that in 
this context, the controller must take every reasonable step to ensure that data which do 
not meet the requirements of that provision are erased or rectified.299 The General Data 
Protection Regulation sets out the same, yet slightly differently phrased, principles for the 
processing of personal data. Each principle now carries its official name, in parenthesis, 
                                                          
292 And in articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 General Data Protection Regulation that will apply from 25 May 
2018 (supra). 
293 Defined in article 4 (7) General Data Protection Regulation.  See also Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of ‘controller’ and ‘processor’’, WP 169, 16 
February 2010; B. VAN ALSENOY, ‘Allocating responsibility among controllers, processors, and 
‘everything in between’: the definition of actors and roles in Directive 95/46’, Computer, Law & 
Security Review 2012, Vol. 28, 25-43.  
294 Article 6 (1) a Data Protection Directive, see also article 5 (1) a GDPR. 
295 Article 6 (1) b Data Protection Directive, see also article 5 (1) b GDPR. 
296 Article 6 (1) c Data Protection Directive, see also article 5 (1) c GDPR. 
297 Article 6 (1) d Data Protection Directive, see also article 5 (1) d GDPR.  
298 Article 6 (1) e Data Protection Directive, see also article 5 (1) e GDPR. 
Article 5  of the General Data Protection Regulation adds another responsibility for the controller, 
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after being laid down in the Regulation’s text: ‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’, 
‘purpose limitation’, ‘data minimisation’, ‘accuracy’, ‘storage limitation’300 The Regulation 
also adds some principles. In subparagraph a) the transparency principle301 and under f) 
the appropriate security of the personal data is added as a condition for processing 
(‘integrity and confidentiality’ principle).302 Under the GDPR the controller shall be 
responsible for and must be able to demonstrate compliance with, all these principles.303  
Furthermore, when the processing of data is based on consent, the data subject will be able 
to withdraw his or her consent at any time.304 Article 5 of the Data Protection Directive set 
out the lawful grounds for processing: consent, performance of a contract, compliance with 
a legal obligation, protection of vital interests, public interest, and overriding interest of 
the controller. They remain largely the same under article 6 GDPR.305 
 
RECTIFICATION, ERASURE OR BLOCKING OF DATA. - Article 12(b) of the Data Protection Directive 
provides that Member States are to guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from 
the controller, as appropriate, the rectification, erasure or blocking of data, the processing 
of which does not comply with the provisions of the directive, in particular because of the 
incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data.306 Subject to the exceptions permitted under 
article 13 of the Data Protection Directive, all processing of personal data must comply, 
first, with the principles relating to data quality set out in article 6 of the Directive and, 
secondly, with one of the criteria for making data processing legitimate listed in article 7 
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of the Directive. Deletion or blocking will therefore be useful in the case where the data 
have been obtained or are being used unlawfully. Article 14 further grants the data subject 
a right to object to the processing of his or her data.307 The data subject must have 
compelling legitimate grounds relating to his or her particular situation in order to object. 
This will normally be the case in the context of identity theft. For valid claims, the data 
controller must fully erase the data, inform the requester of the outcome and communicate 
the erasure request to any downstream recipients who got the data from the controller.308 
This mechanism thus aims to guarantee a real ‘cleaning up’.  
 
REQUEST TO THE DATA CONTROLLER -These rights are to be exercised vis-à-vis the data 
controller. The data subject may address his or her request directly to the controller who 
must then duly examine its merits and, as the case may be, end the processing of the data 
in question (cf. infra, Google Spain). Each supervisory authority has investigative powers 
and effective powers of intervention enabling it to order the blocking, erasure or 
destruction of data or to impose a temporary or definitive ban on such processing (art. 28 
(3) and (4)). 
This procedure thus construes a form of ‘notice and take down’ in the data protection 
framework.309 
 
PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN GOOGLE SPAIN. – In the case Google Spain, the CJEU had to examine to 
what extent the operator of a search engine is obliged to erase data under the Data 
Protection Directive on request of individuals whose name is used as a search query. It 
stated that a search engine can be a data controller and can be obliged to erase or block 
personal data when the processing of that data is incompatible with the Directive.310 This 
may result from the fact that such data are inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant or excessive 
in relation to the purposes of the processing, that they are not kept up to date, or that they 
are kept for longer than is necessary unless they are required to be kept for historical, 
statistical or scientific purposes.311 The Court, referring to article 6 (1) c to e, therefore 
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308 Article 12 (c) Data Protection Directive. 
309D. KELLER, ‘A Right to be forgotten for hosting services?’, CIS 30 April 2015, 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/04/right-be-forgotten-hosting-services. 
310 Judgement of 13 May 2014, Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, §92. 
311 Ibid. 
states that even initially lawful processing of accurate data may, in the course of time, 
become incompatible with the Directive where those data are no longer necessary in the 
light of the purposes for which they were collected or processed.312 That is so in particular 
where they appear to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in 
relation to those purposes and in the light of the time that has elapsed.313 
However, inasmuch as the measure could, depending on the information at issue, have 
effects upon the economic interest of the operator or the search engine and the legitimate 
interest of internet users potentially interested in having access to that information, a fair 
balance should be sought in particular between those interests and the data subject’s 
fundamental rights under articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.314 Whilst it is true that the data 
subject’s rights protected by those articles also override, as a general rule, the interests of 
operators of search engines and internet users, that balance may however depend, in 
specific cases, on the nature of the information in question, its sensitivity for the data 
subject’s private life and on the interest of the public in having that information, an interest 
which may vary, in particular, according to the role played by the data subject in public 
life.315 The CJEU therefore, again, underlines the importance of balancing between 
opposing rights and interests. It however seems to favour the privacy interests of the 
individual. 
 
THE ‘RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN’ IN THE GDPR. – Article 17 of the GDPR foresees in a right to 
erasure, also known as ‘the right to be forgotten’. This article partly draws from the Google 
Spain judgement.316  
The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal 
data concerning him or her without undue delay. The controller has to erase where one of 
the following grounds apply: (a) the personal data are no longer necessary for the purpose 
collected or processed,317 (b) the data subject withdraws consent and no legal grounds for 
processing remain; (c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) 
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315 Judgement of 13 May 2014, Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, § 81 Cf. also case law of 
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316 M. KRZYSZTOFEK, ‘’The Right to be Forgotten’ on a swing’, EBLR 2016, (865) 867. 
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and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject 
objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2); (d) the personal data have been 
unlawfully processed; (e) the personal data have to be erased for compliance with a legal 
obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject; (f) the personal 
data have been collected in relation to the offer of information society services directly to 
a child, under the consent to data processing.318 
 
Option (a) corresponds with the prohibition in article 5 (1) e of the GDPR and article 6 (1) 
e of the Directive to keep personal data in a form which permits identification of data 
subjects for longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are 
processed. Option (c) refers to article 21 GDPR that contains the ‘Right to object’.319 With 
regard to option (d), lawful processing is specified in article 6 of the GDPR and article 7 of 
the Directive.  
In case of ID theft a claim to erase data can be made under article 17 (1) d.  
 
INFORM OTHER CONTROLLERS. - Following paragraph 2 of article 17 a data controller that has 
an obligation to erase data under article 17 (1) must also take reasonable steps to inform 
other controllers of the data subject’s request to erase all links to, or copy or replication of, 
those personal data. ‘Reasonable’ is to be considered in the light of the available technology 
and the cost of implementation.320 Once data is published on the Internet it is available to 
an unlimited and unspecifiable pool of recipients and further controllers.321 It is 
impossible to find all such data and their respective further controllers. Therefore the 
                                                          
318 For a detailed explanation of all of these grouds see: M. KRZYSZTOFEK, ‘’The Right to be Forgotten’ 
on a swing’, EBLR 2016, (865) 868-871. 
319 Paragraph 1 of this article reads as follows: ‘The data subject shall have the right to object, on 
grounds relating to his or her particular situation, at any time to processing of personal data 
concerning him or her which is based on point (e) or (f) of Article 6(1), including profiling based on 
those provisions. The controller shall no longer process the personal data unless the controller 
demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights 
and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims. 
Paragraph 2 states: ‘Where personal data are processed for direct marketing purposes, the data 
subject shall have the right to object at any time to processing of personal data concerning him or 
her for such marketing, which includes profiling to the extent that it is related to such direct 
marketing.’ 
320 Article 17 (2) GDPR, see also recital 66 of the GDPR.  
321 M. K KRZYSZTOFEK, ‘The Right to be Forgotten’ on a swing’, EBLR 2016, (865) 871. 
GDPR thrives for a practicable effectiveness of the ‘right to be forgotten’.322 The controller 
only has a duty to inform and should not take legal steps against further controllers if they 
disregard the notification of an erasure of data.323 
 
EXEMPTIONS TO THE RIGHT OF ERASURE. - Paragraph 3 states exemptions to the right to 
erasure. In short, there shall be no obligation to erase if processing is necessary a) for 
exercising the right of freedom of expression and information; (b) for compliance with a 
legal obligation which requires processing by Union or Member State law to which the 
controller is subject or for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in 
the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (c) for reasons of public interest 
in the area of public health; (d) for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or 
historical research purposes or statistical purposes or; (e) for the establishment, exercise 
or defence of legal claims. 
 
TOO MANY RESPONSIBILITIES DATA CONTROLLER? - It is up to the data controllers, often private 
companies, to scrutinize the erasure request. In theory, data controllers should only 
comply if the request is legitimate. Yet, as there are no specific guidelines in the Data 
protection Directive nor in the new regulation to investigate complaints, that entity is left 
with little direction on how to assess the data subject’s claim. The CJEU set out some 
directions in Google Spain. However, it remains to be seen whether these are sufficient (cf. 
infra). The notion of ‘data controller’ is furthermore very broad and also envisages SMEs 
all over Europe and beyond. Are all these data controllers capable of dealing with this 
complex issue? It remains unclear how the data controllers handle concrete complaints in 
practice. Do they for instance react to any request in any language? Which and whose legal 
interests do they have to take into account? If they also take their own interests into 
account (f.i. costs etc.) they become judge in their own case. Critics fear that in order to 
avoid risks and costs, data controllers will simply comply with any request and that this 
will lead to over-removal of legal online content.324 This leads us to the more fundamental 
                                                          
322 Ibid. 
323 On the evolving concept of the right to be forgotten at successive stages of work on the GDPR 
see M. KRZYSZTOFEK, ‘The Right to be Forgotten’ on a swing’, EBLR 2016, 871-872. 
324 D. KELLER, ‘THE GDPR’s Notice and Takedown Rules: Bad News for Free Expression, But Not 
Beyond Repair’, The Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School, 
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question: is it up to private companies to balance these fundamental rights? Article 18 
GDPR furthermore states that the data controller must restrict public access to the 
disputed data, before assessing its validity. In a case of identity theft, this is of course an 
important tool to end the offence as soon as possible. Critics however warn that such 
automatic removal is ‘a tool begging for use by bad actors with short-term issues.’325 In the 
context of identity theft, one might think about the example of somebody who pretends to 
be someone else in order to request for removal. This brings us to a specific point of 
interest in the context of identity theft, notably the concern that the requester is actually 
the individual whose personal data are at stake. It remains an open question how the data 
controller in some cases will be able to verify the identity of the data subject.  
 
IDENTIFYING THE SUBJECT. - From article 11 (2) GDPR follows that a data subject cannot 
exercise its rights under articles 15 to 20, including the right to rectification and the right 
to erasure, if the controller is not in a position to identify the data subject. Article 12 (6) 
states that the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to 
confirm the identity of the data subject.326 If we would accept the idea that a data controller 
should decide upon erasure requests, we should also give that entity the necessary tools to 
verify the identity of the claimer without evidentially creating new threats to privacy. 
Technology in order to protect privacy might help. Again the Project tool can prove to be 
of great value here, since identification through the tool gives more safeguards regarding 
one’s true identity.  
 
NOTICE AND TAKE DOWN BY INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES. – Internet intermediaries play a pivotal 
role in the distribution of online information, by providing access to online information 
(internet access providers) or by storing and making the online information available 
(internet host providers).327 Because they provide the necessary technical means to 
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327 Online intermediaries provide the platforms or act to intermediate between two or more 
communicators on the internet for the purpose of sending, receiving, sharing or downloading 
information. Definition formulated by M. A. ARAROMI. (M. A. ARAROMI, ‘Determining the liabilities of 
internet service providers in cyber defamation: a comparative study’, C.T.L.R. 2016, (123) 123.)  
Online intermediaries can be divided into three groups: connectivity intermediaries (e.g. ISPs) 
navigating intermediaries (e.g. Google) and commercial and social network providers (e.g. 
Facebook, Twitter etc.) (K.N. ASARI and N. I. NAWANG, ‘A Comparative Legal Analysis of Online 
transmit, access and store the online information, the question arises to what extent these 
services also come with certain responsibilities, for example in the case of storage of or 
access to illegal information. Unlike ‘traditional’ publishers and broadcasters, internet 
intermediaries do not (and may not) actively control the information they store, transmit 
or render accessible. This is to avoid private censorship and enhance freedom of speech. 
As a consequence, they do not face the same responsibilities.328 This liability issue of 
intermediary ISPs who provide services of mere conduit, caching and/or hosting is 
handled by the e-Commerce Directive.329 Article 12 (mere conduit), article 13 (caching) 
and article 14 (hosting) state that the providers of these services are not liable for the 
information they transfer, store or render accessible as long as they are ‘neutral’. This 
means that activity is of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies that 
the information society service provider has neither knowledge of, nor control over the 
information which is stored.330  
 
LIMITS TO BLOCKING ORDERS.– Article 15.1 e-Commerce Directive forbids Member States to 
impose a general obligation on service providers under article 12-14 to monitor the 
information which they transmit or store. They cannot create a general obligation actively 
to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity either. ISPs do not have to act as 
internet watch dogs. However, Member States can oblige ISPs promptly to inform the 
competent public authorities of alleged illegal activities or information provided by 
recipients of theirs services. Member States can also compel ISPs to comply with the 
request of competent authorities to provide information enabling the identification of 
recipients of their services with whom they have storage agreements.331 Recital 47 
explicitly bars Member States from imposing a monitoring obligation on service providers 
only with respect to obligations of a general nature. This does not concern monitoring 
obligations in a specific case and, in particular, does not affect orders by national 
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and Digital Forensics 2015, (123) 322.) 
328 Search engines after Google Spain, 58. 
329 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain 
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal 
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authorities in accordance with national legislation, i.e. the interception of electronic 
communication in specific criminal proceedings.  
So in essence, ISPs may be obliged to block access to a website or remove illegal 
information in order end an infringement and to prevent further infringements unless this 
leads to a general monitoring obligation. Measures to end as well as measures to prevent 
infringements are allowed according to CJEU case law.332 However, it is thus prohibited to 
impose an obligation to monitor actively all the data of each customer in order to prevent 
any future infringement. Such an obligation would also be disproportionate.333 
 
SCOPE OF THE BLOCKING ORDER. - The e-Commerce Directive does not deal with the actual 
issuance of blocking orders. It only states that its limited liability regime ‘shall not affect 
the possibility for a Court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' 
legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement’334 
Recital 46 adds to this that ‘the removal or disabling of access has to be undertaken in the 
observance of the principle of freedom of expression’335 With regard to internet host 
providers, article 14.3 of the e-Commerce Directive explicitly states that this includes the 
removal of illegal information or the disabling of access to it. 336 
 
END OF NEUTRALITY. - The neutrality of service providers ends as soon as they actually take 
note of illegal activities committed with their services, for instance through notification by 
a user, a victim or law enforcement agencies. In order to benefit further from the 
exemption of liability, the internet host provider has to act expeditiously to remove the 
information concerned or to disable access to it.337 The e-Commerce Directive only 
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introduces this principle for intermediaries who store the information and not for the 
providers of mere conduit and caching (see infra). 
 
According to Belgian law, for instance, as soon as the internet host provider has knowledge 
of unlawful activities, it immediately has to inform the public prosecutor, who can take the 
necessary measures on the basis of article 39bis Belgian Criminal Procedure Code, the 
procedural measure of digital seizure (cf. infra). While awaiting of the decision of the public 
prosecutor, the internet host provider can only take the necessary steps to render the 
information (temporarily) inaccessible. This automatic temporary blocking by the 
intermediary seems useful in cases of flagrant illegal activities, such as child pornography, 
terrorism etc. Yet in other, less obvious cases, it remains risky to put the removal of data 
in the hands of a private party, even if it is only temporarily (cf. supra). Much will depend 
on the required level of the ‘knowledge standard’ and whether this can actually set a bar 
for removal. 338 It is thus of utmost importance to give the intermediary the necessary tools 
in order to verify the identity of the requester without creating new privacy risks (cf. 
supra). 
In Belgium it is thus the public prosecutor who has to determine the legitimacy of the 
request. This brings us to the question of the legal basis of internet blocking in criminal 
procedures.  
 
 
BLOCKING ORDERS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES. – Internet blocking or a notice and take down 
measure in order to end a crime and/or to avoid further damage were not a common 
feature in a ‘classic’ criminal procedure, which focused on evidence gathering and 
prosecution (the process of establishing ‘the truth’).339 It is therefore not evident that 
‘classic’ investigative measures, such as seizure, cover this specific measure. Two 
international legal instruments indirectly deal with this matter: Recommendation (95)13 
and the Cybercrime Convention. 
                                                          
338 D. KELLER argues that the knowledge standard can set a much higher bar for removal than in 
the Data Protection Regulation where the data controller prior to assessing the validity, temporarily 
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339 B.-J. KOOPS, ‘Tijd voor computercriminaliteit III’, NJB 2010, 1982. 
Recommendation (95)13 states that: ‘Criminal procedural laws should permit investigating 
authorities to search computer systems and seize data under similar conditions as under 
traditional powers of search and seizure. The person in charge of the system should be 
informed that the system has been searched and of the kind of data that has been seized. The 
legal remedies that are provided for in general against search and seizure should be equally 
applicable in case of search in computer systems and in case of seizure of data therein.’340 
Recommendation (95)13 further states that ‘Subject to legal privileges or protection, most 
legal systems permit investigating authorities to order persons to hand over objects under 
their control that are required to serve as evidence. In a parallel fashion, provisions should be 
made for the power to order persons to submit any specified data under their control in a 
computer system in the form required by the investigating authority’.341  
According to article 19 Cybercrime Convention, each party shall adopt such legislative and 
other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent authorities to seize or 
similarly secure computer data. Article 19 applies to stored computer data.342 To secure 
the data means to maintain its integrity, to make sure that the data remains unchanged 
during the time of criminal proceedings. The term is included to reflect other means by 
which the control over or the taking away of intangible data is executed, such as the power 
to render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer system (art. 
19 §3 d).343 The rendering inaccessible can include the technologically denying anyone 
access to that data. This can be useful when harm is involved, such as the spreading of a 
virus, or when the content of the data is illegal.344  
The aim of a seizure usually is that the suspect is temporarily deprived of the control over 
the data, but it can be returned following the outcome of the criminal investigation. To seize 
or similarly secure data normally has two functions: 1) to gather evidence, such as by 
copying the data, or 2) to confiscate data, such as by copying the data and subsequently 
rendering the original version of the data inaccessible or by removing it.345 The term 
'removal' is intended to express the idea that while the data are removed or rendered 
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343 Ibid, § 197. 
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inaccessible, it is not destroyed, but continues to exist. The rendering inaccessible of data 
can include encrypting the data or otherwise technologically denying anyone access to that 
data. This measure could usefully be applied in situations where danger or social harm is 
involved, such as virus programs or instructions on how to make viruses or bombs, or 
where the data or their content are illegal, such as child pornography.346 This might also 
be useful in the case of identity theft, f.i. when ‘stolen’ personal data, such as passwords, 
are exchanged online or when somebody is defamed by someone abusing someone else’s 
identity. So ‘blocking’ is not just seen as an investigative measure in order to gather 
evidence but also to prevent further harm.  
Article 19, § 4 introduces a specific duty to cooperate. It contains a coercive measure to 
facilitate the search and seizure of computer data. It recognises that system administrators, 
who have particular knowledge of the computer system, may need to be consulted 
concerning the technical modalities about how best the search should be conducted. This 
provision therefore allows law enforcement to compel a system administrator to assist, as 
is reasonable, the undertaking of the search and seizure.347 This power is not only of 
benefit to the investigating authorities. Without such co-operation, investigative 
authorities could remain on the searched premises and prevent access to the computer 
system for long periods of time while undertaking the search. This could be an economic 
burden on legitimate businesses or customers and subscribers that would be denied access 
to data during this time. A means to order the co-operation of knowledgeable persons 
would help in making searches more effective and cost efficient, both for law enforcement 
and innocent individuals affected. Legally compelling a system administrator to assist may 
also relieve the administrator of any contractual or other obligations not to disclose the 
data.348 
In a recent criminal law case against intellectual property infringements, the procedural 
measure of digital seizure has been accepted as the legal basis to block access to a website: 
the Belgian Pirate Bay Case. This case illustrates the relationship between blocking orders 
issued by law enforcement and the principles set out in the e-Commerce Directive.  
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EXAMPLE: THE BELGIAN PIRATE BAY CASE.349 – In the Belgian case against The Pirate Bay, the 
Court of Cassation accepted the blocking of access to a website by Internet Access 
Providers as a form of digital seizure (‘databeslag/’saisie des données).350 The legal basis 
was article 39bis Belgian Criminal Procedure Code (Belgian CPC), which is inspired by 
Recommendation 95(14) and article 19 Cybercrime Convention. In this case, the Belgian 
Anti-Piracy Federation had submitted an official complaint to the investigating judge for 
intellectual property offences via the Swedish website ‘The Pirate Bay’. On the basis of 
article 39bis Belgian CPC, the investigating judge ordered all the Belgian operators and 
Internet Access Providers to block access to the content hosted by the server connected to 
‘thepiratebay.org’, and more precisely to make use of ‘all the possible technical measures’, 
including at least the blocking of all the domain names that refer to the server connected 
to the main domain name ‘thepiratebay.org’.351 
As a consequence, the ISPs were obliged to check whether a domain name referred to the 
illegal website ‘thepiratebay.org’ and if it did, to block access to this domain name. The ISPs 
however lodged an appeal against this ‘blocking order’. They argued that 1) art. 39bis 
Belgian CPC did not provide a legal basis for this type of order and 2) such order would 
imply a general monitoring duty which is incompatible with article 15 e-Commerce 
Directive and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (cf. infra).  
In regard to the first argument, the ISPs held that the purpose of the coercive measure of a 
seizure, and therefore also digital seizure, is to obtain criminal evidence and to make sure 
that law enforcement takes control over the data for the duration of the criminal 
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proceedings. The aim of seizure is temporarily to deprive the suspect of the data. According 
to the ISPs, seizure could not be used as the legal basis to compel internet access providers 
to block access to an illegal website, because it does not prevent the suspect from accessing 
the illegal content he or she hosts on the main server. Seizure is not intended to end an 
infringement or to protect the interests of the victim. 
The Court of Cassation did not follow the argumentation of the ISPs. It stated that article 
39bis Belgian CPC provides a valid legal basis for the blocking of access to a website to end 
behaviour that seems to constitute a crime and to protect the interests of the victim. In 
order to do so, the investigating judge can order internet access providers to block access 
to the illegal website. It is not necessary that the host himself can no longer consult that 
data.352 
Regarding the second argument, the Court stated that the fact that the ISPs were ordered 
to take all the possible technical measures to block the access to the website, does not 
establish a general monitoring duty as they were not ordered to monitor the content or to 
actively seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.  
 
CLEAR LEGAL BASIS? - If one would follow the reasoning of the Belgian Supreme Court, the 
blocking of access to a website in order to end a crime and to prevent further damages 
could take the form of a seizure as a criminal procedure measure. An important 
consequence is that the ratione personae scope of blocking orders could be extended to any 
person, not only ‘data controllers’ or internet hosting providers. It is however doubtful 
whether the Belgian article with regard to digital seizure provides a clear enough legal 
basis in the light of articles 8.2 and 10.2 ECHR (cf. infra). Criminal seizure is furthermore a 
temporary measure. It remains unclear what will happen with this measure once the 
criminal judge has to decide on the merits of the case.353  
Better would be to introduce a clear specific legal basis for this measure. The Netherlands 
is currently debating about the implementation of a ‘notice and take down’ in criminal 
procedures which would apply to all providers of communication services.354 The 
envisaged article 125p of the Dutch Criminal Procedure Code would clearly state that they 
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silent about the blocking measure. The case is now pending before the Antwerp Court of Appeal. 
354 Article 125p Dutch Criminal Procedure Code in the Proposal for a Law on Computer Crime III. 
can be ordered immediately to take all the reasonable measures to render certain data 
inaccessible in order to end a crime or to prevent new crimes. This legal proposal however 
does not address certain issues, such as providers located abroad (cf. infra), the freedom 
to conduct business or the risk of censorship. Under the Dutch proposal the blocking can 
only be ordered by a judge at the request of the public prosecutor and not by the victim or 
the administration.355 Internet blocking may touches upon different fundamental human 
rights so that a European initiative, which clearly demarcates the limits of this type of 
measure thereby taking into account European legal standards and policy, seems 
appropriate. Both the ECtHR and CJEU have already dealt with issues of internet blocking.  
 
3.3.3 Principles on the basis of the case law of the CJEU and the ECHR 
DELICATE BALANCING OF RIGHTS. – The general principles of blocking orders directed at ISPs 
were further elaborated in the case law of the CJEU. Until now, legal questions of 
intermediary responsibility have mainly been touched upon in the (non-criminal law) 
context of intellectual property rights, where there are different interests at stake than in 
the context of identity theft. These cases nonetheless shed some light on the Court’s view 
on the limits of blocking orders.  
 
FILTERING MECHANISM. - In Scarlet Extended, the CJEU had to check whether a filtering 
mechanism was compatible with article 15 of the e-Commerce Directive and with the 
fundamental human rights in the Charter.356 Sabam, a management company which 
represents authors, composers and editors of musical works, brought proceedings against 
Scarlet, an internet access provider. It claimed that Scarlet was best placed to end copyright 
infringements committed by its users by blocking or making it impossible for its users to 
send or receive copyright infringing files. In order to do so, Scarlet would first have to 
identify files containing copyright infringements. Thereto it had to filter any 
communication of data passing through its network, in order to detect or, if preferred, to 
isolate those indicating an infringement of copyright.357 Scarlet therefore claimed that 
such obligation would impose a general obligation to monitor as such system would 
necessarily require general surveillance of all the communications passing through its 
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357 Conclusion of Advocate General CRUZ VILLALÓN of 14 April 2011, Scarlet Extended, C-70/10, 
EU:C:2011:255, §46. 
network. This would also be in breach of European data protection law and the secrecy of 
communications.  
 
The CJEU ruled that an order to implement a system for filtering 1) all electronic 
communications passing via the ISP which 2) applies indiscriminately to all its customers, 
3) as a preventive measure, 4) exclusively at its expenses and 5) for an unlimited period, in 
order to detect on its network intellectual property infringements with the view of 
blocking the transfer of such IP infringing files is indeed not compatible with article 15 e-
Commerce Directive. The Court also examined the order in the light of the requirements 
stemming from the protection of the applicable fundamental rights. It found that such 
system would violate fundamental human rights, as it disproportionately protects the 
fundamental right to property, including the intellectual property rights, to the detriment 
of the protection of other fundamental human rights, such as the freedom to conduct 
business, the right to protection of personal data and the freedom to receive or impart 
information (articles 16, 8 and 11 of the Charter).  
Although this case only relates to the permissibility of a filtering mechanism in the light of 
article 15 e-Commerce Directive and fundamental human rights, it does make clear that 
any system that imposes obligations on ISPs must strike a fair balance between the 
applicable human rights. To that extent, the CJEU valued the fact that the monitoring 1) 
would require the installation of a complicated, costly, permanent computer system at the 
own expenses of the ISPs, 2) would lead to the systematic analysis of all content and the 
collection and identification of IP addresses which are protected personal data and 3) 
might not distinguish adequately between lawful and unlawful content and could lead to 
the blocking of lawful communications. Therefore the filtering mechanism was a 
disproportionate measure.  
 
NO SPECIFICATION REQUIRED. – In UPC Telekabel358 the CJEU examined whether an order in 
general terms (thus without ordering specific measures) to block access to a website 
infringing copyright is compatible with EU law, in particular with the necessary balance 
between the parties’ fundamental rights. The Court had to interpret among others Article 
8 (3) Directive 2001/29.359 This article states that Member States must ensure that holders 
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359 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ 2001 
L 167, p. 10. 
of IP rights can apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by 
a third party to infringe a copyright or related right. These measures are aimed not only at 
bringing to an end to such infringements of copyright and related rights, but also at 
preventing them.360 Such preventive effect presupposes that it does not have to be proven 
that the ISP’s customers actually access illegal content.  
The Court underlined that the specific conditions to be met and the procedure to be 
followed for such injunctions are a matter of national law.361 When transposing a directive 
Member States must however ensure that they rely on an interpretation of the Directive 
which ‘allows a fair balance to be struck between the applicable fundamental rights 
protected by the European Union legal order’.362 So the national law must be interpreted in 
conformity with the Directive and the fundamental human rights and other general 
principles of EU law, such as the principle of proportionality. 
 
The applicable fundamental rights were intellectual property on the one hand, and the 
freedom to conduct business and the freedom of information and the other.363 The CJEU 
first ruled that a blocking order in general terms indeed restricts the freedom to conduct 
business as it obliges ISPs to take measures which may represent a significant cost, have a 
considerable impact on the organisation of its activities or require difficult and complex 
technical solutions. On the other hand, it does not seem to infringe the very substance of 
that freedom for two reasons:364 
- It leaves it to the ISP to determine the specific measures to be taken so that he can 
choose measures which are best adapted to his resources and abilities, and to his 
other obligations and challenges.365 So, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the CJEU 
valued the open-ended formulation of the blocking order in a positive way because 
it left the concrete elaboration to the ISP’s appreciation. 
- It allows the ISP to avoid liability by proving that it has taken all reasonable 
measures. The effort matters, not the result. The ISP will not be obliged to make 
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361 Judgement of 27 March 2014, UPC Telekabel, C-314/12, EU:C:2014:192, §43. 
362 Judgement of 27 March 2014, UPC Telekabel, C-314/12, EU:C:2014:192, §46. 
363 Ibid, §47. In this case, the protection of personal data was not at stake as the blocking order did 
not required any preliminary monitoring of data.  
364 Ibid, §50-51. 
365 Ibid, §52. 
unbearable sacrifices, which seems justified as he is not the perpetrator of the IP 
right infringement.366 Such general blocking order meets the principle of legality 
when it is possible for the ISP to maintain before the Court that the measures taken 
were indeed those which could be expected of him in order to prevent the 
proscribed result.367  
 
In paragraphs 56 to 64, the CJEU elaborates the main principles ensuring that the 
injunction at issue strikes a fair balance between the applicable rights: 
- In order to be in compliance with the fundamental right to freedom of information 
of internet users, the measures taken must be strictly targeted: they must serve to 
bring an end to the infringement, but without unnecessarily depriving internet 
users of the possibility of lawfully accessing information; 
- There must be a possibility for a judicial review to check this first condition. The 
national procedural rules must provide a possibility for internet users to assert 
their rights before the Court once the implementing measures are known and 
before the stage of the enforcement proceedings; 
- The measures taken do not have to be fully effective, they need not ensure a 
complete cessation of the infringements. A measure can be for instance fully 
effective but unreasonable in the light of the above. It suffices that the injunction 
has the effect of preventing unauthorised access to the illegal content or at least of 
making it more difficult to achieve and of seriously discouraging internet users 
form accessing the illegal content.  
 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BLOCKING MEASURE. – In the Brein case, which is still pending before 
the CJEU, Stichting Brein demanded Dutch ISPs to block access to The Pirate Bay website. 
The Dutch Supreme Court asked in a prejudicial question to the CJEU whether EU law 
allows an injunction against an ISP ordering it to block access for its users to an indexing 
site of a peer-to-peer network by means of which copyright infringements have been 
committed, even if the operator of that site does not itself communicate to the public the 
works made available on that network.368 This situation differs from UPC Telekabel, that 
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EU:C:2017:99, §57.  
concerned the blocking of access to a website whose operator itself was the originator of 
the copyright infringement.369 However, in considering whether a blocking measure 
complies with fundamental rights Advocate General SZPUNAR invoked the principles as 
outlined in UPC Telekabel.370 Furthermore, the Advocate General underlined that ISPs 
cannot escape their obligation to block ‘by claiming, according to the circumstances, that 
the measures are either over-restrictive or ineffective’.371 He concluded that ‘if a measure 
that is less restrictive for service providers and constitutes less of an intrusion upon the rights 
of users were now rejected on the ground that it is not sufficiently effective, internet service 
providers would ultimately be released de facto from their duty to cooperate in the fight 
against copyright infringement.’372  
In the main proceedings, the ISPs had expressed their doubt about the effectiveness of 
blocking access to TPB.373 The Dutch Court of Appeals recognised this inefficiency and 
ordered the injunction at issue be lifted immediately. However, this judgement was 
rendered prior to the Court of Justice's ruling in UPC Telekabel, where it stated that 
blocking measures should not be fully effective (supra).374 In Scarlet Extended the CJEU 
rejected the blocking of all internet traffic involving work illegally shared on peer-to-peer 
networks, because it found it too restrictive for ISPs and because it intruded too far upon 
the rights of users (supra).375 
 
LIABILITY ISPS HATE SPEECH. – The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR also faced the balancing of 
rights in the Delfi case . An online news portal (Delfi) was found liable under Estonian law 
for user generated comments containing hate speech and speech that directly advocated 
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EU:C:2017:99, §83.  
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acts of violence376 posted on its online news portal.377 A balance had to be made between 
article 8 (the right to protection of reputation as part of the Right to respect for private life) 
and article 10 (Right to freedom of expression).378 The Court ruled that the liability of Delfi 
under Estonian law did not infringe upon the freedom of expression. Although it cannot be 
concluded from this judgement that Member States have a duty to hold internet 
intermediaries liable for hate speech posted on their platform, the judgement still raises 
questions.  
 
First of all, we should point out the limited scope of the arrest. The Court emphasised that 
‘the present case relates to a large professionally managed internet news portal run on a 
commercial basis which published news articles of its own and invited its readers to comment 
on them.’379 It further stressed that ‘the case does not concern other fora on the Internet 
where third-party comments can be disseminated, for example (…) a social media platform 
where the platform provider does not offer any content and where the content provider may 
be a private person running the website or a blog as a hobby.‘380  
 
With regard to the notice-and-take-down system that Delfi foresaw the Court ruled that 
this could function in many cases as an appropriate tool for balancing the rights and 
interests of all those involved. However, when dealing with third-party user comments in 
the form of hate speech and direct threats to the physical integrity of individuals ‘the rights 
and interests of others and of society as a whole may entitle Contracting States to impose 
liability on Internet news portals, without contravening Article 10 of the Convention, if they 
fail to take measures to remove clearly unlawful comments without delay, even without 
notice from the alleged victim or from third parties.’ 381 
                                                          
376 This was not scrutinized by the ECtHR. The Court only refers to the assessment of the Estonian 
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Similar issues were at stake in the Magyar case382 of the ECtHR. The only substantial 
difference was that in that case the Court ruled that the comments posted on the online 
platforms did not constitute ‘clearly unlawful expressions, amounting to hate speech and 
incitement to violence’383 Therefore the balance between article 8 and article 10 shifted 
and the liability of the online platforms was seen as a breach of article 10 ECHR.  
The problem with the ECtHR’s case law is that the intermediaries have to decide what is 
manifestly unlawful and what is not. In an annotation of the Delfi case, VANDERSLOOT points 
out that the ECtHR declared the statements as manifestly unlawful, without elaborating on 
why they were.384 It only refers to the assessment by the Estonian Supreme Court.385 This 
assessment is however not without concern.386 By laying the responsibility with the online 
intermediary to decide what is unlawful and what is not, the ECtHR increases the risk – 
often underscored by the CJEU – of self-censuring by internet intermediaries.387 As soon 
as doubt about the lawfulness of content arises, the intermediary may be inclined to 
remove the information. If it does not, it runs the risk of being held liable. This is 
problematic because of its impact on the freedom of expression and the freedom to conduct 
a business.388  
Legal scholars are convinced that Delfi qualified as a hosting provider under article 14 (1) 
e-Commerce Directive and thus could not have a general monitoring duty, since this is 
prohibited by article 15 of the Directive (supra).389 However, the ECtHR did not question 
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the qualification given by the national Courts which decide that it was a publisher.390 This 
is not surprising since it is fixed case law of the Court that it is for the national authorities, 
notably the Courts, to interpret and apply domestic law.391 However, if this case had been 
brought before the CJEU, it would have been more than likely that the Court would have 
ruled that Estonia breached the e-Commerce Directive by holding Delfi liable.  
 
LIABILITY ISPS ID FRAUD? - The question is whether the ECtHR would take a similar approach 
in the case of ID fraud. For example could internet intermediaries be held liable for fake 
profiles abusing the identity of another person on their platforms?  
Under EU law this would more than likely not be the case since notification is a 
requirement under the e-Commerce Directive. Even if an individual notifies the abuse, it 
remains unclear whether an service provider should remove the notified data. How can the 
ISP be sure that the individual notifying does not himself act in bad faith and/ or that the 
notified content is indeed compromised? Holding service providers liable only if the 
notified content is ‘manifestly illegal’ can minimise the danger of private censuring and 
over-blocking by service providers, but only if this standard is strictly interpreted. In case 
of notification by administrative authorities, the public prosecutor, and when confronted 
with a judicial order, service providers should act promptly without making their own 
legality assessment, since the content will already be scrutinized by the notifying 
authorities. Another possibility would be to create a hotline where complaints of ID-fraud 
can be made, together with an identification center. This identification center can then 
assess (in cooperation with law enforcement and authorities best placed to verify 
identities and identification instruments) the complaint and confirm authentic ID of the 
complainant. In case of ID fraud, they can send a notice and take down request to the 
service provider (see infra III.5).  
 
CONVENTION-COMPATIBLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK. – In a very interesting and clear concurring 
opinion in the Yildirim case392 , ECtHR-judge PINTO DE ALBUQUERQUE examined the 
standards set out in the various documents of the Council of Europe and the case law of the 
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ECtHR with regard to internet blocking. On the basis of his research, he developed the 
minimum criteria for Convention-compatible legislation on Internet blocking 
measures393: 
1) a definition of the categories of persons and institutions liable to have their 
publications blocked, such as national or foreign owners of illegal content, websites 
or platforms, users of these sites or platforms and persons providing hyperlinks to 
illegal sites or platforms which have endorsed them. For instance, a clear legal 
definition of a content or a service provider should be provided as their 
responsibilities are different; 
2) a definition of the categories of blocking orders, such as blocking of entire websites, 
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, ports, network protocols or types of use, like 
social networking; 
3) a provision on the territorial ambit of the blocking order, which may have region-
wide, nationwide, or even worldwide effect; 
4) a limit on the duration of the blocking order. Indefinite or indeterminate blocking 
orders constitute per se unnecessary interference. Indefinitely valid blocking 
orders, or blocking orders which remain valid for a long period are inadmissible 
forms of prior constraint or pure censorship. 
5) an indication of the ‘interests’, that may justify the blocking order394;  
6) an observance of the criterion of proportionality, which provides for a fair 
balancing of the competing ‘interests’ pursued;  
7) compliance with the principle of necessity, which enables an assessment to be 
made as to whether the interference with human rights, such as freedom of 
expression, adequately advances the ‘interests’ pursued and goes no further than 
is necessary to meet the said ‘social need’. Less draconian measures should be 
envisaged, for example by implementing a ‘notice and take down’ policy prior to 
the issuance of a blocking order;  
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8) a definition of the authorities competent to issue a reasoned blocking order. The 
fact that many different authorities may issue blocking orders does not enhance 
legal certainty. This could lead to different interpretations and applications of the 
law. Better would be to concentrate this power in the hands of one single authority.  
9) a procedure to be followed for the issuance of that order, which includes the 
examination by the competent authority of the case file supporting the request for 
a blocking order and the hearing of evidence from the affected person or 
institution, unless this is impossible or incompatible with the ‘interests’ pursued;  
10) a notification of the blocking order and the grounds for it to the person or 
institution affected;  
11) a judicial appeal procedure against the blocking order. 
 
He further underlined that such a framework must be established through specific legal 
provisions and that neither the general provisions and clauses governing civil and criminal 
responsibility nor the e-Commerce Directive constitute a valid basis for ordering Internet 
blocking. According to the judge, any indiscriminate blocking measure which interferes 
with lawful content, sites or platforms as a collateral effect can never be justified as it lacks 
a rational connection between the interference and the social need pursued. He concludes 
that ‘when exceptional circumstances justify the blocking of illegal content, it is necessary to 
tailor the measure to the content which is illegal avoid targeting person or institutions that 
are not de jure or de facto responsible for the illegal publication and have not endorsed its 
content.’  
 
3.3.4 Evaluation 
MANY ISSUES TO BE SOLVED. – Many issues with regard to internet blocking remain to be 
solved. For instance, who should be ordered to block (scope ratione personae)? Different 
entities have different responsibilities which are sometimes hard to fit together and may 
even collide. This makes a clear overview necessary of which entity has which 
responsibility and when (after being requested or ordered, and thus reactive, or at its own 
initiative (proactive))? Another question is the scope ratione materiae (what should be 
blocked)? Different laws create different categories of information (f.i. personal data and 
non-personal data, identification data, meta data and content data). These different 
categories make it hard to identify the different responsibilities, the applicable laws and 
the legal interests to be assessed. In the context of identity theft, ‘identification data’ may 
at the same time qualify as personal data and as content data, e.g. when somebody uses 
another person’s picture for his or her Facebook profile. Should Facebook then block the 
entire profile or merely the ‘stolen’ picture? Is it Facebook that has to decide what it should 
do? In the context of data protection law, it is the data controller which decides, while in 
the context of the e-Commerce Directive, this depends upon the national procedure.  
 
BLOCKING OR REMOVAL IN THE CONTEXT OF IDENTITY THEFT. – This brings us to the next question: 
which legal safeguards and procedural checks and balances should surround the measure? 
Taking the different principles all together, we may assume that a blocking order to 
terminate the identity theft or prevent further damage, is appropriate provided that the 
following conditions are met:  
- First of all, it must be based on a particularly strict legal framework ensuring both 
tight control over the scope of the ban and effective judicial review to prevent 
possible abuse, because it could have significant effects of ‘collateral censorship’ 
(cf. minimum criteria supra)395; 
- Secondly, it may not impose a general obligation to monitor on the intermediary 
ISP. This condition will only apply in case the ISP provides services of mere conduit, 
caching and hosting. 
- Thirdly, the specific measure has to be proportionate in the sense that it must strike 
a fair balance between the applicable rights and interests, in particular the right to 
privacy of the individual on the one hand, and the economic interests of the entity 
and the right to privacy and freedom of information of internet users on the other 
hand.396 The measure should leave the concrete elaboration to the ISP’s 
appreciation.397 The privacy of the individual seems to override as a general rule 
the economic interests of the entity as well as the interests of internet users. This 
however may depend on the nature of the information, its sensitivity and the 
interest of the general public in the information. In case of stolen identification 
information, it seems that the privacy of the individual will take the upper hand.  
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- Lastly, the blocking measure has to be effective. It suffices that it has the effect of 
preventing further damages or at least of making it more difficult to achieve the 
identity theft and of seriously discouraging internet users from accessing the 
compromising information. 
 
ENFORCEABILITY THROUGH NOTICE BASED LIABILITY. – In the end, the successfulness of such 
measure comes down to having an effective form of enforceability. The e-Commerce 
Directive introduces a very specific type of enforceability. It holds the principle that service 
providers are not responsible for the information they store, transmit or render accessible 
as long as they are ‘neutral’. This means that activity is of a mere technical, automatic and 
passive nature, which implies that the information society service provider has neither 
knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored.398 As 
discussed earlier, this neutrality however ends as soon as service providers actually take 
note of illegal activities committed with the aid of their services. They could find such 
content through their own activities or they could be notified by a third party (a user, a 
victim or a public authority, cf. supra).399 In the case the host provider is notified by a 
private entity, he must assess whether the notification is credible. It however remains 
unclear how they handle concrete complaints. This makes internet host providers judges 
in their own case.400 This ‘notice based liability’ actually comes down to making internet 
host providers responsible for maintaining and keeping illegal information accessible. It 
thus depends on their own decision whether or not they are exempted from liability. They 
may, however, lack the knowledge to assess the illegality of the content. This assessment 
is moreover per definition a very delicate issue, regarding the diverging points of view on 
the right to freedom of speech in different states.401  
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 This increases the risk of privatized censorship and over-blocking. Needless to say that 
this regime also implies potential abuse by fictitious victims.402 
 
FRENCH YAHOO! CASE. - A good illustration of the fact that the assessment of the legality of 
data can be complicated by different views on freedom of speech, is the French Yahoo! 
Case.403 The Tribunal de Grande Instance convicted Yahoo for allowing their online 
auction service to be used for the sale of memorabilia from the Nazi period, contrary to 
Article R645-1 of the French Criminal Code (Code penal).404 Therefore the Court ordered 
Yahoo! to take all possible measures to dissuade and block access in France of web pages 
stored on Yahoo!'s US-based servers. The French Tribunal, relying on expert reports, 
concluded that Yahoo! could screen nineteen percent of its users as well as the illegal 
content by using technologies to identify the geographical origin of users (by their IP 
addresses) and soliciting users’ good faith declarations of their nationality. Other 
possibilities for the ISP to identify users included the purchaser's delivery address and the 
language used by their internet browser.405 Subsequently, Yahoo! successfully sought a 
declaration in the US (its place of incorporation) that the orders made in France were not 
enforceable under US law on the basis that the orders would breach in the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which protects freedom of speech.406 This 
judgement does not nullify ‘the right of France or any other nation to determine its own laws 
and social policies.’407 A US based Internet company like Yahoo! Still needs to comply with 
French speech regulations if it wished to do business or maintain a physical presence in 
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404 Tribunal de Grande Instance Paris (Superior Court in Paris), 22 May 2000, UEJF and 
Licra/Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo France, 
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406 United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue contre le 
racism et l’antisemitsme, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1194; D. IRELAND-PIPERA, ‘The Future Extraterritorial 
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407 United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue contre le 
racism et l’antisemitsme, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1181, 1186. 
France.408 In an attempt to comply with the French Order, Yahoo! amended its policy to 
also prohibit individuals from auctioning ‘[a]ny item that promotes, glorifies, or is directly 
associated with groups or individuals known principally for hateful or violent positions or 
acts, such as Nazis or the Ku Klux Klan.’409 It is noteworthy that Yahoo! amended its overall 
policy and did not employ technical measures to identify French users and then filter out 
Nazi-related propaganda for them. DUB points out that this would have been difficult to 
achieve and burdensome.410 Moreover, ‘Conducting business in a country-by-country basis 
is impractical. Even if a website achieves a reasonable level of compliance with the laws of 
one country, in the end, scalability issues might require most sites to tailor all their content 
to fit the laws of the most restrictive country.’411 
 
STORAGE REQUIREMENT. - Strangely enough, the e-Commerce Directive only introduces 
notice and take down obligations for intermediaries who store the information and not for 
the providers of mere conduit and caching. Although these providers obtain actual 
knowledge or awareness of illegal activities committed through their services, they cannot 
be held liable if they are in no way involved with the information transmitted. To enjoy this 
immunity it is necessary that, among other things, they do not modify the information that 
they transmit. This requirement does not cover manipulations of a technical nature which 
take place in the course of the transmission as they do not alter the integrity of the 
information contained in the transmission. However, if they deliberately collaborate with 
one of the recipients of their service in order to undertake illegal acts goes, this goes 
beyond the activities of ‘mere conduit’ or ‘caching’. As a result, they cannot benefit from the 
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409 United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue contre le 
racism et l’antisemitsme, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 186 ; C. DUB, ‘YAHOO! INC. V. LICRA’, Berkeley Technology 
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410 C. DUB, ‘YAHOO! INC. V. LICRA’, Berkeley Technology Law Journal 2002, (359) 376-377.  
411 Ibid, 378.  
liability exemptions established for these activities.412 In that sense, this principle of 
limited liability does not completely quash the ‘normal’ criminal liability principles.  
Because of the many legal uncertainties and the lack of specific guidelines, including 
safeguards, with regard to internet blocking through the notice and take down scheme of 
the e-Commerce Directive, action was needed at EU level. At the moment of writing, a new 
European Framework for Notice-and-Action is under development.413 It should however 
be clear that private entities, such as internet host providers, should not take over the role 
of judicial authorities in the assessment of the (il)legality of conduct. As already mentioned, 
in Belgium internet host providers, after being notified about alleged illegal activity, must 
immediately contact the public prosecutor’s office. It is thus the latter who assesses the 
illegality of the content and decides what action should be taken. In the meanwhile, the 
internet host provider can only take provisional action. This is a step in the right direction, 
but it remains to be seen whether a public prosecutor qualifies as an independent and 
impartial judicial authority.414  
  
OTHER WAYS OF ENFORCEMENT. – To further strengthen the enforcement of blocking orders, 
lawmakers could consider making the refusal to cooperate after being ordered to block a 
separate, contempt-offence (cf. supra). It will however not be easy to implement such type 
of enforcement in a digital context (cf. infra). 
The Netherlands are discussing the introduction of a very peculiar, new type of 
enforcement in criminal procedure. They link the non-compliance of the notice and take 
down order to the issuance of a periodic penalty payment (een ‘dwangsom’). This would 
be more efficient than a prosecution for non-compliance.415 Imposing pecuniary damages 
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to enforce compliance indeed seems an effective way to compel somebody to do 
something, when he or she cannot forced be physically or manu militari. It however 
remains a strange idea for continental lawyers to introduce this enforcement technique 
from civil procedure in their criminal procedures. 
 
Another specific issue which remains to be solved is the enforceability in cross-border 
context. As this counts for any type of forced cooperation, we will discuss this in the next 
chapter.  
  
4 Enforceability of forced ISP cooperation in a cross-
border context 
4.1 Situation de lege lata: limits to cross-border law enforcement 
COOPERATION ORDERS. - Criminal investigation is the organised gathering of information 
with a view to establish offences, to identify their perpetrators and to find evidence. It is 
thus a specific, targeted and proportional collection of information. Typically, in the course 
of a criminal investigation, i.e. an exercise of State power, investigators can obtain, by 
compulsion, information which the holder does not want to disclose. Orders can be used in 
addition to requests. 
All the above criminal procedure measures relate to ordering third parties, in particular 
internet service providers, to cooperate with law enforcement. Given the international 
context of identity theft, specific attention should be given to their enforceability in an 
international context. Because internet service providers are often located abroad, their 
cooperation in criminal investigation will often require international (public-private) 
cooperation. The Cybercrime convention, which is currently the only binding international 
instrument dealing with internet-related criminal investigations, tries to develop a more 
flexible system of international cooperation. Yet, especially on the point of ISP cooperation, 
it has proven not to be flexible enough. Procedural measures are only effective if all the 
States have law enforcement functions which can rapidly act and provide effective 
international assistance for investigations. Traces however often end at a server providing 
anonymous services in a third country known for its weak international cooperation. That 
is why law enforcers try to be creative and find other solutions to obtain similar results. 
The previously discussed Pirate Bay case is an example of this. Blocking access to websites 
through local telecom operators is an alternative to notice and take down procedure 
through internet host providers. These are often not effective because the host providers 
do not react as they do not feel bound by orders of foreign authorities.416  
 
                                                          
416 This could however change as the CJEU recently ordered Google to comply with the Spanish 
Data Protection Law although they are US based. To the extent that the operator of a search engine 
sets up in a Member State a branch or subsidiary which is intended to promote and sell advertising 
space offered by that engine and which orientates its activity towards the inhabitants of that Member 
State, the processing of personal data falls within the territorial scope of that Member State. 
(Judgment of 8 April 2014, Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317) 
UNILATERAL ORDERS? – The (Belgian417) Yahoo case is another illustration.418 The Belgian 
Criminal Procedure Code (Belgian CPC) imposes a duty to disclose the identity of the user 
of an ICT-application to law enforcement, when ordered to do so by a prosecutor or judge. 
Failure to comply is punishable with a criminal fine. This article 46bis Belgian Criminal 
Procedure Code can be seen as the Belgian implementation of article 18 Cybercrime 
Convention. In a national context enforcing Belgian service providers to cooperate poses 
little problems. But how can Belgium impose this duty to cooperate on a foreign service 
provider based in a foreign country who delivers internet services in Belgium? In other 
words, can a company, that delivers internet services globally but is based in a foreign 
country, ever be required to respond to a cooperation order issued by authorities from 
other states?  
The Belgian public prosecutor tried to enforce it unilaterally. The Belgian prosecution 
service initiated criminal prosecution of a US dotcom for failure to respond to production 
orders for user identification data issued by a Belgian prosecutor. The prosecution is based 
on the assumption that American company Yahoo! Inc. (hereinafter ‘Yahoo’) fell under 
Belgian territorial jurisdiction and therefore no mutual legal assistance from the US 
authorities was required. This case thus revolves around the territorial scope of a duty 
imposed upon private operators to cooperate with law enforcement authorities during a 
criminal investigation. This calls into question the limits of the State’s jurisdiction to 
enforce, which is a sensitive issue.419 Where the classic Lotus judgement was flexible on 
substantive jurisdiction, a sovereign claim to power, it was not flexible on executive 
jurisdiction, a sovereign exercise of power. This jurisdiction ‘cannot be exercised by a State 
outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom 
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Press, 2006, 102. 
or from a convention’.420 States can therefore, in theory, only exercise their procedural 
powers within the national borders. But, where do these borders end in the digital 
environment? Authorities (just like cybercriminals) can investigate information abroad by 
digital means without physically having to leave their territory.421 And, as in the Yahoo 
case, they can request information from a foreign service provider via modern means of 
communication, under the threat of criminal prosecution if refused. This raises the 
question of whether, through this, the Belgian prosecutor is exercising jurisdiction outside 
Belgium. Is he, with a request of this kind, exceeding his Belgian-wide jurisdiction or would 
this procedure be permissible in the light of international law? 
 
NO UNILATERAL ENFORCEMENT ON ANOTHER STATE’S TERRITORY. – The territorial scope of the 
criminal procedure law arises, as does substantive criminal law, from the sovereign 
equality of the States.422 If a State wishes to conduct an investigation on another’s territory, 
it does in theory require permission.423 This is why States conclude bilateral or multilateral 
conventions on mutual legal assistance, to obtain evidence located on another State’s 
territory. Any unilateral exercise of authority in another country’s territory outside the 
framework of these conventions is, theoretically, contrary to international law.424 
International law on legal assistance does not prevent States from exchanging information 
voluntarily. A merely informal request is not, therefore, contrary to international law. 
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Neither is fulfilment of that foreign request by a private person, for example.425 But once 
the request is no longer informal, but an order, that State is exercising direct authority in 
another State and this violates the principles of international law. 
 
NON-PHYSICAL BREACHES OF SOVEREIGNTY. - To what extent do criminal investigative measures 
constitute a breach of another State’s sovereignty? In our opinion, these acts include not 
only coercive measures implemented physically in a foreign country, such as interrogation 
after deprivation of liberty, a house search or a seizure of property, but any action by the 
detectives or investigators which results in subjecting someone or something in a foreign 
country to state powers. With modern means of communication, investigators have the 
ability to investigate data abroad without physically leaving the territory of the State in 
which it is located. An investigation physically carried out on the territory of one State can, 
however, have extraterritorial consequences. The question is whether such investigations 
violate another State’s sovereignty and thus requires permission or mutual legal 
assistance. 
 
CURRENT OBJECT-ORIENTATED APPROACH – In parallel with the gathering of physical evidence, 
we could say that the gathering of virtual evidence takes place in the country were the data 
are stored.426 In this view a search at a distance, for virtual data stored abroad requires, in 
principle, international cooperation. This classical viewpoint is generally accepted in the 
US427 and in the Council of Europe. While drafting the Cybercrime Convention, many state 
parties considered that transborder law enforcement access to data or networks, if 
conducted without the permission of the Member State in question, would breach the 
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sovereignty of that country and the principles of international law. This is true in particular 
of data stored on the territory of another State. In this case, all that remains is the 
traditional path of mutual legal assistance as foreseen in article 31 Cybercrime 
Convention.428 Intrusions of this kind are best regulated by international agreements.429 
 
Article 20 of the EU Convention on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters430 and 
article 32 of the Convention on Cybercrime are examples of international agreements of 
this kind of non-physical intrusions. They illustrate the broader investigation potential 
thanks to the use of new communication technologies.431 
Problems of jurisdiction in criminal investigations had already come up when transborder 
telephone calls were tapped. For instance, when a Belgian receives calls from abroad, these 
calls can be subject to a Belgian tapping procedure without the Belgian investigators 
having to leave the territory and without them having to rely on foreign jurisdiction. These 
telephone calls are, however, multiterritorial because the audio signals move through both 
foreign and Belgian telecommunication networks and a Belgian tapping order can apply to 
foreign subjects. These cases often involve nothing more than a trace that ‘moves’ to 
another State without Belgian investigators entering the territory of that State. The breach 
of the other State’s sovereignty is less serious than when the police deliberately cross the 
border to gather evidence on their own initiative.432  
 
The EU Convention on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters contains a specific 
Regulation on this. Under Article 20, the authorities of one Member State can tap a 
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telecommunication address that is used on the territory of another Member State provided 
that they 1) do not require any technical assistance from that Member State in order to do 
so and 2) inform the Member State in question either before the tap order, if it is known 
that the targeted person is on the Member State’s territory or, in other cases, immediately 
after they are aware that the person is located on the territory of the notified Member State. 
The same rules can be found in article 31 of the European Investigation Order (EIO).433  
 
Article 32 of the Convention on Cybercrime regulates the situation in which investigators 
are able to gain remote access to a foreign network and the data stored therein. The 
question of whether this was possible unilaterally led to serious discussion during the 
preliminary negotiations. It was thought by some that the physical location of the computer 
systems and the data stored there would determine which State had (exclusive) 
sovereignty. Others were of the opinion that these systems were part of global cyberspace 
and were therefore freely accessible, not only by citizens, but also by the police and judicial 
authorities.434 
Eventually, the Member States reached an agreement on just two issues. These kinds of 
transborder investigations are possible only when 1) the computer data are open to the 
public or 2) the investigators have obtained the lawful and voluntary consent of the person 
who has the lawful authority to disclose the information held in that computer system (see 
Article 32 (a) and (b) of the Convention on Cybercrime). The Council of Europe is currently 
looking at whether Article 32 of the Convention on Cybercrime has been superseded and 
must be altered out of practical necessity.435 But, for the time being, no other transborder 
access to computer data is permitted under international law. Article 39 of the same 
convention does not, however, preclude Member States from recognising each other 
broader powers in other conventions. It also states specifically that it has no effect on a 
party’s other rights, restrictions, obligations or responsibilities (Article 39, §3). The parties 
to the convention explicitly adopted this ‘saving clause’ because they did not want to 
exclude broader options for transborder investigative work in the future or between 
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willing States.436 Whatever the case, these other transborder network searches first 
require consensus between the States involved.437 
Moreover, it is unclear if ISP’s can serve as a ‘lawful authority’ within article 32 (b) 
Cybercrime Convention.438 The CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE states: ‘Service 
providers are unlikely to be able to consent validly and voluntarily to disclosure their users’ 
data under Article 32. Normally, service providers will only be holders of such data; they will 
not control or own the data, and they will, therefore, not be in a position validly to consent. 
Of course, law enforcement agencies may be able to procure data transnationally by other 
methods, such as mutual legal assistance or procedures for emergency situations.’439  
 
This gives rise to the question if cooperation orders from a law enforcement authority to a 
service provider based in a foreign country might also be a non-physical, transborder 
exercise of authority. The Cyber Crime Convention seems to imply that this is the case. 
However, according to the Belgian Court of Cassation and the Belgian law of 25 December 
2016, if the ISP is virtually present on Belgian territory440, this is not an extraterritorial 
exercise of jurisdiction.441 They choose to ignore the criticism that although Belgium might 
have jurisdiction to prescribe and adjudicate in the case of virtual presence of Yahoo, it still 
lacks the jurisdiction to enforce. Whereas under international law Belgium might lawfully 
request Yahoo to cooperate, but it cannot secure payment of the criminal fine applicable 
under article 46bis Belgian Criminal Procedure Code, since under international law it is 
forbidden to exercise jurisdiction outside its own territory (see supra Lotus case). 
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Apparently, the intention is to use this unilateral approach to push for a change in 
international law, preferably through multilateral legal instruments.  
 
LOSS OF OBJECT-LOCATION. - C. CONINGS notes that one of the weak points of an object-
orientated approach is that it is not always possible to locate the data. She states: ‘It is 
difficult or impossible to pinpoint the precise location of data. Cloud computing is a major 
contributing factor to this. The ‘cloud’ consists of various servers connected to one another 
through the internet. Data stored in the cloud are continually moved for financial reasons 
and in order to render optimum use of the storage capacity. Therefore, locating data at a 
given moment appears to be practically impossible. Moreover, files in a cloud can be split up 
into small parts, which can be stored at different locations.’442 This is one of the reasons 
why she suggests to move to a subject-orientated approach when determining procedural 
competence in criminal law.443 The loss of location is also marked as a problem in the 
Progress Report following the Conclusions of the Council of the European Union on Improving 
Criminal Justice in Cyberspace. This report points out that ‘criminals have the access and 
ability to make use of sophisticated techniques that allow hiding the location of infrastructure 
for the storage or processing of electronic evidence.’444 
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4.2 Cross-border unilateral cooperation orders allowed? 
COMPULSORY MEASURE? – A duty to cooperate arises only after an explicit request or order. 
It is a reactive form of cooperation (cf. supra). This investigative measure was introduced 
as an alternative to other, more intrusive measures, such as the search and seizure.445 Now 
that much of the ‘necessary information’ for criminal investigations is no longer stored 
with the authorities themselves, obligations of this kind to disclose information to the 
authorities are quite common. They arise in various contexts. The measure is less intrusive 
than a search, for example, but it is still a form of coercion which does not derive directly 
from the law (active obligation) but from a judicial order (reactive obligation).446 This will 
especially be the case when the refusal to cooperate is punishable with a criminal sanction. 
The threat of a penalty gives the request an undeniably compulsory character. In the 
various cases in which the ECtHR has had to test these duties to disclose information 
against the non-incrimination principle, it has stressed that measures of this type have a 
compulsory nature. For example, in the Weh case, the Court ruled that ‘without a sufficiently 
concrete link with these criminal proceedings the use of compulsory powers (i.e. the 
imposition of a fine) to obtain information does not raise an issue with regard to the 
applicant’s right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination’.447 In 
O’Halloran and Francis, the Court reiterated: ‘The Court accepts that the compulsion was of 
a direct nature, as was the compulsion in other cases in which fines were threatened or 
imposed for failure to provide information.’448 
The request for information is not, therefore, an informal request, but the competent 
authority does exercise coercive powers on the person addressed.  
 
LOCATION OF COERCION. – The next question to be answered is where the coercive power is 
exercised. Does the public prosecutor for example in the Yahoo case exercised this 
compulsory power in Belgium or abroad? In directing his order to the American company 
based in the US, was the prosecutor actually conducting an investigative act on American 
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territory? The prosecutor did not believe so. He argued that the American company simply 
needs to fulfil the Belgian legal duty to cooperate in Belgium. He considers the duty 
cooperate as an active obligation, deriving directly from the law. Once a company falls 
within the territorial and personal operating sphere of the omission punishable under 
Article 46bis Belgian CPC, it is required to bring the information to Belgium when so 
requested by the prosecutor. The law, in other words, orders the company to bring the data 
to Belgium.449 This view was confirmed by the Belgian Court of Cassation and the Belgian 
Legislator.450  
In our opinion, the latter could indeed be correct, provided that the Belgian prosecutor’s 
request had indeed ‘activated’ a duty to cooperate on the part of Yahoo. But the Belgian 
judges have put the cart (punishment for non-cooperative behaviour) before the horse (a 
duty to cooperate that is binding on the person in question). Substantive criminal law 
jurisdiction, i.e. the international law that allows Belgian judicial authorities to claim 
jurisdiction over behaviour that goes beyond their borders, does not entail full criminal 
procedure jurisdiction, without any complications. The Belgian omission offence requires 
a prior, compulsory obligation to ‘bring’ the information, i.e. an order to activate the 
obligation. We are of the opinion that a Belgian prosecutor can only obtain this coercion of 
a US subject present in the US with the cooperation or permission of the American 
government (jurisdiction to enforce).  
If the identification information resides with a service provider based abroad, the law 
enforcement authority must, in our view, abide by international law. The competent 
authority could, of course, send a request, regardless of where the service provider is 
located. This location does, however, determine the way in which the prosecutor can 
enforce cooperation. The law enforcement authority has no procedural criminal 
jurisdiction over this foreign company and so cannot issue a direct order or, in this case, 
enforce the denial of cooperation. 
The argument of an ‘obligation to bring information to the forum’ does apply, as we see it, 
when a Belgian service provider administers the data remotely, with a third party or 
abroad, for example. In the latter case, in our opinion, that service provider could not argue 
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on the basis of legal assistance that these data are not accessible through it because they 
are located abroad. Therefore, the location of the data is not decisive under the duty of 
cooperation. We are of the opinion that this follows from Article 18 of the Cybercrime 
Convention, which concerns existing (‘historical’) data in the possession and under the 
control of the service provider. 451 
 
As similar enforcement problem arose in the French Yahoo! Case (for the facts of the case, 
see supra III.3.3.4). Yahoo! successfully sought a declaration in the US that the orders made 
in France were not enforceable under US law.452 If Yahoo! is only virtual present in a 
country, and thus does not have any assets in that country, cross-territorial enforcement 
without the cooperation of the state of incorporation is rendered impossible. Even if a State 
is allowed to take decisions with a possible extraterritorial effect such as prosecute 
offences committed in another State, it generally lacks the jurisdiction to enforce it on the 
territory of the other State.453  
 
The view that there is no exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction when a cooperation order 
is made to a company that is virtual or physically present on the requesting state’s 
territory, regardless of where the data are stored is not generally accepted as follows from 
the Microsoft case. 
 
MICROSOFT CASE. - In the Microsoft case the traditional view that the search takes place 
where the data are stored was confirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit. Microsoft, a company incorporated in the US, refused the US Department of 
Justice access to a customer’s e-mails relevant to a drug trafficking investigation, stored on 
a Microsoft server in Ireland. Microsoft refused to do so because it would be ‘an unlawful 
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extraterritorial application of the Stored Communications Act (SCA)454 and would work an 
unlawful intrusion on the privacy of Microsoft’s Customer’.455 The government on the other 
hand was of the opinion that there was no extraterritorial enforcement of jurisdiction, as 
long as the requested data were subject to the recipient’s custody or control.456 The 
question is where the relevant state action takes place when the government compels the 
production of e-mails from an Internet Service Provider: at the place where data is 
accessed or the place where it is stored?457 The District Court ruled that the proposed 
execution of the warrant was not extraterritorial because ‘a SCA Warrant does not 
criminalize conduct taking place in a foreign country; it does not involve the deployment of 
American law enforcement personnel abroad; it does not require even the physical presence 
of service provider employees at the location where data are stored. [I]t places obligations 
only on the service provider to act within the United States.’458 However, the United States 
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit reversed this decision and agreed with Microsoft. It ruled 
that the enforcement of the warrant was an extraterritorial enforcement of jurisdiction 
since the data were stored outside the U.S. and therefore the conduct that falls within the 
focus of the SCA would occur outside the US, regardless of the customer’s location and 
regardless of the Microsoft’s home in the US.459 To get access to emails stored outside its 
borders, the U.S. government must turn to a mutual legal assistance treaty and make a 
request to the foreign government that happens to have jurisdiction turn it over.460 
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However, this ruling is very controversially, and the case can still be appealed to and 
ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court.461 Furthermore, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality could easily be rebutted by congress, if it were to introduce an explicit 
clause in the law.  
 
OTHER RELATED ISSUES. – The procedural rules of the game do not suddenly change because 
a failure to fulfil the duty to cooperate is punishable with a fine, on the basis of broad rules 
of substantive jurisdiction (as is the case under Belgian law).462 That would circumvent the 
rules of international legal assistance. Obtaining this foreign evidence 463 is still a matter of 
international cooperation.464 
When assessing these jurisdictional issues, we must also bear in mind that if a State allows 
its own people to conduct far-reaching, transborder, unilateral investigative work, then it 
must also, in view of the reciprocity principle, allow other States to do the same. While we 
might be able to live with this from our EU partners, it would be more difficult to accept 
that Chinese investigators were able to search the servers of EU companies with a 
territorial link to China, or that a EU service provider would be forced to disclose its 
information to the American government without the EU Member State being able to 
exercise any form of control. The company also risks getting into trouble due to non-
fulfilment of the European data protection laws.465 
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 DISTRUST US DATA PROTECTION. - The distrust with regard to the data protection in the US 
was shown in the Schrems case466 of the CJEU. The Data Protection Directive provides that 
the transfer of personal data to a third country may, in principle, take place only if that 
third country ensures an adequate level of protection of the data (article 25).467 The 
European Commission therefore had taken a decision468 that recognized the adequate 
level of protection for the transfer of data from the EU to the US if organisations declared 
its will to obey the data protection principles as envisaged under the Safe Harbour 
Agreement. Nonetheless, in the Schrems case469 the CJEU declared this decision of the 
Commission invalid because it failed to comply with the requirements laid down in Article 
25(6) of Directive 95/46, read in the light of articles 7, 8 and 47 of the EU Charter.470 The 
Court held that the system of self-certification of a company could only constitute a reliable 
measure of adequacy if US Companies violating the Safe Harbour principles were identified 
and punished. There was no such mechanism put in place. Moreover, the rules could be 
overridden by national security requirements set out in US law, state interference was not 
limited to what is strictly necessary and US authorities were allowed to store all personal 
data on a general basis.471 Furthermore there was no possibility for an individual to pursue 
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470 Judgement of 6 October 2016, Schrems, C-362/14, EU:C:2015:650, §86-90. 
471 M. S. VIDOVIC, ‘Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner(Case C-362/14): empowering national 
data protection authorities’, Croatian Y.B. Eur. L. & Pol'y 2015,(259) 267-268.  
legal remedies in order to have access to personal data relating to him, or to obtain the 
rectification or erasure of such data.472  
From the invalidity it follows that national supervisory authorities can examine the claim 
of a person in the EU concerning the protection of his rights and freedoms in regard to the 
processing of personal data relating to him which has been transferred from a Member 
State to the US. If they are of the opinion that, pursuant to the Data Protection Directive, a 
company in the US does not provide an adequate level of protection, the transfer of the 
data to that company can be suspended. Consequently, US companies were no longer 
allowed to transfer private data from the EU to the US solely on the basis that they are 
members of the Safe Harbour Scheme. The judgement had an impact on the cross-border 
economy between the US and the EU. It was very unclear if and under which conditions 
companies were allowed under EU law to transfer data to the US. Moreover the impact of 
the judgement on other transfer tools for personal data was put into question as well, 
especially in relation to cross-border transfers of personal data to the US. For example the 
Police Directive,473 containing harmonised rules for law enforcement cooperation, also 
made the transfer of data to third states conditional to an adequate level of protection. 
Therefore a new framework for the transfer of personal data between the U.S. and the EU 
became a priority. On the 12th of July 2016 the Commission launched the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield.474 In its press release475 the Commission stated that: ‘This new framework protects 
the fundamental rights of anyone in the EU whose personal data is transferred to the United 
States as well as bringing legal clarity for businesses relying on transatlantic data transfers’. 
It also added that the new arrangement lives up to the requirements of the European Court 
of Justice in the Schrems case. Unless the Court of Justice would come to the conclusion that 
this new arrangement also violates fundamental rights, companies can safely transfer 
personal data to the States again. This new framework prevents that companies in case of 
a request for personal data by US authorities should either violate the EU data protection 
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rules or otherwise risk penalties in the US for not complying with the request.476 However, 
there are already two cases pending before the CJEU asking to annul the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield on the basis of articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter.477 
 
SUBPOENAS AND INDIRECT EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION. - This problem of issuing direct orders to 
foreign legal subjects actually dates from before the internet era. The practice is 
reminiscent of the American ‘discovery orders’.478 They obliged US citizens, who fall within 
US jurisdiction, usually under the threat of a penalty (subpoena), to bring documents from 
abroad to the US.479 The US sees this as an indirect territorial exercise of its jurisdiction 
because it does not itself conduct investigations in the foreign territory. Because the 
documents are brought to the US, the ‘discovery’ is made on American territory. Therefore 
it shifts the border when it orders discoveries on foreign territory. However, the practice 
runs into systematic resistance from other States, particularly in Europe. Europe views the 
execution of this type of unilateral request without the permission of the other State as an 
intervention in the territorial sovereignty of that State. A typical example is the controversy 
surrounding the ‘Belgian’ corporation SWIFT, which was intended to give the American 
authorities access to financial data.480 
Therefore, America may not object too strongly to these direct orders. A recent Council of 
Europe report shows that the same US Government uses such a practice in relation to cloud 
service providers falling under their jurisdiction. This is the case when the company or one 
of its subsidiaries is based in the US, but also when a company ‘conducts continuous and 
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systematic business in the United States’.481 Because the US uses the practice itself, it might 
have no objection to unilateral orders against US private companies coming from the EU. 
Then again, the practice does not tally with the traditional uncooperative European 
attitude to American orders for information. If Europe were to change track, it would be 
forced, in view of the reciprocity principle, to stop being uncooperative with these 
unilateral American orders, and this is something that the Americans would only 
applaud.482 RYNGAERT rightly concludes: ‘Europeans may indeed reason that arguments of 
reciprocity counsel against unilateral assertions of jurisdiction in the field of the law of 
evidence. Although such assertions may confer short-term litigation benefits, such benefits 
may be outweighed by the burdens of future unilateral assertions of jurisdiction of other 
States.’483 
We should not lose sight of the fact that investigators might also run the risks of being 
prosecuted in other countries. Unilateral, transborder tapping orders and network 
searches could be described in other States as unlawful eavesdropping and hacking.484 As 
KASPERSEN rightly notes: ‘Under public international law, there is no rule that law 
enforcement officers of one State can lawfully execute their duties as imposed by national law, 
nor can they invoke legal competences or coercive measures in that State as provided by their 
national law.’485 
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 CONCLUSION. - When a law enforcement authority directly orders legal subject based 
abroad, for instance by threatening with fines for non-fulfilment of a unilateral request for 
foreign evidence, it is exercising its power across its borders. In other words, this is a 
unilateral request with an extraterritorial effect. It cannot be claimed that this is a purely 
territorial and domestic affair simply because the law enforcement authority has not 
physically left his own territory. Such order is a coercive measure and comes down to an 
extraterritorial exercise of enforcement jurisdiction. Without permission from the foreign 
government, an action of this kind is, in our opinion, contrary to international law. 
Multilateral treaties facilitating access to data without the burdensome MLAT-procedures 
should be a priority for policy makers. The European Council and Commission seem to 
acknowledge that.486  
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5 The road ahead 
5.1 Need for international cooperation 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL MEASURES. – Based on the case law of the ECtHR, legislators have a 
positive duty actively to provide for an effective response to the risks to secure identity.487 
Such an effective and comprehensive response implies: 
- Reporting mechanisms to victims in order to tackle the underreporting of the 
offence;488 
- Ensuring the identification of perpetrators by implementing an IT infrastructure 
designed to protect all fundamental human rights and freedoms at stake, for 
example keeping logs and transaction records and constructing reliable 
identification and authentication while at the same time securing the storage of 
these logs and personal data, controlling the access to it and executing effective 
audits. 
- Block access to compromising illegal content in order to avoid further damage 
while at the same time ensuring the respect of the other fundamental rights at 
stake; 
 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ‘2.0’. – All these principles are only effective to the extent they 
can be enforced. In an international context, individual Member States cannot act on the 
basis of unilateral measures. Efficient solutions must of necessity be international in 
scope.489 An effective enforcement of ISP cooperation requires an effective, flexible system 
of international cooperation.  
In a digitised society, evidence need not necessarily be on one territory, but it can be on 
foreign servers or held by foreign third parties. International law however draws the line 
between the different sovereign legal orders and, when compared with the 
extraterritoriality of substantive criminal law, it seems very strict in procedural criminal 
law matters. This gap is normally bridged by international legal assistance.490 The path of 
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legal assistance however is too cumbersome and slow. A study of the practice reveals that 
the American authorities have often returned requests for legal assistance in the 
identification of users of electronic communication services without processing them.491 
Although the US is conventionally obliged to assist states like Belgium492, this traditional 
legal assistance contains no mechanism by which to penalise the US or force it to act if 
assistance is not forthcoming or is too late. It is just not worth the effort for the average 
criminal case. Diplomatic pressure is the only possible solution, but we fear that the 
individual EU Member State will not really have much impact on the American authorities 
at that point. 
 
It goes without saying then that increasing internationalisation and digitisation will 
increase pressure for flexible and efficient international cooperation.493 For the time being, 
compromises are being sought, such as the aforementioned Article 20 of the EU Convention 
on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and Article 32 of the Convention on 
Cybercrime.494 These two articles make legal assistance slightly more flexible, but they 
constitute an insufficient attempt to render the cooperation practical and efficient. For 
example, we see that Article 32 of the Convention on Cybercrime is much stricter on 
transborder network searches than its counterpart provision, in relation to the 
transborder tap, in the EU’s Convention on mutual legal assistance. This is because the EU 
States tend to go for intra-EU transborder cooperation. 
 
But even the provision of Article 20 of the EU Convention applies only when there is no 
need for active cooperation from foreign intermediaries. This shows that the Parties to the 
Convention considered it a step too far to allow States unilaterally to coerce foreign IT-
intermediaries to cooperate, which Belgium undeniably tried to do in the Yahoo case. 
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Other compromises in the Convention on Cybercrime are, for the time being, the expedited 
preservation measure (Article 29), the expedited disclosure measure (Article 30) and the 
setup of permanent points of contact (Article 35). These measures should relieve the 
problems relating to the speed and transience of electronic communication to a certain 
extent and prevent States from acting on their own initiative. On the basis of Article 29, a 
State can request that another State impose an expedited preservation of stored computer 
data. The requesting State must then, subsequently, send a legal assistance request in order 
to obtain these data.495 There is one important exception to this. Article 30 stipulates that 
if, when implementing a request made under Article 29, the requested State discovers that 
a service provider in another State was involved in transmission of the electronic 
communication, the requested State must provide the requesting State with the necessary 
‘traffic data’ as soon as possible496 so that this service provider and the path through which 
communication was transmitted can be identified.497 The combination of these two articles 
therefore appears to solve (at least on a theoretical level) the prosecutor’s problem in the 
Yahoo case and enables, more generally, a faster acquisition of the data held by service 
providers based abroad. The procedure sounds great in theory, but in practice appears to 
run into the same problems experienced with traditional mutual legal assistance. 
Implementation of the measure may yet be too slow to allow the capturing of the needed 
data498, and the willingness of some States to cooperate with requests of this type is often 
limited. 
 
                                                          
495 Explanatory Report to the Cybercrime Convention, §283 and 284: ‘At the same time, a requested 
party is permitted to use other procedures for ensuring the rapid preservation of data, including the 
expedited issuance and execution of a production order or search warrant for the data. The key 
requirement is to have an extremely rapid process in place to prevent the data from being irretrievably 
lost. (…) Finally the requesting Party must undertake to subsequently submit a request for mutual 
assistance so that it may obtain the production of the data.’ 
496 Article 1, (d) of the Cybercrime Convention states that this includes data relating to the origin 
of the communication (IP addresses, numbers, etc.). See Explanatory Report to the Cybercrime 
Convention, §30. 
497 See Explanatory Report to the Cybercrime Convention, §290: ‘In doing so, the requested Party 
may discover that the traffic data found in its territory reveals that the transmission had been routed 
from a service provider in a third State, or from a provider in the requesting State itself.’ For example, 
if the data lead back to the requesting State itself, it can obtain the necessary information through 
internal measures. If they lead back to a third State, the requesting State can again make an 
expedited preservation or expedited disclosure request, this time to the third State. 
498 H.W.K. KASPERSEN, ‘Cybercrime and Internet jurisdiction (Draft discussion paper prepared in 
the framework of the Project on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe)’, 28, www.coe.int/cybercrime. 
It is to be hoped that Article 35 will satisfy the high expectations of those who look for 
better cooperation. This article stipulates that States establish a point of contact that is to 
be continually available and guarantees immediate assistance, among other things for the 
location of suspects.499 The setup of a 24/7 network of this type is, in our opinion, one of 
the most important achievements of the Convention on Cybercrime.  
 
THE ‘POWER OF DISPOSAL’. – As we have said, the Council of Europe is currently considering 
amendments to Article 32 of the Convention on Cybercrime. The report by the Cybercrime 
Convention Committee gives several interesting suggestions to ‘update’ transborder 
access to data.500 Of the policy options under consideration, we think that the suggestion 
to replace the location of the data as a condition for procedural criminal jurisdiction with 
‘the power of disposal’ is a deserving one. It binds the data to the person or people who have 
the right to access and ‘administer’ them (edit, delete, deny others the right of access and 
use, etc.). For these data to fall under the jurisdiction of the investigating State, this 
‘administrator’ would have to physically be in the territory of the investigating State or be 
a national subject.501  
This new criterion offers prospects for transborder network searches and production 
orders issued to national based service providers who choose to store their data abroad 
but not for coercive orders issued to foreign based service providers who nonetheless 
provides services on other states’ territories. When the latter is the case, it is still not the 
place where the data are stored that should be relevant, but the place where the person 
charged with the duty to cooperate (the ‘administrator’) is located. 
 
SUBJECT-ORIENTATED APPROACH.502 - C. CONINGS suggests that ‘the habitual residence of the 
subject regarding his virtual past’ should become the main criteria for localizing 
                                                          
499 States can themselves choose who to appoint. For Belgium, it is the Federal Computer Crime 
Unit (FCCU). See Explanatory Report to the Cybercrime Convention, §298. 
500 The scope of the present contribution does not allow us to go into this in any more detail. See 
the report of the CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE (T-CY), ‘Transborder access and jurisdiction: 
what are the options?’, Report of the Transborder Group adopted by the T-CY on 6 December 2012, 
www.coe.int/TCY. 
501 J. SPOENLE, ‘Cloud Computing and cybercrime investigations: Territoriality vs. the power of 
disposal?’, Discussion Paper of 31 August 2010, www.coe.int/cybercrime. 
502 This part is entirely based on the findings of C. CONINGS in her PhD ‘A coherent criminal 
procedure regime for search in the physical and digital world’. (C. CONINGS, Een coherent regime voor 
strafrechtelijke zoekingen in de fysieke en digitale wereld, onuitg. Doctoraatsthesis Rechten KU 
Leuven, 2016, 554-581; The part of the PhD on territorial search competences was also published 
in C C. CONINGS, Locating criminal investigative measures in a virtual environment. Where do searches 
investigation measures and, hence, indicating which state has jurisdiction. She justifies her 
choice by stating that: ‘Focusing on habitual residence ensures that the most important 
competencies of control of both the virtual and the physical life are vested in one and the same 
state. Individuals can no longer escape from the local legal system by storing data abroad, 
whilst enjoying full access and use of that data’. Furthermore she adds: ‘The autonomous 
investigative competence relates to the investigated subject’s legal virtual environment. 
Making this competence dependent on the will of the state of storage or the service provider's 
state should, in our opinion, be excluded. As is the case with investigations in real time, the 
focus should be on the subject. Moreover, in a subject-oriented approach, legal subjects are 
given the protection they expect. Regardless of where the data are to be found, the human 
rights of a person are protected on the basis of the law of the country where he has habitual 
residence and, in general, where he habitually consults his data. In this way, every virtual 
action falls within the scope of a coherent and, for the person concerned, familiar system of 
protection of privacy and other human rights. This also ensures that there is legal 
certainty.’503 In addition to this, CONINGS is of the opinion that territorial competence 
should also be attributed to the state where the service provider is located504 and to the 
                                                          
take place in cyberspace. B-CCENTRE Legal Research Report 2015, 43-72 and in B. J. KOOPS, C. 
CONINGS and F. VERBRUGGEN, Zoeken in computers naar Nederlands en Belgisch recht, Oisterwijk, Wolf 
Legal Publisher, 2016, 136-187.) 
503 C. CONINGS, Locating criminal investigative measures in a virtual environment. Where do searches 
take place in cyberspace. B-CCENTRE Legal Research Report 2015, 62. However, she notes that: ‘ 
illegal access (e.g. hacking) cannot extend the territorial competence of the respective state due to the 
fact that this causes illegal entrance in another person’s virtual environment. An authority which 
wants to access this must do so by means of international cooperation with the authority having the 
sovereign competence over the hacked system.’ (Ibid, 65). 
504 CONINGS is of the opinion that denying the service provider’s state the competence to 
autonomously investigate the data linked to that service could infringe its sovereignty. ’If the data 
sought are accessible to the service provider and are linked to its service, which is consulted by the 
subject, the service provider’s state displays a well-founded link with the data sought and its claim to 
sovereignty cannot merely be brushed aside.’. However, the server state only has competence if: 
‘service was consulted by the investigated subject and that the sought data are related to the subject’s 
use of the service.’ If this is the case the legal subject could expect that his data can be investigated 
under the service provider’s state’s law. (Ibid, 63.) 
state where the subject his data are stored but only if the data subject stored his data 
himself in the foreign territory.505, 506  
 
Although there have been a few Court decisions (see supra) about the obligations of service 
providers, enforceability remains a challenge unless the service provider is established in 
the relevant country.507 
 
Unfortunately, the T-CY report pays little attention to the problems posed by Yahoo-like 
cases (transborder request or ISP cooperation as an alternative of transborder access). It 
merely states that when data are in the hands of a service provider in a foreign country, 
the investigating authorities must generally take the path of legal assistance. However, 
they will experience technical and legal difficulties in this regard. Some States do allow 
service providers to respond directly to requests from foreign law enforcement 
authorities. Under some circumstances, information might be voluntarily exchanged.508 
The time has come to find an international generally agreed solution to this problem. Just 
as the US first negotiated an agreement with Belgium and then with the EU over more rapid 
American access to financial data of the type held by companies like SWIFT in its fight 
against terrorism, it would seem recommendable that the US oblige its internet companies 
to comply directly with requests for user information coming from judicial authorities 
from EU-states or the EU as such. The EU could set a first example of such direct ISP 
cooperation. It would be desirable, of course, to have a standardised electronic 
communication system for this, which could guarantee speed, authenticity and 
confidentiality. In more sensitive cases, such as when the request could endanger relevant 
interests (e.g. medical confidentiality, professional secrecy, business confidentiality or 
                                                          
505 If the service provider (e.g. Google) has control over which country has competence over the 
legal subordinate’s data by storing them in a place that is financially more viable, it becomes difficult 
to the subject to know which state has competence over his data and legal certainty in a virtual 
environment is therefore eroded. (Ibid, 63-64). 
506 For an extensive justification of these choices see C. CONINGS, Locating criminal investigative 
measures in a virtual environment. Where do searches take place in cyberspace. B-CCENTRE Legal 
Research Report 2015, 43-72. 
507 Commission services, Cover note of 2 december 2016, ‘Non-paper: Progress Report following 
the Conclusions of the Council of the European Union on Improving Criminal Justice in Cyberspace’, 
no. 15072/16, 12-13. 
508 CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE (T-CY), ‘Transborder access and jurisdiction: what are the 
options?’, Report of the Transborder Group adopted by the T-CY on 6 December 2012, 31 and 44, 
www.coe.int/TCY. 
other national interests), the Member State could then intervene. With the right 
guarantees, it might be possible, for example, to oblige service providers to respond to 
requests to disclose identification data to foreign law enforcement authorities, provided 
that the requested data has substantial links with the territory of the investigating State, 
such as the suspect or victim is a national subject of that State.509 In those cases, the data 
are identification information relating to electronic communications. Those 
communications were generated for the most part in the investigating State, and use was 
made of internet access and/or service providers based in that State. The role of the foreign 
service provider was merely secondary, the communication had its centre of gravity in the 
investigating State. 
 
5.2 Semi-private take down procedures 
SOURCE OF INSPIRATION. - Since the CJEU ruled in Google Spain that there is a right to be 
forgotten, we could say that there is a fortiori a right to rectify when false information 
concerning one’s identity circulates on the internet.510 
 This is also in line with the positive obligations of states under article 8 ECHR. Because ID 
fraud takes place in an online context without territorial borders, international 
cooperation is very much needed if we want to offer victims an efficient redress. In the 
context of child sexual abuse online, INHOPE an international association of hotlines was 
set up to take down images of child abuse more efficiently. Another project worth assessing 
is the European Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) launched by Europol to take terrorist 
propaganda offline. Both projects could be a source of inspiration when looking for 
remedies to take offline a compromised ID. 
                                                          
509 We refer in this matter to the current doctoral dissertation by LEWIS CHEZAN BANDE at KU Leuven 
entitled ‘Cross-Border Access to Computer Data by Foreign Law Enforcement and the Position of 
Private Actors: Reducing the Role of Requested-State Authorities in International Cooperation 
against Cybercrime?’. 
510 This right can also be derived from the Data Protection Directive and the GDPR that state that 
the data controller  has the task of ensuring that personal data are processed ‘fairly and lawfully’ , 
that they are ‘collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in 
a manner that is incompatible with those purposes’ , that they are ‘adequate, relevant and not 
excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/ or further processed’,  that 
they are ‘accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date’,  and finally, that they are ‘kept in a form 
which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for 
which the data are processed’. (see Supra III.3.3.2) 
INHOPE. – The International Association of Internet Hotlines (INHOPE) brings together 51 
hotlines in 45 countries511 and offers the public a way of anonymously reporting Internet 
material including child sexual abuse material they suspect to be illegal.512 The project is 
co-funded by the European Union.513 
HOW DOES IT WORK?514 – Civilians can make a complaint of internet material of sexual child 
abuse to a reporting portal of one of the hotlines. A highly trained analyst will manually 
assess the report. If the analyst qualifies the received content under the national law as an 
image of sexual abuse, he or she will trace and determine the geographical location of the 
server on which the content is hosted at the time of assessment. If the content is hosted in 
the country where the complaint is made, the hotline will contact the police as well as the 
host provider in question to ensure a quick removal of the url. The specific method of 
cooperation with the police, the judiciary and the ISP’s is different in every country. When 
the content is being hosted in an INHOPE country a report will be send to the INHOPE 
reporting system which then forwards the report to the relevant INHOPE hotline. An 
analyst of this hotline will reassess the report and if found illegal under its national law the 
analyst will start the Notice and Takedown procedure in consultation with the police and 
the judicial authorities.515 Most of the time URLs of sexual abuse are then removed from 
the internet within 72 hours.516  
A similar structure could be set up to report ID fraud online and to take down false 
information concerning one’s identity circulating on the internet. Moreover it would also 
bypass the problem of territoriality since under the INHOPE system it are always the 
hotlines in the country of the ISP that hosts the illegal content, that start the notice and take 
                                                          
511 A list of the participating countries and hotlines is published at the INHOPE website 
(www.inhope.org ) 
512 www.inhope.org  
513 https://ec.europa.eu/justice/grants/results/daphne-toolkit/en/content/child-pornography-
internet-cooperation-between-hotlines-inhope-forum  
514 Internet Watch Foundation, How we assess and remove content, 
https://www.iwf.org.uk/what-we-do/how-we-assess-and-remove-content ; Child Focus, Hoe 
werkt het concreet in het buitenland?, http://childfocus.be/nl/seksuele-
uitbuiting/kinderpornografie/burgerlijk-meldpunt/hoe-werkt-het-concreet-in-het-buitenland.  
515 The cooperation with law enforcement is necessary to secure the possibility of an criminal 
investigation and in this regard to protect evidence.  
516 When the content is not hosted in an INHOPE country, hotlines can report it to the national 
police who then can forward it to INTERPOL, who then can pass it on to the hosting country’s police. 
down procedure. ISPs therefore do not receive direct legal orders from foreign authorities 
which might conflict with their obligations under national law.  
The EKSISTENZ project’s technology could also help hotlines with their assessment. If the 
victim himself makes a complain, it could easily use the EKSISTENZ-tool to prove its 
identity. 
EU IRU. – On 1 July 2015 Europol launched the European Union Internet Referral Unit (EU 
IRU) to combat terrorist propaganda and related violent extremist activities on the 
internet. The unit is aimed at reducing the level and impact of terrorist and violent 
extremist propaganda on the internet.517 One of the core tasks of the EU IRU is flagging 
terrorist and violent extremist content online and cooperating with online service 
providers with the aim of removing this content.518 Furthermore, EU IRU supports 
Member States with operational and strategic analysis.519 The EU IRU works closely with 
relevant social media and other private companies and national expert contact points (due 
to be established in all Member States).  
A referral activity (meaning the reporting of terrorist and extremist online content to the 
concerned online service provider) does not constitute an enforceable act. The decision to 
remove the referred terrorist and extremist online content is left to the concerned service 
provider under their own responsibility and accountability (in reference to their Terms 
and Conditions). Nevertheless, in 91.4% of the EU IRU referrals, the material has been 
swiftly removed.520 Referrals to the online platforms are made both following requests 
received from Member States and as a result of Open Source Scanning by the EU IRU team. 
521 
                                                          
517 EUROPOL, ‘Europol’s Internet Referral Unit to combat terrorist and violent extremist 
propaganda’, Press Release 1 July 2015, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol%E2%80%99s-internet-referral-unit-
tocombat-terrorist-and-violent-extremist-propaganda  
518 EUROPOL, ‘EU Internet Referral Unit Year One Report Highlights’, 22 July 2016, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/eu-internet-referral-unit-year-one-
report-highlights, 4. 
519 EUROPOL, ‘Europol’s Internet Referral Unit to combat terrorist and violent extremist 
propaganda’, Press Release 1 July 2015, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol%E2%80%99s-internet-referral-unit-
tocombat-terrorist-and-violent-extremist-propaganda  
520 For the first working year of EU IRU.  
521 EUROPOL, ‘EU Internet Referral Unit Year One Report Highlights’, 22 July 2016, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/eu-internet-referral-unit-year-one-
report-highlights, 4. 
Following the Year One Report a 24/7 referral service an real time access to referral 
information for Member States’ investigators will be set up by July 2017. Furthermore it 
states that: ‘the development of a strong referral capability, which will be informed by tactics 
derived from operational analysis and outreach to the private sector, will bridge the gap 
between prevention and attribution’.  
CONCLUSION. – Both the INHOPE project as the EU IRU can be seen as examples of successful 
cooperation with the private sector. This type of cooperation on a voluntary basis seems 
to be very effective to take down online content. Both projects work with experts in the 
field when assessing possible illegal content. For example the EU IRU comprises of a team 
of experts with multiple and diverse knowledge and skills, ranging from experts in 
religiously inspired terrorism, translators, ICT developers and law enforcement experts in 
counter terrorism.522 This is important, the more expertise these central bodies have the 
more credibility they have towards the private sector.  
Setting up a similar cooperation network when dealing with ID theft seems the way to go. 
It should be seen as a first step to take compromised personal data offline. Only when ISPs 
refuse to voluntarily take down referred information, coercion mechanisms should come 
into play. 
  
                                                          
522 EUROPOL, ‘EU Internet Referral Unit Year One Report Highlights’, 22 July 2016, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/eu-internet-referral-unit-year-one-
report-highlights, 4. 
Conclusion 
 
A key goal of the EKSISTENZ-project is to prevent identity theft, but it has to be assumed 
that absolute watertight prevention will never be possible. Criminal law only plays a role 
in the aftermath, as the legal basis for authorities to start criminal investigations. It 
acknowledges the suffering of the primary victims and gives them a stepping stone in the 
legal process of recovery of their compromised identity. 
 
Under the case law of the ECtHR, member state lawmakers have a positive duty to actively 
provide for an effective response to the risks to secure identity.523 Such an effective and 
comprehensive response requires notification, identification and blocking mechanisms. All 
of these measures face  particular stumbling blocks. They all require cooperation of service 
providers: voluntarily if possible, compulsory if necessary. 
 
With regard to notification duties, under EU law a patchwork of notification duties 
currently exists, all different in scope. This creates legal uncertainty for service providers 
as to when, to whom and what they should notify. Furthermore, notification duties entail 
operational costs and possible reputational damage for service providers. In practice, 
compliance with notification duties seems very low. From May 2018 onwards, a 
notification duty for ‘all data controllers’, will apply under the GDPR. This duty is backed 
up with high administrative fines to ensure compliance. These measures can only be 
applauded. The sooner data breaches are notified, the sooner they can be remedied. In this 
way ID fraud can be redressed swiftly in order to limit or even avoid harm to a victim’s 
identity.  
 
As for identification duties, article 18 Cybercrime Convention obliges the Member States 
to adopt legislative and other measures to order a service provider to submit subscriber 
information, including the subscriber’s identity. This obligation is in line with the case law 
of the ECtHR. In K.U. v Finland524 the Court stated that States should implement a legal 
procedure where a judicial authority may order, under certain conditions, the release of 
                                                          
523 ECtHR 14 February 2012, nr. 7094/06, Romet/The Netherlands; ECtHR 2 December 2008, no. 
2872/02, K.U. v. Finland; T. PÖYSTI,’Judgement in the case of K.U. v. Finland’, Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review 2009, Vol. 6, 45. 
524 ECtHR 2 December 2008, no. 2872/02, K.U. v. Finland. 
information required to identify an internet user, provided that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that he or she has committed a criminal offence. In I v Finland, the ECtHR 
decided that the respect for private life under article 8 ECHR, holds a positive obligation 
for the state to provide for effective information security measures to exclude the 
possibility of unauthorised access to data.525 One might argue that this also demands 
technical measures which provide for the reliable identification and authentication of 
users of electronic communication services. Here the Project’s technology might provide a 
handy tool in the fight against ID Fraud and other misuse of personal data. However, the 
need for identification is hindered and in some cases even made impossible by the CJEU’s 
principled case law on data retention based on article 7 and 8 of the EU Charter. 526 One 
can only hope that the CJEU will come up with a more nuanced position in the near future. 
 
Due to concerns of private censorship and the importance of freedom of speech, the 
blocking of information by service providers is perhaps the most controversial measure. 
First and foremost it should be stressed that in the EU, a general monitoring obligation 
cannot be imposed on ISPs. However, the neutrality of service providers ends as soon as 
they actually take note of illegal activities committed with use of their services, for instance 
through notification by a user, a victim or a law enforcement agency. To continue to benefit 
from the exemption of liability, the internet host provider has to act expeditiously to 
remove the information concerned or to disable access to it.527 Moreover, under the Data 
Protection Directive and the GDPR, data subjects can in certain circumstances request the 
rectification, erasure or blocking of data. This is certainly the case when false information 
concerning the victim’s identity circulates on the internet.  
 
However, some important questions remain. For example how can the ISP be sure that the 
individual that notifies ID fraud does not act in bad faith and/ or that the notified content 
is indeed compromised? One of the possibilities would be to create a hotline where 
complaints of ID-fraud can be made, together with specialized identification centers. This 
identification center can then assess (in cooperation with law enforcement and the 
authorities best placed to verify identities and identification instruments) the complaint 
                                                          
525 ECtHR 17 July 2008, no. 20511/03, I. v. Finland, paragraph 37. 
526Judgement of 21 december 2016, Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State 
for the Home Department v Tom Watson and Others, Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, 
EU:C:2016:970.  
527 Article, 14 (1) b and recital (46) e-Commerce Directive. 
and confirm the authentic ID of the complainant. Again the EKSISTENZ-project tools can 
prove to be of great value for such assessment centres, since identification through the 
tools may offer additional safeguards to establish the victim’s true identity. If ID fraud is 
established, the assessment center can send a notice and a take-down request to the 
service provider. Similar semi-private take down procedures are already set up to take 
down online child abuse and terrorist propaganda.  
 
All these duties for internet service providers are only effective to the extent they can be 
enforced. In an international context, individual Member States cannot act on the basis of 
unilateral measures. An effective enforcement of ISP cooperation requires an effective, 
flexible system of international cooperation. Both the Council of Europe and the European 
Union are currently looking for possibilities to ‘update’ transborder access to data.528 In 
the current object-orientated approach, the place where the data are stored determines 
the procedural competence in criminal law. We suggest to move to a subject-orientated 
approach. ‘The habitual residence of the subject regarding his virtual past’ should become 
the main criteria for localizing investigation measures and, hence, indicating which state 
has jurisdiction.529 Territorial competence should in addition be attributed to the state 
where the service provider is located and to the state where the subject’s data are stored 
respectively, but only if the data subject itself knowingly decided to store the data on the 
foreign territory. These new criteria would enhance legal certainty by giving the data 
subject the protection it can expect. Moreover, criminals could no longer abuse the existing 
system by storing their data in countries that are known to be difficult in providing 
international cooperation or by storing illegal content on servers located in countries 
where such content is not prohibited. Last but not least, international cooperation can be 
hindered by European Data Protection law. Under the Data Protection Directive as well as 
under the GDPR personal data can only be transferred from the EU to a third country if an 
adequate level of protection is ensured by that country.  
 
                                                          
528 CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE (T-CY), ‘Transborder access and jurisdiction: what are the options?’, 
Report of the Transborder Group adopted by the T-CY on 6 December 2012, www.coe.int/TCY; Council 
of the European Union, Council conclusions on improving criminal justice in cyberspace, 9 June 2016; 
Commission services, Cover note of 2 december 2016, ‘Non-paper: Progress Report following the 
Conclusions of the Council of the European Union on Improving Criminal Justice in Cyberspace’, no. 
15072/16. 
529 C. CONINGS, Locating criminal investigative measures in a virtual environment. Where do searches take 
place in cyberspace. B-CCENTRE Legal Research Report 2015, 43-72.  
In the borderless internet environment, criminals can easily escape responsibility or 
remain out of the reach of law enforcement by operating from countries with less or no 
regulation. A criminal offence has limited deterrent effect if there is no means to bring the 
perpetrator to justice. Not so much harmonisation of identity fraud criminalisation, but 
joint efforts at international and supranational level to implement and enforce specific 
procedural measures are the key to successfully tackling identity fraud and identity theft. 
Annex  
 
                                                          
530 Data Protection Authority 
Personal data breach notification duties 
 e-Privacy Directive 
(2002/58) + Regulation 
611/2013 
Framework Directive 
(2002/21) 
eIDAS Regulation 
(910/2014) 
e-Commerce Directive 
(2000/31) 
GDPR  
(2016/679) 
Scope Provider of publicly 
available electronic 
communications services 
Undertakings providing 
public communications 
networks or publicly 
available electronic 
communications services 
Trust service providers Information society 
services providers 
 Data controllers  
 
Notification to 
Supervisory 
authority/ 
DPA530 
Article 4 (3):  
All personal data breaches 
 24 hours after the 
detection of the 
personal data breach, 
where feasible 
(Article 2 Regulation) 
Article 13a (3): 
“A breach of security or 
loss of integrity that has 
had a significant impact on 
the operation of networks 
or services.” 
Article 19 (2): 
“(…) any breach of 
security or loss of integrity 
that has a significant 
impact on the trust service 
provided or on the 
personal data maintained 
therein.” 
 Without undue delay 
but in any event 
within 24 hours after 
having become aware 
of it 
Article 15: 
“Member States may 
establish obligations for 
information technology, 
widely recognised and used 
by industry, to society service 
providers promptly to inform 
the competent obtain data on 
the use of the information; 
and public authorities of 
alleged illegal activities 
undertaken or information 
provided by recipients of 
their service …” 
Article 33:  
Personal data breach is 
likely to result in a risk to 
the rights and freedoms of 
natural persons. 
 Within 72 hours (if 
not accompanied by 
reasons for the delay) 
  
 e-Privacy Directive 
(2002/58) + Regulation 
611/2013 
Framework Directive 
(2002/21) 
eIDAS Regulation 
(910/2014) 
e-Commerce Directive 
(2000/31) 
GDPR  
(2016/679) 
Notification to 
data subject  
Article 4(3): 
“When the personal data 
breach is likely to 
adversely affect the 
personal data or privacy of 
a subscriber or individual, 
…” 
 Without undue delay 
 Article 19(2): 
“Where the breach of 
security or loss of integrity 
is likely to adversely affect 
a natural or legal person to 
whom the trusted service 
has been provided, …” 
 Without undue delay  
 Article 34: 
“When the personal data 
breach is likely to result in 
a high risk to the rights and 
freedoms of natural 
persons,…” 
 Without undue delay  
Notification to 
the public  
 Article 13a (3): 
“The national regulatory 
authority concerned may 
inform the public or 
require the undertakings 
to do so, where it 
determines that 
disclosure of the breach is 
in the public interest.” 
Article 19 (2):  
“The notified supervisory 
body shall inform the 
public or require the trust 
service provider to do so, 
where it determines that 
disclosure of the breach of 
security or loss of integrity 
is in the public interest.” 
  
